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 Chapter 1: Introduction  
Congress passed No Child Left Behind (NCLB) nearly two decades ago, which expanded 
the federal government’s role in education and held schools accountable for student learning by 
directly tying federal funds to student test scores (Manna, 2011). Although NCLB’s metrics were 
relatively prescribed, the federal government has since given states increasingly more freedom to 
design the incentives of their school accountability policies. Legislators passed NCLB with the 
dual purposes of (a) raising achievement for all students and (b) closing the achievement gap 
(McGuinn, 2006). The policymakers’ equity intentions are illustrated by the name of the policy. 
These intentions, however, did not necessarily align with the metrics used to rate schools. How 
the state determined school ratings mattered because NCLB was the first federal accountability 
policy where schools faced consequences for failing to meet the annual measureable objectives 
set by the state (McGuinn, 2006). These sanctions escalated each subsequent year that a school 
missed accountability targets, ranging from allowing students to transfer schools to restructuring 
continuously-failing schools (which included the threat of state take-over and job loss) (Manna, 
2011). NCLB's consequences followed the theory of accountability, that the combination of 
measurement, transparency (school ratings were released publicly), and consequences would 
motivate schools to improve (Manna, 2011).  
 NCLB’s consequences, coupled with the metrics used to evaluate schools, created 
perverse incentives for schools to meet rising student achievement requirements. Student 
achievement was measured by the proficiency rate, or the percentage of students in a school who 
met proficiency on the state test. All-or-nothing proficiency labels do not account for student 
starting points because students either pass or do not, regardless of how much improvement they 
demonstrate over the previous year. Rating schools on this metric incentivizes them to focus on 
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students who are close to meeting proficiency (sometimes called "bubble" students) at the 
expense of low- and high-performers. Diverting resources away from students who are so low 
that they are unlikely to meet proficiency and away from those who are likely pass and towards 
students close to proficiency is a strategic behavior known as educational triage (Gillborn & 
Youdell, 1999). This unintended consequence of NCLB means that the students with the most 
need, those who score the lowest on the achievement tests, may be neglected by schools as they 
focus on bubble students.  
In response to growing criticism of NCLB and Congress’ failure to reauthorize the 
policy, the Department of Education in 2011 allowed states to apply for waivers from NCLB’s 
requirements by proposing an alternative accountability system (Polikoff, McEachin, Wrabel, & 
Duque, 2014). These waivers allowed states to adjust the indicators used to hold schools 
accountable for student learning. By March 2013, 48 states submitted requests for waivers 
(Polikoff et al., 2014). Although schools continued to be evaluated on proficiency rates, states 
implemented a variety of other incentive changes, and many states added growth metrics to their 
revised accountability systems (Riddle, 2012). A growth system of accountability would 
theoretically incentivize schools to focus more attention on lower-performing students because, 
even if these students cannot improve enough in a given year to get above the proficiency line, 
they can still make gains.  
Despite concerns that proficiency rates cause schools to neglect low-performing students, 
empirical evidence of educational triage is mixed. Qualitative and case studies clearly 
demonstrate that triage happens (e.g., Booher-Jennings, 2005; Diamond & Spillane, 2004), yet 
quantitative researchers using large administrative datasets have found mixed evidence regarding 
this practice (e.g., Ballou & Springer, 2016; Krieg, 2008; Ladd & Lauen, 2010; Reback, 2008; 
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Springer, 2008b). These mixed findings may result from limitations of administrative datasets 
that often lack (a) clear indicators of which students schools would consider “on the bubble” of 
proficiency and (b) measures of resource allocation within the school.  
Some of these limitations are addressed in this project by using a unique dataset from a 
large urban district. Between 2009-10 and 2013-14, Greenfield County Public Schools (GCPS, a 
pseudonym) implemented a benchmark test policy. Like many other large urban districts (Burch, 
2010), GCPS adopted the benchmark policy in response to the high-stakes testing of NCLB. This 
initiative included (a) assessing third through eighth grade students three times per year in math 
and reading, (b) projecting student end-of-year performance on the state test, and (c) sharing that 
information with schools. The district provided data coaches to support administrators and 
teachers in using this benchmark data to inform instructional decisions. During these five years, 
the state changed from NCLB to a waiver accountability system. The waiver introduced a suite 
of changes to the accountability system, which included adding growth measures to the school 
accountability and educator evaluation systems. This created a natural experiment that allows for 
exploring whether the change in policy incentives influenced how schools used the benchmark 
data shared by the district.  
Most quantitative research investigating educational triage relies on assumptions 
regarding which students would be considered bubble by their schools. If schools in GCPS were 
going to triage, they might utilize the district-supplied benchmark information. GCPS’ dataset 
offers the opportunity to test the hypothesis that schools use the benchmark data but not 
necessarily as intended. A feature of the benchmark information shared with schools is that 
students were labeled Advanced, Proficient, Basic, or Below Basic on each benchmark, a 
projection which was based on the number of questions they answered correctly. Although these 
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test-score labels provide no information beyond students’ underlying scores, schools may have 
used them as shortcuts to determine which students should receive additional support (i.e., to 
identify the bubble students). In addition to sharing these performance labels, during the first 
year of the waiver accountability system, the district combined multiple metrics to assign 
students even more prescriptive labels—Multi-Year Plan, Priority, or Enrichment—and 
encouraged schools to target the Priority students in the two months before the state test. The 
GCPS benchmark data is utilized to specifically investigate whether low-performing students 
were harmed during NCLB and, if so, whether the policy changes caused schools to treat lower-
performing students more equitably. This project examines how the effect of the test-score labels 
on student outcomes changes under shifting accountability incentives.  
In addition to labeling students based on their benchmark scores, in 2012-13, the district 
gave 29 schools additional funds to target their Priority students in advance of the state test. 
These school leaders turned in proposals detailing (a) which students were targeted with 
interventions and (b) what resources they would provide to those students. These documents 
describe how schools would restructure their school days to offer targeted interventions. The 
school proposals are qualitatively analyzed to investigate how school leaders proposed to spend 
those funds. These documents provide information on school-level resource allocation that is not 
generally available in administrative datasets.  
This dissertation uses mixed methods to explore the effects of accountability policy 
changes on student outcomes. It takes a systems view that the state accountability system created 
a set of incentives, which led the district to take a series of actions (e.g., implementing the 
benchmark policy, providing funding for schools to focus on certain students), which influenced 
how principals and teachers viewed and treated students. This project investigates what happens 
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at the intersection of state and district policy and explores broad questions regarding the effects 
of policy incentives on students. Did schools engage in triage during NCLB? If so, when during 
the school year did that begin? Do changes in policy incentives change how schools behave? 
Which students gain or lose from which policy incentives? Are the equity goals of federal 
accountability policy realized? These policy- and research-relevant questions are examined using 
local benchmark assessment information which offers the most up-to-date information schools 
had on student learning at different points in the school year. The benchmark data offers insight 
into how schools use this information, which is useful for district leaders who want to help 
schools use data for instructional purposes. The proposals provide a unique view inside the black 
box to explore what strategic behavior looks like. Which students were targeted? What resources 
were used, and how were interventions structured? The proposals completed by school leaders 
offer resource allocation information that does not rely on patterns of test score gains, which is 
beneficial for broadening the discussions of policymakers, district leaders, and researchers. 
The rest of this dissertation is arranged as follows. This chapter provides the (a) 
theoretical and empirical background of educational triage and the effect of performance labels 
on student outcomes, (b) the state accountability context describing the shifting incentives 
between 2009-10 and 2013-14, and (c) the GCPS district context describing the benchmark 
policy. Chapter 2 is a quantitative investigation of the effect of the Below Basic, Basic, 
Proficient, and Advanced labels over the five years of the benchmark policy. It explores the 
hypotheses that schools used these test-score labels to triage during NCLB and that this behavior 
changed after the waiver. Chapter 3 examines alternative explanations for the previous chapter’s 
findings that low-performers gained during the waiver. These alternatives include (a) the 
adoption of a new educator evaluation system in 2011-12, (b) the more prescriptive district-
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supplied labels of Multi-Year Plan, Priority, and Enrichment, and (c) the additional funding 
provided for the select group of schools in 2012-13. Chapter 4 uses qualitative methods to 
analyze the 29 school documents that detail schools’ proposed academic interventions. This 
chapter investigates which students receive what resources in the schools that were provided 
additional funding to target Priority students. The dissertation concludes with Chapter 5, which 
discusses the results from the analyses; the implications for policymakers, district and school 
leaders, and researchers; and next steps for further research. 
Theoretical and Empirical Background 
Theoretical Background: Educational Triage 
One main difference between NCLB and prior federal education policies was the threat 
of increasingly consequential sanctions for schools that did not meet yearly benchmarks 
(McGuinn, 2006). Faced with high-stakes exams in math and reading, schools responded to 
NCLB’s incentives in a variety of unintended ways. For example, schools engaged in a variety of 
strategies to “teach to the test” (Cuban, 2013). These strategies included (a) teaching only the 
grade-level content that was assessed on the state test  (McMurrer, 2007; Perlstein, 2010), (b) 
using released items from state tests (Reback, Rockoff, & Schwartz, 2011; Ryan, 2010; 
Srikantaiah, 2009), and (c) shifting time during the school day towards the tested subjects and 
away from non-tested subjects, such as science, social studies, and electives (Darling-Hammond, 
2007; Dee, Jacob, & Schwartz, 2012; McMurrer, 2007; Murnane & Papay, 2010; Reback et al., 
2011). In addition, in the early years of NCLB, the test scores of certain special education 
students did not count towards their school’s rating. Schools responded to the incentives of this 
rule by increasing the number of students identified as special education after the policy was 
enacted (Cullen & Reback, 2006; Figlio & Getzler, 2006; Jacob, 2005). There is also evidence 
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that schools selectively disciplined low-performing students more harshly around testing time to 
prevent them from being part of the testing pool and the resulting school rating (Figlio, 2006). 
These behaviors suggest that schools were aware of how they were held accountable and 
responded to the incentives created by those metrics. Campbell (1979) would have predicted this 
response under a high-stakes testing regime such as NCLB, as he posited that "the more any 
quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to 
corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is 
intended to monitor" (p. 85). 
Because NCLB attached sanctions to student proficiency levels and gave no credit for 
student growth, schools under accountability pressure may have responded by engaging in triage. 
In educational triage, schools classify students into three groups based on their perceived 
probability of meeting proficiency: (a) students who are unlikely to meet the proficiency 
standard that year are considered too low to help (called “lost causes” by a Texas elementary 
teacher [Booher-Jennings, 2005, p. 41]), (b) students who are predicted to pass without 
additional resources are considered “safe” cases, and (c) students who are close to passing are 
considered “suitable” cases who might meet proficiency with some additional support (i.e., the 
bubble students). After dividing students into three groups, schools then divert resources away 
from low- and high-performers and towards the suitable cases (Gillborn & Youdell, 1999).  
In summary, educational triage involves (a) sorting and labeling students and (b) 
allocating resources to certain students at the expense of others. These actions are considered 
gaming behaviors because schools decide which students should receive additional support based 
on who would most improve overall school performance metrics rather than based on the 
individual needs of the students.  
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Empirical Background  
Educational triage. Qualitative research provides accounts of how educational triage 
plays out in schools. Drawing on observations, interviews, and documents, Booher-Jennings 
(2005) reports that teachers in a Texas elementary school, at the directive of the principal and 
district, used benchmark test data to classify students into three groups and then diverted 
resources to the bubble students. Similarly, Horn (2016) uses video-recordings of middle school 
math teacher meetings to investigate how benchmark data inform teacher lesson planning. In one 
school, teachers identified which students they would be able to "get over the [proficiency] 
hump" by using the benchmark scores and test-score labels (Horn, 2016, p. 15). In both cases, 
teachers used benchmark data to identify the students close to proficiency and then provided 
interventions only for those students. The resources that were offered to the bubble students—but 
not provided for lower-achieving students—included extra attention during class, preferential 
seating, pull-out interventions during the school day, after-school and Saturday tutoring, and 
additional test preparation activities (Booher-Jennings, 2005; Diamond & Spillane, 2004; Horn, 
2016; Horn, Kane, & Wilson, 2015). These studies show that some schools used benchmark data 
to sort students and then focused resources inequitably on bubble students.  
These reports indicate that schools engaged in triage, and additional research suggests 
that the practice may occur somewhat frequently. A large majority of principals, along with 
nearly 25% of elementary and middle school teachers surveyed in three states, report that they 
focused more on students close to proficiency in response to high-stakes testing (Hamilton, 
Berends, & Stecher, 2005). In addition, more than half of the teachers surveyed agreed that high-
performing students were not appropriately challenged (Hamilton, et al., 2005). Worth noting 
about these findings is that it is not only teachers who engage in these activities, but also school 
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leaders who encourage and support these practices (e.g., Brown & Clift, 2010). For instance, a 
study of Philadelphia Public Schools’ benchmark system indicates that district leaders expected 
low-performing schools to use test data to “identify, support, and monitor students who were 
close to proficiency” (Bulkley, Christman, Goertz, & Lawrence, 2010, p. 196). In all of these 
cases, these schools used data provided through district benchmark assessments to engage in 
educational triage.  
These studies clearly demonstrate that some schools behave inequitably when they are 
held accountable for the percent of students who meet the proficiency threshold. Do these small-
scale and case studies represent relatively isolated events, or are they indicative of more wide-
spread responses to accountability pressure? Quantitative researchers have used large datasets to 
examine this question.  
A challenge of using administrative data to investigate triage is identifying the bubble 
students: which students would schools consider “on the bubble” of proficiency? Previous 
studies generally categorize bubble students based on either their previous year’s state test score 
(e.g., Ladd & Lauen, 2010) or a low-stakes exam that does not influence school ratings (e.g., 
Krieg, 2008). One strategy prior researchers employ to identify these students is to divide the test 
score distribution into quantiles, with students in the middle quantiles considered bubble students 
(e.g., Dee & Jacob, 2011; Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010). Another common strategy classifies 
students based on their distance from proficiency. For instance, Lauen and colleagues classify 
students as “bubble” if they score one-half of a standard deviation above or below the 
proficiency line (e.g., Ladd & Lauen, 2010; Lauen & Gaddis, 2012). Researchers do not know 
who the bubble students are, and in all of these studies, the researchers made arbitrary decisions 
which may be inaccurate.   
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The problem facing researchers, however, is the same problem facing schools. If a 
principal or teacher wanted to know which students might meet proficiency with some additional 
resources, how would they decide which students to select? Who are the bubble students? The 
qualitative case studies just described indicate that educators use results from local benchmark 
assessments to identify these students, information that is not typically included in administrative 
datasets. The local assessment information employed by this study represents a contribution to 
the triage literature because the benchmarks provide schools with the most up-to-date indicators 
of student mastery of the current grade-level standards, which is what the state test will cover. 
Because of this, schools may have used the benchmark labels to identify their bubble students. 
Furthermore, schools received this information three times per year, which allows for exploring 
whether the benchmark data had different effects over the course of the school year (something 
that is unique to this study). The quantitative analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the degree 
to which these labels impact student outcomes and whether the effects are consistent with 
educational triage.  
Because administrative datasets generally lack measures of resource allocation, 
researchers rely on patterns of test score increases as proxies for strategic behavior (Springer, 
2008b). As previously noted, researchers generally use one of two strategies to identify bubble 
students in the administrative data. After students are classified, researchers generally compare 
test score gains between these groups to see whether those in the middle gain more than those at 
the ends before and after high-stakes accountability systems like NCLB were implemented. The 
body of work investigating triage has found mixed results. Some research finds that under high-
stakes accountability systems, bubble students make larger-than-expected gains while low- and 
high-performing students make smaller-than-expected gains (Jennings & Sohn, 2014; Krieg, 
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2008; Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010) which supports the educational triage theory. Jennings and 
Sohn (2014) and Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) both use data from large urban districts 
(Houston and Chicago, respectively) to estimate gains between low- and high-stakes tests for 
students across deciles of the test score distribution before and after NCLB was introduced. 
These studies estimate that the lowest-performing students perform about 0.04 to 0.11 standard 
deviations worse after NCLB was introduced. Krieg (2008) uses Washington state data to 
estimate that students close to proficiency perform about 0.02 to 0.05 standard deviations higher 
if their school failed AYP. Other studies find that test score increases for bubble students are 
accompanied by similarly-sized gains for low-performing students (Ladd & Lauen, 2010; 
Springer, 2008b) and no negative effect for the highest-performing students (Ballou & Springer, 
2016; Reback, 2008), suggesting that NCLB had its intended effect of supporting the academic 
achievement of all students. 
I offer a model in Figure 1 that represents the implicit logic in quantitative work using 
patterns of test score gains as evidence of triage by schools. The underlying rationale in this 
work is that schools will identify students who have the largest impact on their school rating (in 
this case, bubble students) and then allocate resources to those students. If these additional 
resources are effective, then students who receive them would have larger test score gains than 
students who do not receive these resources. The middle two steps in Figure 1 (where resources 
are allocated and those resources are effective) are in a black box to highlight the fact that 
quantitative analyses using test scores as proxies suffer from the “black box” problem. 
An open question is why previous quantitative research has often failed to detect a focus 
on bubble students. The logic model in Figure 1 points to some possible reasons. First, 
researchers and schools may not agree on who the bubble students are. As already noted, case 
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studies that detail triage indicate that schools use benchmarks to identify their bubble students 
(Booher-Jennings, 2005; Horn et al., 2015). Because most administrative datasets lack this level 
of information, researchers may misidentify the bubble students. If this were the case, prior 
researchers are finding null results because they are not looking at the students who actually 
received special treatment. A second reason for null results is that schools may not be targeting 
the bubble students. If schools were behaving more equitably by supporting students across the 
test score distribution, then there would be no differential outcomes for low-, high-, and middle-
performers. A third explanation is that schools are engaging in triage but are not very good at it. 
This would mean that bubble students were targeted but that the special treatment did not 
improve test scores. If schools are allocating resources in ways that are not effective in raising 
test scores, this would be concerning from an efficiency standpoint. It would also be concerning 
from a research perspective because if this strategic behavior is not detectable in student 
outcomes, then test scores are not good proxies for resource allocation. While the quantitative 
analyses in this dissertation similarly suffer from this issue, the qualitative work reported in 
Chapter 4 removes the need for proxies by analyzing school documents. These documents show 
how school leaders proposed to use additional funds, including what resources were provided to 
which students. This information helps illuminate the black box in Figure 1 regarding how 
schools used the benchmark data, which has implications for policymakers, district leaders, and 
researchers. 
Labeling students. Labeling students is not problematic if the labels are used to provide 
students with instruction at their needed level (i.e., students who have already mastered the 
grade-level standards are offered challenging content, while those have did not receive 
remediation in their areas of need). The labels are problematic, however, if they facilitate triage. 
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For instance, Horn (2016) reported on a school that used benchmark labels to divide students into 
triage groups. The seventh-grade teachers discussed in detail the all-day math camp that they 
were planning for their bubble students. One teacher spoke about "the kids that are gonna be left 
behind…are the really, really struggling children and then your kids that don't need camp" 
(Horn, 2016, p. 17). This teacher is describing students from the “too low” and “safe” triage 
groups, respectively. These teachers identified the students who were excluded from this 
intervention based on the district-supplied test-score labels. The math teachers taught bubble 
students at the all-day math camp (meaning these students received small group instruction from 
their math teachers), while the students who were left behind were taught by substitute teachers. 
This illustrates triage, where resources were diverted away from low- and high-performers and 
towards bubble students. While high-performing students would not need the grade-level 
remediation offered to the bubble students, the lowest-performing students certainly require 
additional support. The exclusion of the low-achievers from the learning opportunities provided 
to the bubble students highlights the inequities of triage.  
Papay, Murnane, & Willett (2011) examine the effects of test-score labels on college 
enrollment using Massachusetts data. Massachusetts divides the state test score distribution into 
four regions, similar to the state used in this analysis. Using a regression discontinuity design, 
Papay and colleagues (2011) compare the college enrollment rates of students who fell on 
opposite sides of a performance category on their eighth-grade state test. The results indicate that 
the eighth-grade label mattered even though it provided no additional information beyond the 
test score. The researchers offer as one possible explanation that teachers may base "decisions 
and behaviors on the performance label and not the underlying test score" (Papay et al., 2011, p. 
28). This hypothesis is investigated in Chapters 2 and 3. The authors found that the labeling 
14 
 
effects were strongest for students who received the highest and lowest labels of the four groups 
with no difference in outcomes for students in the two groups around the proficiency line. They 
posit that the differences between these groups around the proficiency line would be minimized 
if schools focused on bubble students (Papay et al., 2011).  
These studies suggest that teachers may use test-score labels as short-cut summaries of 
student ability when they decide which students should get additional support. Under a high-
stakes accountability system where schools feel pressure to meet required proficiency rates, these 
benchmark labels may enable triage by identifying which students are closest to passing. An 
open question is the extent to which the accountability pressures changed with the adoption of 
the waiver accountability system and whether the incentive changes mitigated strategic behaviors 
that may have resulted from NCLB. 
State Accountability Context 
NCLB’s incentives were relatively clear for schools: get a certain percentage of students 
to meet proficiency (called Adequate Yearly Progress [AYP]) or face consequences. These 
consequences ranged from allowing students intra-district transfer to successful schools (called 
NCLB school choice) to restructuring the school and possibly firing all of the staff (Manna, 
2011). Implemented beginning in 2003-04, NCLB required that the percentage of students 
meeting proficiency increase each year until 2013-14, when 100% of students had to meet 
proficiency. NCLB was primarily directed at schools: the school received the AYP rating and 
any consequences stemming from failing to meet AYP. Students who did not meet proficiency 
generally faced no consequences (although there were some states that did not allow students in 
certain grades to be promoted to the next grade until they met proficiency) (Manna, 2011). 
Proficiency rates did not directly impact teachers or principals until the sixth consecutive year of 
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failing to meet AYP, when the state could take over these continuously low-performing schools, 
and teachers and administrators could lose their jobs.  
In 2011, because Congress failed to reauthorize NCLB, President Obama offered states 
the opportunity to apply for waivers from some of NCLB’s requirements. To receive a waiver, 
states submitted proposals that detailed their new accountability systems. Throughout their 
waiver application, this state’s policymakers laid out their beliefs and intentions for the 
accountability system in light of lessons learned from NCLB. For instance, because more than 
half of the state’s schools failed to meet AYP in 2011-12, NCLB’s 100% proficiency 
requirement by 2013-14 was described as “unrealistic and de-motivating” (Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act [ESEA] Flexibility Request , 2012, p. 34).  
The waiver, which was implemented in this state beginning in the 2012-13 school year, 
introduced a suite of policy changes for districts, schools, administrators, and teachers. The 
waiver proposal describes an accountability system with clear equity intentions and a focus on 
growth: “we premise our goals on growth against the current baseline…we do believe that all 
students, classes, schools and LEAs [local education agencies] have equal capacity to improve 
against their current baseline” (ESEA Flexibility Request, 2012, p. 34). Policymakers wanted to 
see growth against current performance across the education system. The same section of the 
document explained that “[t]his focus on growth against our current performance level meets 
each child, teacher, principal and LEA superintendent in the right place and creates 
accountability that is fair but ambitious” (ESEA Flexibility Request, 2012, p. 34). The state 
intended to create a fair accountability system with a “focus on growing every student, every 
year” (ESEA Flexibility Request, 2012, p. 43). With that focus, districts and schools were 
responsible for two primary goals: (a) growth for all students, every year, and (b) closing 
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achievement gaps. The state had a two-pronged approach for meeting those accountability goals. 
The first was through the district and school accountability system, and the second was through 
the teacher and principal evaluation framework. Did the waiver’s incentives match these 
intentions? 
District and School Accountability System 
Under the waiver, the state no longer directly held schools accountable. This is because 
policymakers did not believe that “direct state intervention in schools generally is an effective 
strategy for driving improvement” (ESEA Flexibility Request, 2012, p. 34). Instead, the state 
held LEAs accountable, and LEAs held schools accountable, for student achievement. The 
exception was in the state’s lowest-performing 5% of schools, which remained under state 
oversight. The vast majority of schools did not face prescribed consequences for failing to meet 
AYP because (a) there were no longer set AYP requirements and (b) the LEA was responsible 
for intervening in schools that the LEA (not the state) identified as needing support. 
During the waiver, the state evaluated districts and low-performing schools on two 
different measures—overall achievement and gap closure. Both overall achievement and gap 
closure were primarily measured by proficiency rates. Like NCLB, the overall achievement 
measure was simply based on the percentage of students scoring proficient. A difference from 
NCLB is that the required proficiency rate was no longer the same for districts and schools 
across the state. The required proficiency rates were calculated from the LEA’s current baseline, 
and the state called for “each LEA to have targets of advancing proficiency levels at a steady and 
ambitious rate over the next four years, and for our LEAs to ask all schools to do the same” 
(ESEA Flexibility Request, 2012, p. 34). Gap closure was measured by reducing the difference 
in proficiency rates between students from historically underperforming subgroups (i.e., students 
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in racial/ethnic sub-groups that perform below the state average, economically disadvantaged 
students, students with disabilities and English Learners). Although students from these 
subgroups must “grow proficiency levels faster than other students” (ESEA Flexibility Request, 
2012, p. 34), this performance indicator measures growth in proficiency rates rather than year-to-
year growth for individual students. Despite the policymakers’ intentions to maintain a focus on 
“growth for all students, every year,” the proficiency metrics assessing that goal continued to 
incentivize schools to focus on bubble students. 
The waiver changed the students for which districts and schools were held accountable. 
Under NCLB, school ratings were calculated based on the aggregate proficiency rates for all 
students in the school from third to eighth grade. Under the waiver, the state rated schools based 
on students (a) in third grade math and reading, (b) in seventh grade math and reading, and (c) in 
aggregate grades three to eight in math and reading. Students in third and seventh grade were 
included both in the separate grade measures and in the aggregate, meaning they counted twice 
for school ratings. The waiver, then, created an incentive to focus on third and seventh grade 
students.  
Educator Evaluation System 
Through their waiver, the state continued to implement a state-wide student outcomes-
based educator evaluation system that was first introduced in 2011-12. The waiver indicates that 
the “teacher and principal evaluation framework uses student growth through value-added 
scores, ensuring that across the state, we maintain a focus on advancing each child against the 
current baseline results” (ESEA Flexibility Request, 2012, p. 34). Teachers of tested subjects 
(i.e., math and reading), had 35% of their final effectiveness rating based on their students’ 
value-added scores. For principals, 35% of their evaluation is based on school-wide growth 
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data1. This is in contrast with the previous educator evaluation system, which relied on 
observations to rate principals and teachers but which did not take into account student 
achievement. The addition of growth metrics to the evaluation system may reduce the incentive 
for educators to focus on bubble students. Because the new educator evaluation system was 
introduced in 2011-12, prior to the adoption of the waiver, Chapter 3 explores the possibility that 
schools changed behavior because the incentives in the evaluation system shifted rather than the 
incentives of the waiver accountability system as a whole. 
To summarize, NCLB rated schools primarily on proficiency rates without accounting for 
student or school baseline performance. NCLB’s sanctions were intended to induce schools to 
improve. The combination of these factors may have resulted in unintended behaviors such as 
educational triage. The removal of the sanctions under the waiver may have lessened the 
pressure to triage. Although the waiver system continued to hold districts and schools 
accountable mainly for proficiency rates, the teacher and principal evaluation systems included a 
value-added growth component. These two metrics created competing incentives for educators. 
Because the GCPS benchmark data span these shifting accountability systems, Chapters 2 and 3 
explore whether these policy changes induced schools to change their behavior towards low-
performing students.  
District Context: Greenfield County Public Schools 
After a new state test in 2008 indicated that a large proportion of their students scored 
below proficiency, GCPS implemented a benchmark assessment policy to inform schools about 
student performance throughout the school year. For the 2008-09 school year, the district 
                                                          
1 Both teachers and principals had 15% of their evaluation scores based on overall student achievement (i.e., 
proficiency rates). 
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adopted the Discovery Education Assessment (DEA) benchmark tests, which were “designed to 
predict student performance on the next high-stakes test the student will experience” (Discovery 
Education Assessment Research, n.d., p. 3). These predictions came in the form of test-score 
labels assigned to students based on their benchmark scores (either Advanced, Proficient, Basic, 
or Below Basic) which represent the category in which students were projected to score on the 
end-of-year state test later in the spring. Students in third through eighth grade took the DEA 
benchmarks three times per year in math and reading (in September, November, and February). 
After each benchmark, the number of questions each student answered correctly and their 
corresponding performance labels were shared with schools (i.e., school leaders and teachers) 
through the district’s digital data warehouse. In addition to sharing this information, GCPS 
helped schools access, understand, and utilize the data to support student learning, a strategy 
which included hiring data coaches to work with schools. This large investment in their 
benchmark policy makes GCPS similar to other urban districts. A survey found that 82% of the 
largest urban districts in the country invested in interim assessment technology (Burch, 2010). In 
addition, the coaching supports and technology provided by GCPS are similar to those described 
by other district leaders who implemented benchmark systems (Davidson & Frohbieter, 2011).  
The GCPS research team recognized the pressure schools felt under the state 
accountability system and acknowledged that schools under accountability pressure focused on 
bubble students before the state test. Although data on student performance was shared with 
schools throughout the school year, district leaders were concerned that schools might focus 
exclusively on bubble students. They shared GCPS data with school leaders showing that 
students could make tremendous growth over the course of a year and encouraged schools not to 
target bubble students too early. GCPS supplied the benchmark scores and labels from 2009-10 
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through 2013-14. Chapter 2 represents a contribution to the literature regarding educational 
triage because it explores the extent to which the benchmark data may have been used differently 
by schools throughout the school year, information that has not been utilized in prior research. 
In February of 2013 (the year the state implemented the waiver accountability system), 
GCPS provided schools even more prescriptive test-score labels. In this year, the state 
electronically shared projections for each student based on their previous test history. The GCPS 
research team combined these state projections with current benchmark performance to identify 
“priority” students. Priority students were identified through a document shared with school 
leaders entitled Identification of Target Students. This document, recreated in Figure 2, classified 
students into four groups based on their probability of passing the state test: Multi-Year Plan 
(MYP), Priority 1, Priority 2, and Enrichment. The Priority students were described in this 
document as students who might meet proficiency with additional support. The Enrichment 
students were described as having "very high success" on state tests, and the MYP students were 
described as having "very low success." The labels, descriptions, and color-coding (red for MYP 
and green for Enrichment) found in this document are aligned with the triage hypothesis, with 
Priority students representing the district-identified bubble students who are closest to meeting 
proficiency, the MYP students are those who are too low to reach proficiency this year, and the 
Enrichment students are the safe cases.  
Although they cautioned schools that a focus on Priority students was a short-term 
solution to increase proficiency rates, district leaders encouraged schools to target these students 
as they prepared for state tests. This information is aligned with the case studies that show local 
assessments (and not prior year test scores) are used to determine who the bubble students are 
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(Booher-Jennings, 2005; Horn, 2016). Chapter 3 examines the effect of these more prescriptive 
labels on student outcomes.  
Around the same time that they shared the Priority label with schools in 2012-13, the 
district selected 29 low-performing schools to receive additional funding for remediation before 
the state test. Each of the 29 school leaders completed a Targeted Academic Intervention 
Proposal (TAIP) which described their plans for restructuring the school day to provide targeted 
interventions. The district encouraged schools to target Priority students with the TAIP 
interventions, although schools were given leeway in spending the funds. These proposals from a 
large number of schools are analyzed in Chapter 4 and offer a view into the different strategies 
designed by school leaders to increase student test scores. Because this TAIP funding was 
offered to low-performing schools during the waiver, the TAIP documents provide insight into 
how schools behaved after the accountability incentives changed. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Logic model of how targeting resources to marginal students would lead to increased 
test scores  
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Figure 2. District training document: Identification of Target Students 
Identification of Target Students     
 Run the Virtual Data Wall Report  in the Assessment folder of the data warehouse 
 Prioritize Target students utilizing the summary table at the top of the report (State Projections vs most recent benchmark 
results) and the recommendations below: 
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* Upper Basic and Lower Proficient range defined as within a few (3-4) items of number correct cut score for Proficient level. 
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Chapter 2: Did the Adoption of the Waiver Accountability System Mitigate Triage 
Behavior? 
The overarching purpose of this chapter is to explore the extent to which benchmark test-
score labels assigned to students affect student outcomes. This analysis examines the differential 
effects of the performance labels yielded by the three yearly benchmarks while taking account of 
incentive changes associated with the adoption of the waiver. Using a combination of regression 
discontinuity and difference-in-differences strategies, the labeling effects are calculated for 
students whose benchmark scores place them close to the thresholds separating the labels of 
Below Basic, Basic, Proficient, and Advanced. This chapter investigates whether schools used 
the district-supplied labels to triage—with the hypothesis that students close to proficiency will 
show more improvement than low- or high-performers during NCLB—along with the possibility 
that school behavior changed after the adoption of the waiver. 
As described in the Introduction, much prior research on educational triage typically 
utilizes students’ prior year test scores to determine which students schools would consider “on 
the bubble” of proficiency (e.g., Ladd & Lauen, 2010; Reback, 2008). There are several reasons 
why schools would likely employ benchmark scores rather than prior year test scores to do this. 
Benchmark scores represent the most current snapshot of student performance and are updated 
three times per year. The benchmarks assess each student’s readiness for meeting the current 
year’s grade level standards and are used to project how students will perform on the state test. 
Prior year test scores indicate student mastery of the previous year’s tested standards but would 
not necessarily offer information regarding student understanding of current standards. 
Benchmark scores would also reflect any summer learning loss. Furthermore, case studies of 
educational triage indicate that schools engage in triage using benchmark results, not prior year 
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test scores (e.g., Horn, 2016). This analysis benefits from the rich amount of district-level testing 
data shared with schools at different points in the school year and allows for making causal 
inferences about the effects of the label, something prior triage work has not been able to do. 
Prior triage studies have not investigated differences between elementary and middle 
schools. There are reasons to believe schools might respond differently to the student testing 
information, and it is worth exploring whether schools vary in how they use benchmark data. For 
instance, the structure of the school day often has elementary teachers provide instruction for all 
core subjects whereas middle school teachers generally offer instruction in only one content area. 
Because elementary teachers spend much of the day with their students (rather than the single 
period that most middle school teachers have with students), it may be more difficult for 
elementary teachers to engage in triage and write off a group of students whom they know well 
as “too low” to receive support. Middle schools, on the other hand, may be better able to shift 
students to alternate classes to provide additional remediation for bubble students because 
students are used to changing classes and teachers. Additionally, middle schools generally have 
larger and more diverse student populations than elementary schools, which could influence the 
accountability pressure schools felt (Balfanz, Legters, West, & Weber, 2007). 
The specific research questions explored in this chapter are:  
 To what extent do the benchmark performance labels assigned to students in September, 
November, and February affect end-of-year test scores during NCLB? 
 To what degree did these relationships change after the state implemented a waiver 
accountability system? 
 Do these relationships differ for elementary and middle schools? 
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Data and Methods 
Sample 
This analysis uses student-level math and reading test scores from the 2009-10 through 
2013-14 school years for students in Greenfield County Public Schools (GCPS). The 
benchmarks were administered to elementary and middle school students in third to eighth grade 
three times per year. There are about 30,000 students in these grades each year from 2009-10 to 
2013-14, meaning the entire GCPS sample includes about 155,000 total observations. As 
described in the Methods section, each analysis limits the sample of students to those who are 
close to the cut-score for each test-score label. 
Data 
Dependent variables. The outcome of interest is each individual student’s end-of-year 
state test score in math and reading. The test scores were standardized at the year-grade-subject 
level, meaning they represent the number of standard deviations above or below the mean of all 
other students in the state who were in the same grade and took the same subject-area test that 
year.  
Independent variables. The three Discovery Education Assessment (DEA) benchmark 
assessments represent three different independent variables. In each school year, Benchmark A 
was administered in September, Benchmark B was administered in November, and Benchmark C 
was administered in February. Each benchmark score represents the number of questions 
answered correctly on that exam, ranging from 0 to 33 for math and from 0 to 40 for reading. 
The test-score labels for these assessments comprise the main variables of interest (i.e., 
“treatment”). On each of these assessments, students were labeled as either Advanced, Proficient, 
Basic, or Below Basic based on the number of questions they answered correctly. The threshold 
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for each performance label varied across each of the three benchmarks, two subjects, and even 
by grade level and year2. In each analysis, as detailed in the next section, each student’s 
benchmark raw score was centered on the specific cut-score for their grade/subject/year for the 
threshold being analyzed to take into account this variation across tests. 
Control variables. The data shared by GCPS contain background information about 
students. The student-level variables, employed to increase the precision of estimates, include 
race/ethnicity, prior year state test score, free and reduced-price lunch (FRPL) status, disability 
status, and whether the student was an English language learner (ELL). 
School-level variables were also included to control for time-varying factors that may 
influence student outcomes. These include the log enrollment of the school and the percentage of 
students who are Black, Hispanic, White, of another race, and eligible for FRPL (gathered from 
the Common Core of Data for each school year). The percentage of students in each school who 
have a disability or are an ELL was calculated based on the GCPS data. Each school’s prior year 
proficiency rate in math and reading came from the state’s accountability website. 
Accountability eras. A binary indicator Waiver represents which school accountability 
system was in place during each school year. A value of zero represents NCLB (2009-10 through 
2011-12), and a value of one represents the waiver (2012-13 through 2013-14). 
Methods 
Because benchmark performance labels are determined by students’ benchmark scores in 
relation to specific cut-scores on a continuous measure, regression discontinuity (RD) is a strong 
                                                          
2 The cut-scores were not consistent over time because the DEA determined the cut-scores after each benchmark 
based on student performance. 
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method for assessing the causal effect of the label (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; Shadish, Cook, & 
Campbell, 2002). This analysis represents a sharp RD design because all students who score 
above the cut-points are assigned the same performance label (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). The 
RD analyses compare outcomes for students whose benchmark scores place them close to the 
threshold separating two different performance labels.  
The hypothesis being tested is that schools used certain labels as shortcuts to determine 
which students should receive special treatment by engaging in triage. Under this hypothesis, 
students labeled Basic are likely viewed as bubble students because that is the label assigned to 
students who are not projected to meet proficiency, with the Below Basic label representing 
students who are too low to meet proficiency and the Advanced label representing students who 
are unlikely to drop below proficiency (i.e., the “safe” cases). For there to be a label effect, 
schools would need to treat students differently whose test scores were almost identical. It is 
worth noting that schools could have practiced triage using other information to identify the 
bubble students, a conjecture that is explored in the next chapter. Conversations with district 
personnel indicate that many schools did, in fact, use these labels to determine which students to 
target with additional resources. Additional information supporting the assumption that schools 
use these performance labels will also be forthcoming in Chapter 4.  
The magnitude and statistical significance of differences in outcomes are estimated for 
students close to each test-score label threshold on each of the three benchmarks using local 
linear regression. This estimates the local average treatment effect for students with test scores 
close to the threshold for each performance label (Imbens & Kalyanaraman, 2009). To estimate 
the discontinuities in outcomes, first, the sample is limited only to students for the particular 
benchmark whose scores place them in the two performance labels on either side of a threshold 
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(i.e., separately for students who were labeled as (a) Below Basic or Basic, (b) Basic or 
Proficient, and (c) Proficient or Advanced)3. Second, the number of questions each student 
answered correctly is centered on the cut-score that determines whether the student received the 
higher of the two labels (i.e., Basic, Proficient, or Advanced, respectively). The “treatment” in 
each model is a binary variable indicating whether the student received the higher of the two 
labels. Third, ordinary least squares regression is used to calculate the discontinuity at the 
threshold for each performance level, which allows for flexibility in including covariates and 
various fixed effects.  
Because this analysis explores whether there is a difference in the effect of the 
performance labels across accountability eras, difference-in-differences (DID) within this RD 
framework is used to compare the difference in the discontinuity between the NCLB and waiver 
accountability regimes. This is done by including an interaction term between the treatment 
indicator and a binary variable indicating whether the state was under the waiver accountability 
system in a given school year. For each benchmark and threshold, I use the least squares form 
shown below in Equation 2. 
Ysijt = β0 + β1Tsijt + β2 (Tsijt x Waivert) + β3 num_correctsijt + β4 (Tsijt x num_correctsijt) +        (1)  
δXit + γYjt + ηj + θt  + eijt 
In these models, Ysijt represents the standardized end-of-year state test score on the 
subject-area test s for student i in school j in year t. Tsijt represents treatment (a binary variable 
indicating that the student received the higher of the two performance labels in subject s), 
                                                          
3 In the rest of this paper, the Below Basic/Basic threshold will be referred to as the Basic threshold, the 
Basic/Proficient threshold will be referred to as the Proficient threshold, and the Advanced/Proficient threshold will 
be referred to as the Advanced threshold. 
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Waivert is a binary variable indicating that the state was under the waiver accountability system 
in year t, num_correctsijt represents the distance from the threshold (students who score below the 
cut-score have negative values, students who score at or above have zero or positive values), Xit 
is a vector of student controls (for student i in year t, including prior year state test score, race, 
FRPL, ELL, and disability status), Yjt is a vector of time-varying school controls (for school j in 
year t, including log enrollment, prior year’s percentage of students scoring proficient in subject 
s, and the percentage of students who are Black, Hispanic, White, FRPL, ELL, and have a 
disability), ηj are school fixed effects, θt are grade-by-year fixed effects, and eijt is the error term. 
Standard errors in this and all subsequent models are clustered at the school by grade by year 
level because, while the school fixed effects remove any between-school variation from the 
estimates, the errors for students who are in the same grade in a given school year might still be 
correlated. Using cluster-robust standard errors should remove any continuing correlation among 
students in the same grade and school (Nichols & Shaffer, 2007). 
If schools used the test-score label as a shortcut to decide which students should receive 
resources, and if that resource allocation improved student test scores, then there should be a 
discontinuity in predicted outcomes at the cut-score for the performance label. The β1 coefficient 
on Tsijt represents this discontinuity for students who received the higher label during the NCLB 
era. A statistically significant positive estimate for β1 would indicate that receiving the higher 
performance label resulted in significantly higher test scores during NCLB. Worth noting is that 
β1 is not expected to be higher for all models. For example, at the Basic threshold, the hypothesis 
is that the Basic students would be targeted over Below Basic students. This hypothesis would be 
supported by a positive estimate for β1. At the Proficient threshold, however, the Basic students 
(or lower performance label) may be targeted. A negative coefficient on β1 would provide 
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evidence of students in the lower label being targeted. Null results would indicate that the label 
did not have an effect, suggesting that schools did not treat students differently based on their 
performance labels. 
The other coefficient of interest in Equation 1 is β2, which represents the difference in the 
estimated discontinuity at the threshold between NCLB and the waiver. The interpretation of β2 
depends on the β1 estimate. If β1 and β2 have the same sign, then the estimated discontinuity from 
NCLB is enhanced after the waiver was implemented. If β1 and β2 have different signs, then the 
waiver ameliorates the earlier effect of NCLB. One main concern regarding educational triage is 
that the lowest-performing students are harmed because of the focus on bubble students. Because 
of this concern, the coefficients β1 and β2 at the Basic threshold are of special interest. 
The β3 and β4 parameters represent the slope of the regression line for students who score 
below and above the cut-score for the performance label, respectively. These values are used to 
estimate the slope of the predicted performance on either side of the threshold. These estimates 
are expected to be positive, which would indicate that students who answer more questions 
correctly on the benchmark have higher end-of-year state test scores. The slope of the line is 
estimated separately on either side of the threshold because requiring slopes to be constant when 
they are actually different would affect the estimate of the discontinuity (Imbens & Lemieux, 
2008). 
In order to balance precision and bias in estimating the coefficients, local linear RD 
requires deciding how close to the threshold students need to score in order to be included in the 
analysis. If the discontinuity is estimated only for students very close to the threshold, the 
estimates will be less precise because there are fewer observations being compared. 
Alternatively, widening the bandwidth increases the precision but may introduce bias because 
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the groups of students on either side of the cut-score may have more differences than simply the 
label assigned to them.  
Determining the optimal bandwidth in these analyses is made somewhat complicated by 
the forcing variable (i.e., the number of questions answered correctly on the benchmark). The 
benchmarks do not include a large number of questions (33 in math, 40 in reading). Differences 
of a few items in the number answered correctly are indicative of relatively large differences in 
underlying performance. For instance, students who are four or five questions away from these 
cut-points have fairly different levels of performance. In math, students who answer four 
questions below the Proficient threshold on Benchmark C have an average outcome of -0.34, and 
19.3% of these students meet proficiency on the state test. Students who answer four questions 
above that threshold have an average outcome of 0.50, and 75.4% meet proficiency4. 
Furthermore, the width of each performance label varies across years, subjects, grades, and 
thresholds. There are some examples where there are relatively few questions between 
thresholds, which limits how wide of a bandwidth could be used5. 
I used the rd command (Nichols, 2011) in the Stata statistical analysis software to 
calculate the optimal bandwidth suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) for each 
threshold and benchmark. The suggested ideal bandwidth in both math and reading ranged from 
1.39 to 1.96. Due to the discrete nature of the forcing variable, this means that the ideal 
bandwidth includes students who answered two questions above to two questions below the 
                                                          
4 Appendix Figures A1 and A2 show the relationship between the number of questions answered correctly on the 
benchmark and both (a) the percent of students meeting proficiency on the state test and (b) the mean standardized 
score on the state test for math and reading, respectively. Both sets of figures indicate that answering more 
benchmark questions correctly is positively related to these outcomes. 
5 For example, the Basic category ranges from 10 to 13 questions answered correctly for 5 th grade in 2010 (meaning 
a maximum bandwidth of 4 questions could be used) but from 8 to 15 questions for 3rd graders in 2011 (with a 
bandwidth of 8). 
33 
 
threshold. To investigate the stability of estimates across varying bandwidths, Equation 1 is run 
on the subset of observations in increasingly wide bandwidths above and below each threshold 
(from 2 to 6 questions). These analyses across varying bandwidths serve as sensitivity tests for 
the estimated coefficients at the optimal bandwidth of two6.  
To answer the third research question, the sample is separated into elementary and middle 
school students. The same methods just described are then employed separately on those 
samples.  
Assumptions Required for Regression Discontinuity 
A credible treatment effect in RD rests on the assumption that there should not be a 
discontinuous change in the outcome based on a continuous change in the forcing variable unless 
there was some treatment at a certain cut-score on the forcing variable (Imbens & Lemieux, 
2008). Various potential threats to RD analyses can arise. For example, if there is something that 
makes those who score just above and just below the threshold for the Basic performance level 
observably different, then any subsequent differences in average outcomes may be due to this 
selection into treatment. A few tests and figures are suggested by methodological research (e.g., 
Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; McCrary, 2008) to ensure underlying assumptions are true.  
Smoothness of covariates at the threshold. I checked for underlying differences 
between the groups on observable covariates that could drive subsequent differences in student 
performance, which is recommended by Imbens and Lemieux (2008). As mentioned previously, 
the cut-scores for each threshold on each of the three benchmarks varied across grade, year, and 
                                                          
6 The narrowest bandwidth of one does not allow for estimating the slope of the regression line. Because the forcing 
variable is discrete, the estimated discontinuity for a bandwidth of one represents the difference in mean outcome for 
students who score at the threshold compared to those who missed that label by one question as opposed to the 
difference at the threshold (i.e., the difference between the intercepts of the two regression lines).    
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subject. This variation occurred because the performance labels were assigned after the students 
took the assessment by the company administering the DEA. Because the thresholds were 
externally determined after students took the test, it is highly unlikely that there would be 
significant differences by prior test score, race, FRPL, ELL, or disability status around the cut-
score. The smoothness of covariates at the threshold was checked by using each student 
covariate as the dependent variable in a simplified form of Equation 1 shown here:   
Ysijt = β0 + β1Tsijt + β2 num_correctsijt + β3(Tsijt x num_correctsijt) + δXit + γYjt + ηj + θt  + eijt    (2) 
The discontinuity (β1) is estimated using Equation 2 at each threshold across varying 
bandwidths around the threshold separately for the NCLB and waiver eras. Results for these 252 
tests (two subjects x two eras x three thresholds x three benchmarks x seven student covariates, 
not shown) indicate no consistent significant difference in covariates around any of the 
thresholds in either era.  
Manipulation of the running variable. Identification of a discontinuity in the regression 
function requires an assumption of continuity in the density of the number of questions answered 
correctly around each threshold (McCrary, 2008). If agents are able to manipulate values on the 
running variable (that is, manipulate the number of correctly-answered questions and the 
subsequent performance label), then resulting differences in outcomes may be based on this 
selection. For example, this could occur if teachers systematically changed some students’ 
answer sheets so instead of being labeled Below Basic, students would receive the Basic label 
(i.e., treatment of receiving the higher of the two labels). If the students whose scores were 
adjusted would have scored higher on the state test in absence of this manipulation, these actions 
could create an artificial discontinuity at that threshold. Manipulation of benchmark test-score 
labels is less plausible in this case because the performance label cut-scores are externally 
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calculated after students take the test, a situation which meets the criteria set by the What Works 
Clearinghouse regarding the integrity of the forcing variable in RD analyses (Schochet et al., 
2010). I tested for manipulation visually through a series of histograms plotting the number of 
questions answered correctly around each threshold for each benchmark (Imbens & Lemiux, 
2008; McCrary, 2008). Neither subject shows evidence of manipulation around any thresholds 
(shown in Appendix Figures A3 for math and A4 for reading). 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
The percentage of students classified as Below Basic, Basic, Proficient, and Advanced on 
each benchmark during the two accountability eras are shown in Figure 3 (math) and Figure 4 
(reading). These graphics indicate that the labels were more consistent across the benchmarks 
during NCLB than the waiver. For example, about 23% of students were labeled Below Basic on 
each math benchmark during NCLB, whereas that percentage dropped ten points between 
Benchmark A (23%) and Benchmark C (13%) during the waiver. Nearly 40% of the students are 
labeled Basic and about 28% are labeled Proficient in math during both eras. Figure 4 shows that  
all three reading benchmarks had similar breakdowns by label: about 15% of students were 
labeled Below Basic, 39% as Basic, 34% as Proficient, and 12% as Advanced. During the 
waiver, the percentage of students labeled Below Basic decreased between the first and third 
reading benchmarks with similarly-sized increases in both the Basic and Proficient labels. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the descriptive characteristics for students assigned each test-score 
label for math and reading, respectively. The first column in each table represents the full 
sample, and each of the three benchmarks has been broken down into the four performance 
labels in the next sets of columns. Overall, the average student in GCPS scores about two-tenths 
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of a standard deviation below the state average on the end-of-year state test. The sample is 45% 
Black, 18% Hispanic, and 26% White. Seventy-one percent of the sample is eligible for FRPL, 
12% are ELLs, and 5% are identified as students with disabilities.  
Black, Hispanic, FRPL, and ELL students (a) are over-represented in the Below Basic 
label for both subjects, (b) have smaller percentages on the higher labels, and (c) are under-
represented in the Advanced level on all tests. For example, in math, Black students—who make 
up 45% of GCPS students—comprise 56% of the students labeled Below Basic but only 22% of 
the Advanced students. Although they make up 71% of the entire sample, FRPL-eligible students 
comprise 88% of Below Basic students but only 35% of the Advanced students. 
 The full results from Equation 1 are shown in Tables 3 and 4, for math and reading, 
respectively. These results are estimated by including students who score two questions above to 
two questions below the cut-score for each threshold (i.e., the optimal bandwidth). The full 
results are reported to show that the estimated values for β3 and β4 (the slopes for the regression 
line to the left and to the right of each threshold) are positive, as expected. These values mean 
that every additional question answered correctly on the benchmark is associated with an 
increase of 0.02 to 0.09 standard deviations on the state test. These positive slope estimates occur 
across all models of the data. Because of the large number of comparisons being made in these 
analyses (three thresholds for each of three benchmarks for varying bandwidths of two to six 
questions around the threshold for two subjects), only the coefficients for T and T x Waiver are 
included in subsequent tables and figures.  
Math  
The discontinuities estimated from Equation 1 across varying bandwidths are shown in 
Table 5. The coefficients marked “T” represent β1, the estimated discontinuity in outcome for 
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students who received the higher of the two labels during NCLB. These results will be discussed 
first. The coefficients marked “T x waiver” represent β2, the difference in the estimated 
discontinuity at that threshold during the waiver, and are discussed second. 
Each of the estimated discontinuities from Table 5 are also shown graphically with 95% 
confidence intervals in Figure 5. The set-up of these coefficient plots matches the structure of the 
table: the thresholds comprise the columns, the three benchmarks make up the rows, the 
estimated discontinuities during NCLB appear in the top part of each plot, and the difference in 
estimated discontinuities during the waiver are shown in the bottom part of each plot. The visual 
representations in Figure 5 are helpful for assessing whether (a) the point estimates across 
bandwidths are similar to one another and (b) the confidence intervals cross the zero line, 
indicating that the coefficient is not statistically significant. In the results, I look for consistent 
evidence of differences in average outcomes between groups of students on either side of the 
threshold. By consistent, I mean that the point estimates across the varying bandwidths are 
similar in magnitude and statistically significant (or very close).  
No Child Left Behind (2009-10 through 2011-12). The NCLB results are shown in the 
top part of each panel in Table 5 and Figure 5 (T). The most consistent results during this era are 
shown in the bottom left set of results, representing the effect of the Basic label after the third 
math benchmark (administered in February of the school year). During NCLB, students who 
were barely labeled Basic scored significantly higher than students who were barely labeled 
Below Basic (with discontinuities ranging from 0.033 to 0.047, p<0.01). The larger gains for 
Basic students suggest that schools focused more attention on these students at the expense of 
Below Basic students during NCLB. This is aligned with the triage theory that schools would 
shift resources to students closer to meeting proficiency.  
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There are few other consistent or significant estimated discontinuities found on other 
math benchmarks or thresholds during NCLB. The discontinuities estimated at the Proficient 
threshold on Benchmark C, for instance, are consistently negative across bandwidths. Taken at 
face value, this indicates that students who are barely labeled Proficient gain less than students 
who are barely labeled Basic. The estimates are small in magnitude and insignificant, however, 
providing only limited support to the idea that schools focused more on students labeled Basic 
than on those labeled Proficient. At the Advanced threshold for Benchmark B, the estimated 
discontinuities are consistently positive but larger in magnitude and significant only at the 
narrowest bandwidth (β= 0.054, p<0.05). This is suggestive that students who barely received 
the Advanced label in November scored higher than students who barely received the Proficient 
label. There are significant and positive discontinuities at the Basic threshold on Benchmark B 
and at the Proficient threshold on Benchmarks A and B at the wider bandwidths, but these 
estimates are negative at the optimal bandwidth of two. Because these estimates are not 
consistent across bandwidths and are significant only when comparing students who answered 10 
or 12 questions differently on a 33-question test, there are few conclusions to be drawn about 
school behavior. 
In summary, there is some evidence that schools viewed students labeled Basic on the 
third math benchmark as bubble students and targeted resources to them during NCLB. Students 
labeled Basic who were close to either the Basic or Proficient thresholds gained more than 
students who were close to but on the other sides of those thresholds (although the gains are 
statistically significant only at the Basic threshold). These gains for Basic students do not appear 
to come at the expense of the highest-performing students, given that Advanced students gained 
more than students who barely miss that label. That the labels from earlier benchmarks did not 
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have test score effects suggests that schools did not target Basic students until later in the school 
year. The third benchmark was the last data that schools received from the district prior to the 
state test, and schools may have viewed students labeled Below Basic at that point in the school 
year as unlikely to meet proficiency.  
 Waiver (2012-13 to 2013-14). The difference in the estimated discontinuities during the 
waiver period are shown in the bottom part of each panel in Table 5 and Figure 5 (marked “T x 
waiver”). There are a number of consistent and significant differences between NCLB and the 
waiver. At the Basic threshold, the interaction of the label with the waiver is statistically 
significant and negative across all bandwidths on both Benchmarks B and C. Because the 
estimated discontinuities at this threshold were positive during NCLB, these negative differential 
effects indicate that students barely labeled Below Basic benefitted after the waiver was 
introduced. The magnitude of the differential effect is even larger on Benchmark C (β= -0.040 to 
-0.066, p<0.01) than on Benchmark B (β≈ -0.03, p<0.05). Whereas the significant positive 
estimates for β1 indicate that students who barely received the higher Basic label had better 
outcomes than students who barely received the Below Basic label during NCLB, the combined 
coefficients under the waiver are no different from zero. This means that the Basic label did not 
have an effect under the waiver, suggesting that schools no longer prioritized bubble students.  
This shift in focus during the waiver period to students with the lower of the two labels is 
also shown at the Proficient threshold. The point estimates for T x Waiver are consistently 
negative across all three benchmarks at this threshold (ranging from -0.010 to -0.035). This 
suggests that schools shifted resources during the waiver era towards the lower-performing (i.e., 
Basic) students over those labeled Proficient. These estimates, however, are generally smaller in 
magnitude at lower bandwidths and significant only at wider bandwidths. This increased focus 
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during the waiver era on lower-performing students is aligned with the results found at the Basic 
threshold.  
To summarize, schools used the math labels differently under the two accountability 
regimes. During NCLB, the students who were barely labeled Below Basic on the third 
benchmark scored significantly lower than students who were barely labeled Basic. During the 
waiver, schools appear to have shifted their attention to lower-achieving students. Students who 
score on the lower side of the Basic and Proficient thresholds on Benchmarks B and C had better 
outcomes during the waiver compared to similar students during NCLB. Furthermore, schools 
may have shifted their attention to lower-performing students during the waiver as early as 
November, when the second benchmark was taken. This provides evidence that the incentive 
shift in the accountability system changed schools’ behavior, which benefitted lower-performing 
students mainly in math.  
Elementary and middle schools. The math results estimated separately by school level 
are presented in Figure 6 for elementary schools and in Figure 7 for middle schools (coefficients 
are included in Appendix Tables A1 and A2, respectively). The results just reported indicate that 
the only significant positive discontinuities estimated from NCLB were at the Basic threshold on 
the third benchmark. These results appear to be driven by middle schools, with Figure 7 showing 
consistently positive significant estimates of approximately 0.05 standard deviations for β1. The 
corresponding coefficient estimates in elementary schools are small in magnitude and not 
measurably different from zero. This suggests that during NCLB, middle schools targeted 
students labeled Basic in the lead up to the state test at the expense of students labeled Below 
Basic, which had a detectable effect on end-of-year outcomes. These differences by school level 
are discussed in more detail after all of the results are presented. 
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One difference from the district-wide results is found at the Proficient threshold in 
elementary schools during NCLB. The estimates of β1 on Benchmark C are consistently negative 
and statistically significant at the Proficient threshold in elementary schools (β ≈ -0.04, p<0.05), 
results which did not occur in middle schools. This indicates that elementary students who were 
barely labeled Basic scored significantly better than students barely labeled Proficient during 
NCLB. This suggests that elementary schools focused their attention on students labeled Basic at 
the expense of those labeled Proficient under NCLB.  
Both elementary and middle schools exhibit the increased focus on lower-performing 
students at the Basic threshold during the waiver. Both school types display consistent negative 
coefficients for T x waiver at this threshold on Benchmarks B and C. The coefficients are similar 
in magnitude across school types and somewhat larger in magnitude on the third benchmark 
(estimates ranging from -0.038 to -0.071) than the second benchmark (estimates ranging from -
0.026 to -0.048). The estimates are less precise in elementary schools—likely due to the smaller 
sample of students—which makes the estimates significant more often in the middle schools. 
Middle schools appear to be driving the full results that found significant negative 
coefficients at the Proficient level on both Benchmark B and C during the waiver. While both 
school types have consistent negative estimates at this threshold, the differential effect of the 
Proficient label on these two benchmarks during the waiver is larger in magnitude for middle 
schools (β= -0.013 to -0.048) and statistically significant across most bandwidths. The results at 
the Basic and Proficient thresholds suggest that middle schools supported lower performing 
students relatively early in the year during the waiver compared to NCLB.  
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Reading 
 No Child Left Behind (2009-10 through 2011-12). The reading results are shown in 
Table 6, with the corresponding coefficients presented graphically in Figure 8. As with math, I 
first discuss the results from NCLB, which are shown in the top part of each set of estimates, 
before moving onto the results during the waiver.  
 The most consistent results in reading during NCLB are similar to those found in math: 
students who are barely labeled Basic on Benchmark C score higher across all models on the 
end-of-year state reading test than students barely labeled Below Basic. The discontinuity 
estimates are all positive and similar in magnitude across the varying bandwidths (ranging from 
0.019 to 0.030) but are significant only at the widest bandwidths of five and six. As with the 
math results, this suggests that, during NCLB, schools focused more attention in the months 
before the state test on students labeled Basic over those labeled Below Basic. These findings 
align with the triage hypothesis that schools would neglect low-performing students to focus on 
those close to proficiency, although the evidence of this is weaker in reading than in math. 
 There are few other consistent or significant differences in end-of-year state reading 
scores based on the test-score label at other thresholds or benchmarks. The Proficient threshold 
on Benchmark B reveals consistent negative estimates, which suggests that students who barely 
scored Proficient have lower estimated outcomes than students who barely scored Basic. These 
discontinuities, however, are small in magnitude (β≈ -0.015) and significant only at the widest 
bandwidth. As with math, this is somewhat suggestive that schools focused more on students just 
below the proficiency line during NCLB. This evidence is relatively narrow in reading, however, 
because the discontinuities in outcome around the proficiency threshold are present only on the 
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second reading benchmark. By Benchmark C, the estimated coefficients are still negative but 
smaller in magnitude and no longer significant.  
These results provide suggestive evidence that schools in GCPS used the district-
provided labels during NCLB to decide which students to target. Students labeled as Basic 
appear to be viewed by schools as the bubble students, and barely receiving the Below Basic 
label has a negative effect on students close to the Basic threshold. The effects of the labels tend 
to show up later in the year (after the third benchmark, administered in February), which 
suggests that while schools may have diverted attention from low-performers to bubble students, 
they did not do so for the entire school year. 
Waiver (2012-13 to 2013-14). The difference in the estimated discontinuities during the 
waiver are shown in the bottom set of results in Table 6 and Figure 8. Once again, the main 
labeling effect is found at the Basic threshold on Benchmark C. The differential effect of the 
Basic label for reading during the waiver era is consistently negative and significant across 
bandwidths (β= -0.041 to -0.053, p<0.05). As with math, this indicates that schools shifted their 
attention during the waiver to the lower-performing students.  
Similar to the reading results during NCLB, there are relatively few consistent or 
significant estimates at other thresholds or benchmarks. The point estimates for the Basic x 
Waiver indicator are consistently negative for Benchmark A, which implies that schools began 
shifting attention to lower-performing students earlier in the year. These results are imprecisely 
measured, however, and significant only at the widest bandwidth, which limits these 
interpretations. Because performance labels on the early reading benchmarks did not influence 
student outcomes, this again suggests that schools did not use these labels to target bubble 
students early in the school year. 
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 To summarize, student outcomes in reading appear to be less influenced by benchmark 
labels than in math. There is some evidence that students who barely received the Below Basic 
label on the third benchmark during NCLB scored significantly lower on the end-of-year reading 
state test and relatively strong evidence that those students benefitted under the waiver. Taken 
together with the math results, this provides evidence that schools used the performance labels 
from the third benchmark to target Basic students (at the expense of the Below Basic students) 
during NCLB. The waiver ameliorated the negative effect estimated from the NCLB era for 
students who just missed the Basic label on the third reading benchmark. 
Elementary and Middle Schools. Reading results for elementary schools are shown in 
Figure 9 and for middle schools in Figure 10 (with coefficients included in Appendix Tables A3 
and A4, respectively). In contrast to the math findings, the reading benchmarks displayed 
relatively few significant results district-wide. Separating the sample by school level, however, 
reveals additional differences between elementary and middle schools. 
The district-wide reading results were somewhat suggestive that students who were just 
barely labeled Basic on the third benchmark scored better than students who were just barely 
labeled Below Basic during NCLB. Disaggregating these results by school level indicates that 
middle schools were responsible for these results. Figure 10 presents consistently positive 
estimates at the Basic threshold on Benchmark C during NCLB in middle schools. The estimated 
discontinuities are similar in magnitude across bandwidths (ranging from 0.020 to 0.035) but are 
statistically significant only at the higher bandwidths. Although not as strong as the math results, 
these findings indicate that middle schools in GCPS were more likely than elementary schools to 
focus on Basic students over the Below Basic ones, at least for students close to the Basic 
threshold.  
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The district-wide results indicated that Below Basic students benefitted from the waiver. 
The differential effect of the Basic label (compared to the Below Basic label) was consistently 
negative and statistically significant across varying bandwidths on the third reading benchmark. 
Both elementary and middle schools show this consistent negative pattern at the Basic threshold. 
The magnitude of the estimates is larger for middle schools (β= -0.042 to -0.060) and 
consistently significant. The elementary estimates (β= -0.022 to -0.040) are imprecisely 
measured and not statistically different from zero (likely due to the smaller sample). Both 
elementary and middle schools, then, appear to have shifted attention to lower-performing 
reading students during the waiver. 
There are differences in the reading results between the school levels which did not show 
up in the district-wide results at the Advanced threshold. First, elementary schools display 
consistently negative and significant estimates at this threshold on Benchmark B during the 
waiver (β= -0.048 to -0.071, p<0.05). This indicates that elementary students who were barely 
labeled Proficient (compared to Advanced) gained significantly more under the waiver than 
similar students during NCLB. This negative differential effect in elementary schools occurred 
only on the second reading benchmark. The third reading benchmark showed smaller negative 
estimates at the Advanced threshold under the waiver, with none of them measurably different 
from zero. Second, there is a positive effect of the Advanced label for middle school students 
during the waiver. Coefficients at the Advanced threshold on reading Benchmark C are 
consistently positive and statistically significant (β= 0.033 to 0.055, p<0.05). In this case, middle 
school students who were barely assigned the Advanced labeled gained significantly more than 
students who were barely assigned the Proficient label during the waiver. This suggests that 
middle schools’ shift in attention to lower-performing students (found on Benchmark C at the 
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Basic and Proficient thresholds) did not harm high-performing students. It appears that the 
middle school students labeled as Advanced may have benefitted from that change in focus.  
Both elementary and middle schools appear to have shifted their attention during the 
waiver to students who were lower-performing. Many of the differences in the estimated 
discontinuities during the waiver are negative, suggesting that lower-performing students 
benefitted from the suite of changes made by the waiver. Evidence for the increased attention on 
lower-performing students is not as strong in reading as it is in math. 
Discussion 
The purpose of this analysis was to explore whether the district-supplied benchmark test-
score labels that were quasi-randomly assigned to students influenced their end-of-year state test 
scores. The previous section reported on a large number of comparisons across label thresholds, 
benchmarks, subjects, accountability eras, and school types. I now step back to look for patterns 
across these results. 
No Child Left Behind Era (2009-10 through 2011-12) 
This analysis investigated the extent to which schools used the performance labels as 
shortcuts to perform educational triage under the incentive pressures of NCLB and if so, at which 
point in the year the performance labels influenced outcomes.  
Math. The findings indicate that schools in GCPS focused on students who were labeled 
Basic on the third benchmark. This was predicted under the triage hypothesis with the idea that 
schools would view Basic students as “on the bubble” of meeting proficiency. Both elementary 
and middle schools focused on Basic students in math, although they did so at different 
thresholds. Middle schools focused on Basic students whose scores placed them close to the 
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Basic threshold during NCLB. Answering just enough questions on the third benchmark to be 
labeled Basic (compared to Below Basic) resulted in significantly higher end-of-year test scores 
for middle school students. These gains suggest that middle schools provided additional 
resources for Basic students but not for the Below Basic students in the last months before the 
state test during NCLB. On the other hand, elementary schools appear to have paid more 
attention to Basic students close to the Proficient threshold. Elementary schools did not 
differentially treat students at the lower end of the Basic label (i.e., no discontinuity at the Basic 
threshold).  
Reading. The results from reading provide limited evidence that schools focused on 
students labeled Basic during NCLB. Middle school students who were barely labeled Below 
Basic on the third reading benchmark gained less than students barely labeled Basic. As with 
math, this implies that middle schools used the Below Basic label—especially on the last 
benchmark before the state test—as a designation that students would not improve enough to 
meet proficiency and instead focused on Basic students. There were no differences in outcomes 
for elementary students who scored close to the threshold.  
Takeaways from NCLB. The results demonstrate that schools did focus on bubble 
students during NCLB. This focus occurred more strongly in math than in reading. Although the 
labels provided no additional information beyond the underlying test scores, the statistically 
significant results indicate that schools used the district-supplied labels to make resource 
allocation decisions. That the performance labels on the first two benchmarks do not relate to 
final test scores implies that schools did not write off low-performing students earlier in the year 
during NCLB.  
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In addition, middle schools appear to be more consistent with their behavior during 
NCLB. The findings indicate that middle schools focused on bubble (Basic) students over lower-
performing (Below Basic) students in both math and reading. This implies that middle schools 
were more responsive to NCLB’s accountability incentives. This might be because middle 
schools had larger populations with more subgroups that had to meet NCLB proficiency rates 
than elementary schools. This pressure may have led middle schools to engage in strategic 
behavior to increase the proficiency rate. The consistency in this behavior across subjects, in 
schools where these subjects are taught by different teachers, may also reflect middle school 
leaders who encourage or facilitate this behavior.  
  Elementary schools, on the other hand, exhibit a strategic focus on bubble students but 
only in math and only for Basic students close to the Proficiency threshold. Elementary schools, 
then, do not appear to treat lower-performing students differently based on the label. This 
difference by school level may be due to the fact that elementary teachers spend more time with 
their students. They might have a harder time considering certain students as “too low” than 
middle school teachers who teach a much larger number of students throughout the school day. 
In addition, because elementary school teachers instruct multiple content areas, they might know 
a student does well in reading but not in math, which might limit their belief that a certain 
student is too low for support. Middle school teachers, who typically teach only one content area, 
would not have as broad a knowledge of their students, which could make it somewhat easier to 
consider students too low. 
While there is evidence that schools in GCPS targeted bubble students during NCLB, a 
triage response also involves diverting resources away from the highest-performing students. 
There was no measurable difference between students who scored just above or below the 
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Advanced threshold during NCLB. Students whose benchmark scores place them near the 
Advanced threshold, however, are unlikely to drop in the distribution enough to fall below 
proficiency. Schools may then have viewed students close to but on either side of this threshold 
as “safe” and treated them the same, which could help explain why students did not have 
different outcomes7.  
Yet this argument that schools should not treat students differently based on their labels is 
true for all thresholds. On its surface, it seems counterintuitive that schools would treat students 
differently based on these labels, given that the district shared the test scores that produced the 
labels. This seems especially true for students close to but above the Proficient cut-off, although 
the results indicate that elementary students just above and below that threshold on the third 
math benchmark had different outcomes. After hearing preliminary results from this analysis, 
district leaders gave credence to the idea that schools did, in fact, use these labels in the way 
hypothesized for this study. A member of the district research team, who works directly with 
administrators to use benchmark data in making instructional decisions, reported that educators 
viewed the labels as meaningful. This individual shared that some administrators in GCPS 
believed that students who were labeled Proficient on a benchmark meant students would meet 
proficiency on the state test, believing that they “don’t have to focus on those kids anymore” 
(meeting with GCPS research team). Some of these school leaders expressed displeasure towards 
the GCPS research office at the end of the year when those students did not meet proficiency on 
the state test. This viewpoint represents a misunderstanding of the benchmark data, and the 
district research team discussed how to communicate appropriate uses (and misuses) of the 
                                                          
7 A different definition of bubble students is examined in the next chapter, which groups together these higher-
performing students close to the Advanced threshold as the “safe” group. 
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student data shared with schools. This also highlights a tension that GCPS faces—along with 
other districts implementing a benchmark test policy—that the information they provide, coupled 
with the pressures placed on schools to meet proficiency requirements, may actually assist 
schools to engage in strategic behavior that is inequitable. 
Waiver Accountability Era (2012-13 to 2013-14) 
 Math. During the waiver, schools in GCPS shifted focus to lower-performing students in 
math and did so relatively early in the year. Both elementary and middle schools demonstrate 
consistent negative differential effects of the test-score label at both the Basic and Proficient 
thresholds. The magnitude of the coefficient estimates were similar across school types. The 
larger standard errors in elementary schools, however, made the coefficients significant more 
frequently in middle schools.  
This shift in focus to lower-performing students occurred as early as Benchmark B, 
which was administered in November of each school year. Schools might have used the labels 
from that benchmark to make changes in classes or teachers for the second semester, such as 
reassigning lower-achieving students to the best math teachers. Alternatively, schools may have 
used the results from the second benchmark to determine which students should receive 
additional resources. These issues are explored further in Chapter 4. 
 Reading. The waiver was also associated with a shift to lower-performing students in 
reading. These results, however, were concentrated only at the Basic threshold and only on the 
third benchmark. Both elementary and middle schools show consistent negative differential 
effects at the Basic threshold. This indicates that schools focused more on students labeled 
Below Basic on the third benchmark during the waiver than they did during NCLB. Middle 
schools display effects that are larger in magnitude and more frequently significant than 
51 
 
elementary schools. This may reflect a shift in behavior from NCLB, when only middle schools 
exhibited an increased focus on students receiving the Basic label over those labeled Below 
Basic on the third reading benchmark. 
Some effects emerged at the Advanced threshold when the data were analyzed separately 
by school level. There is a strong positive effect for middle school students who barely received 
the Advanced label on the third benchmark. This might reflect that students labeled Advanced on 
the last benchmark before the state test receive some sort of special treatment that would benefit 
them (e.g., enrichment activities) while the school is providing support to other lower-
performing students. On the other hand, there is a strong negative effect during the waiver for 
elementary students who barely received the Advanced label on the second benchmark. This 
does not necessarily mean that Advanced students were harmed but that the students who just 
missed this label gained more during the waiver. This could occur, for example, if elementary 
schools gave additional resources for students labeled Proficient to ensure they met proficiency 
on the state test.  
An alternative explanation for these findings is not that schools treated students 
differently based on the label but that the label affected students' views of themselves8. In their 
study of how eighth-grade state test labels influence college-going rates, Papay and colleagues 
(2011) hypothesize that students adjust their self-identity and expectations based in part on 
external factors such as these performance labels. For example, being labeled as Advanced might 
                                                          
8This would require that students knew their benchmark performance. When asked if schools would have shared this 
information with students, a member of the GCPS research team answered that it would “have varied by school 
and/or classroom. A school leader would likely have an expectation around sharing data with students but that 
doesn’t mean every single teacher would do it… Further, if data were being shared with students, then I think the 
label most definitely would have been shared. It’s more likely that the label was shared than the number of questions 
answered correctly” (email correspondence). 
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enhance middle school students’ views of themselves, which might increase their motivation and 
subsequent performance. The Advanced label had the opposite effect for elementary students. 
The negative results for elementary students just below the Advanced threshold could indicate 
that these students were motivated to work harder so they would be labeled Advanced on the 
state test. This might also help explain the negative effects found during NCLB for Below Basic 
students. It is plausible that barely scoring Below Basic on the last benchmark before the state 
test may depress a low-performing students' self-view, leading to lower motivation and lower 
test scores. This hypothesis does not seem to bear out, however, given the results of this study. If 
this were the reason behind the lower performance for Below Basic students, then it is hard to 
explain why this label would no longer have a similar effect during the waiver.  
 Takeaways from the Waiver. The adoption of the waiver was associated with a shift in 
focus to lower-performing students in both math and reading. Students barely labeled Below 
Basic benefit in both subjects and in both elementary and middle schools. This shift occurred at 
more thresholds (both Basic and Proficient) and earlier in the year (beginning after Benchmark 
B) in math than in reading. 
Middle schools demonstrated a more consistent shift during the waiver across both 
subjects. Middle schools appeared more likely to focus on students above the Basic threshold 
during NCLB, and students in those schools had a larger change in average outcomes under the 
waiver than elementary students. Middle schools in GCPS, then, appear more responsive to 
accountability incentives. As already noted, middle schools’ larger populations may have driven 
them to engage in strategic behavior during NCLB. Perhaps the release from that policy’s 
requirements under the waiver allowed middle schools to behave more equitably. These 
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differences by school level point to additional research which investigates factors that may 
contribute to these behaviors. 
Implications 
The implications of this analysis for GCPS district leaders were apparent after they were 
presented with these results. The research team discussed what to do about their current 
benchmark system. The state test had changed in the previous year, meaning there was no way to 
project student end-of-year state test performance and assign test-score labels (as had been done 
with the DEA assessments used in these analyses). In this first year of the new state test, the 
district continued to administer the benchmark tests but shared with schools only student raw 
scores. Due to the findings of this study, the team deliberated about whether they should assign 
performance labels to benchmark scores, given that schools seemed to make instructional 
decisions based them. While this work is representative only of GCPS, knowing that the test-
score labels have unintended effects on student outcomes could be useful to consider for other 
large urban districts who administer interim assessments and share that data with schools. 
The results of these analyses indicate that the lowest-performing students—those who 
were labeled Below Basic—benefitted from the waiver policy changes. The significantly higher 
performance for these students under the waiver wiped out the negative impact that the label 
created during NCLB; during the waiver, there was no significant difference in outcome between 
students barely labeled Below Basic and Basic. This suggests that the suite of changes during the 
waiver did change the incentives for schools and led to more equitable treatment of students.  
These results suggest that schools changed how they responded to student data they 
received over the course of the school year. This has implications for researchers who are 
investigating educational triage and have access only to prior year test scores. These results 
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should lead to some caution in the conclusions made when there are no differences found in 
outcomes. For instance, labels on Benchmark A have no measureable effect on students’ average 
test scores, but those on Benchmark C do. If only the first data point for students was utilized in 
this research, the conclusion might have been that performance labels have no effect on student 
outcomes. Another lesson for researchers is that elementary and middle schools responded 
differently to the labels. Disaggregating results by school level might reveal variation in behavior 
that might otherwise be concealed.  
If basing school ratings on proficiency rates caused schools to consider some students too 
low to receive needed support, this should be concerning for policymakers who intend for school 
accountability systems to equitably support the learning of all students. This analysis, however, 
is unable to disentangle the effects of policies which all changed at the same time. It is not clear 
whether the improved performance of the low-performing students was due to (a) the removal of 
required consequences for schools that failed to meet state-determined proficiency rates, or (b) 
oversight by the district rather than the state, or (c) the inclusion of growth metrics in the 
educator evaluation system. The combination of these changes appear to have benefitted these 
students. The incentives that changed school behavior are certainly of policy interest and worth 
further research with datasets that can explore these different policy changes. 
Furthermore, while the waiver, which was implemented in 2012-13, overhauled the 
school accountability system, the state made changes in 2011-12 to the educator evaluation 
system that may have shifted incentives in the direction found in these results. The 2011-12 
school year was during NCLB but was the first year that the state utilized value-add growth 
metrics as a substantial portion of teachers’ and principals’ evaluation scores. That means the 
incentives in 2011-12 were somewhat mixed. The school rating under NCLB was comprised 
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primarily of proficiency rates and related to consequential sanctions, which would incentivize a 
focus on bubble students, but educators’ personal evaluations were determined in part by student 
growth. The more equitable behavior towards lower-performing students during the waiver 
demonstrated in this study may reflect the growth metrics that were implemented the previous 
year. The next chapter explores this as one of several alternative explanations for the reduced 
focus on bubble students found here. 
Limitations 
This analysis tested the hypothesis that schools used benchmark test-score labels to 
allocate resources to students but faces some limitations. The discrete nature of the running 
variable limits the ability to use RD models to their full effect. This was illustrated by the 
computer program indicating that the optimal bandwidth was a fractional value. Additionally, 
because the slope of the regression line is estimated using clusters of students at each individual 
data point and because the widths are narrow for some test-score labels, the slope estimates are 
limited in how variable they can be. Furthermore, these results reflect only the local average 
treatment effect for students close to the threshold separating the labels. While the results 
indicate that the Below Basic students benefitted under the waiver system, this is true for 
students close to the threshold but not necessarily for all low-performing students. Another 
limitation of this work is that test scores are used as proxies for allocation of resources by 
schools. It is possible that schools did in fact target students earlier in the year but that the 
interventions were not effective in increasing test scores. This is a limitation quantitative black 
box studies, and Chapter 4 addresses this issue. That chapter analyzes documents completed by 
school leaders to learn more about what schools do to target students (and which students are 
actually targeted), which helps contextualize the results from these analyses. 
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Benefits of using data from a single district include being able to learn more about how 
the district used and shared student data with schools as well as receiving access to more data 
than is generally available in large-scale datasets. While the district shared this benchmark data 
with schools for five years, the district gave schools even more prescriptive labels for students 
based on their benchmark scores in 2012-13 (the first year of the waiver) and provided additional 
funding to some schools to prioritize a group of district-identified bubble students. It is possible 
that the change in behavior found here is because schools defined bubble students differently. In 
the next chapter, I examine this as one of several alternative explanations for the reduced focus 
on bubble students found in this study. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Math benchmark sample statistics, 2009-10 to 2013-14 
  
Benchmark A Benchmark B Benchmark C 
 
Full 
Sample BB Basic Prof Adv BB Basic Prof Adv BB Basic Prof Adv 
                         
Math z-score 
-0.21 -0.95 -0.38 0.40 1.23 -1.07 -0.43 0.30 1.11 -1.14 -0.50 0.30 1.10 
(0.99) (0.73) (0.75) (0.72) (0.72) (0.70) (0.72) (0.71) (0.73) (0.68) (0.68) (0.66) (0.72) 
Demographic information            
Black 0.45 0.56 0.48 0.37 0.22 0.56 0.48 0.39 0.24 0.57 0.49 0.39 0.26 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.41) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.43) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.44) 
Hispanic 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.09 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.11 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.12 
 (0.38) (0.40) (0.40) (0.37) (0.29) (0.40) (0.40) (0.37) (0.31) (0.39) (0.40) (0.38) (0.33) 
White 0.26 0.16 0.24 0.33 0.44 0.17 0.23 0.30 0.42 0.16 0.22 0.31 0.43 
 (0.44) (0.37) (0.43) (0.47) (0.50) (0.37) (0.42) (0.46) (0.49) (0.36) (0.41) (0.46) (0.50) 
FRPL 0.71 0.84 0.77 0.61 0.38 0.86 0.78 0.64 0.43 0.85 0.78 0.65 0.47 
 (0.45) (0.36) (0.42) (0.49) (0.48) (0.35) (0.42) (0.48) (0.49) (0.35) (0.41) (0.48) (0.50) 
English 
language 
learner 
0.12 0.18 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.19 0.14 0.09 0.04 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.05 
(0.33) (0.39) (0.35) (0.27) (0.17) (0.39) (0.35) (0.28) (0.20) (0.38) (0.36) (0.29) (0.22) 
Students with 
disabilities 
0.05 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 
(0.21) (0.26) (0.20) (0.17) (0.15) (0.26) (0.21) (0.18) (0.16) (0.26) (0.22) (0.17) (0.15) 
              
Observations 154480 36440 58320 34380 13570 32380 56470 38450 18090 30490 54840 41160 20080 
 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. BB means Below Basic, Prof means Proficiency, and Adv means Advanced. 
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Table 2. Reading benchmark sample statistics, 2009-10 to 2013-14 
  
Benchmark A Benchmark B Benchmark C 
 
Full 
Sample BB Basic Prof Adv BB Basic Prof Adv BB Basic Prof Adv 
                         
Reading z-
score 
-0.21 -1.22 -0.54 0.37 1.22 -1.27 -0.53 0.38 1.20 -1.31 -0.55 0.41 1.26 
(1.00) (0.70) (0.67) (0.67) (0.70) (0.67) (0.65) (0.67) (0.71) (0.68) (0.66) (0.67) (0.71) 
Demographic information            
Black 0.45 0.53 0.51 0.39 0.24 0.52 0.51 0.39 0.24 0.52 0.51 0.38 0.23 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.43) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.43) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.42) 
Hispanic 0.18 0.24 0.20 0.15 0.07 0.24 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.08 
 (0.38) (0.43) (0.40) (0.35) (0.26) (0.43) (0.40) (0.35) (0.28) (0.42) (0.40) (0.35) (0.27) 
White 0.26 0.14 0.21 0.34 0.43 0.15 0.22 0.34 0.41 0.13 0.21 0.34 0.45 
 (0.44) (0.35) (0.41) (0.47) (0.50) (0.35) (0.41) (0.47) (0.49) (0.34) (0.41) (0.48) (0.50) 
FRPL 0.71 0.88 0.80 0.60 0.35 0.89 0.80 0.60 0.37 0.89 0.80 0.60 0.36 
 (0.45) (0.32) (0.40) (0.49) (0.48) (0.32) (0.40) (0.49) (0.48) (0.31) (0.40) (0.49) (0.48) 
English 
language 
learner 
0.12 0.28 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.28 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.27 0.15 0.05 0.02 
(0.33) (0.45) (0.35) (0.21) (0.13) (0.45) (0.35) (0.21) (0.12) (0.44) (0.35) (0.22) (0.14) 
Students with 
disabilities 
0.05 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.02 
(0.21) (0.27) (0.22) (0.17) (0.14) (0.26) (0.22) (0.17) (0.15) (0.27) (0.22) (0.17) (0.14) 
              
Observations 154475 25688 59326 45359 14585 25998 60811 46159 14783 22611 65117 47295 12769 
 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. BB means Below Basic, Prof means Proficiency, and Adv means Advanced. 
  
59 
 
Table 3. Regression discontinuity results with bandwidth of 2, math 
 
 Benchmark A Benchmark B Benchmark C 
 BB/B B/P P/A BB/B B/P P/A BB/B B/P P/A 
T -0.013 -0.005 0.010 -0.020 -0.023 0.054* 0.033 -0.011 0.024 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.025) (0.020) (0.017) (0.022) (0.019) (0.016) (0.021) 
T x waiver 0.013 -0.010 0.029 -0.031* -0.010 0.034* -0.040* -0.024 -0.018 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.021) (0.016) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) 
Slope left 0.047*** 0.060*** 0.048*** 0.086*** 0.090*** 0.038** 0.063*** 0.081*** 0.076*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) 
Slope right 0.055*** 0.066*** 0.080*** 0.065*** 0.072*** 0.070*** 0.066*** 0.074*** 0.090*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Black -0.058*** -0.062*** -0.075*** -0.040*** -0.051*** -0.094*** -0.049*** -0.043*** -0.084*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) 
Hispanic 0.021 0.026* 0.001 0.028* 0.016 -0.030* 0.012 0.011 -0.020 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) 
Other race 0.096*** 0.108*** 0.099*** 0.094*** 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.051 0.053** 0.074*** 
 (0.024) (0.018) (0.020) (0.028) (0.019) (0.018) (0.028) (0.018) (0.016) 
FRPL -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.041*** -0.061*** -0.051*** -0.047*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) 
ELL -0.021 0.019 0.032 0.012 0.019 0.077* 0.036 0.002 0.007 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.040) (0.025) (0.026) (0.034) (0.023) (0.025) (0.036) 
SWD -0.112*** -0.142*** -0.075* -0.096*** -0.089*** -0.077* -0.083*** -0.058* -0.026 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.034) (0.021) (0.024) (0.034) (0.021) (0.023) (0.027) 
Prior test score 0.548*** 0.554*** 0.477*** 0.468*** 0.487*** 0.464*** 0.433*** 0.420*** 0.422*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
          
Observations 31054 26982 12247 25335 27476 15781 22456 25007 17208 
R2 0.414 0.455 0.398 0.397 0.455 0.452 0.406 0.420 0.457 
 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. “T” represents the discontinuity in outcomes for students who received the higher of the two labels. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the school by grade by year level. All models condition on grade by year fixed effects, and school fixed effects. B/BB represents the 
Below Basic/Basic threshold, B/P represents the Basic/Proficient threshold, and P/A represents the Proficient/Advanced threshold.  
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Table 4. Regression discontinuity results with bandwidth of 2, reading 
 
 Benchmark A Benchmark B Benchmark C 
 BB/B B/P P/A BB/B B/P P/A BB/B B/P P/A 
T 0.009 -0.004 0.019 0.002 -0.015 -0.010 0.032 -0.017 0.003 
 (0.026) (0.017) (0.021) (0.024) (0.016) (0.021) (0.026) (0.016) (0.020) 
T x waiver -0.021 -0.009 -0.012 0.001 0.014 -0.010 -0.046* -0.008 0.026 
 (0.018) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.017) (0.021) (0.013) (0.017) 
Slope left 0.019 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.033* 0.044*** 0.075*** 0.027 0.053*** 0.070*** 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016) (0.009) (0.011) 
Slope right 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.058*** 0.048*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.057*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
Black -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.097*** -0.074*** -0.079*** -0.091*** -0.059*** -0.056*** -0.099*** 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.008) (0.012) 
Hispanic 0.012 0.008 -0.017 0.001 -0.024* 0.004 0.006 -0.000 -0.034* 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.018) (0.011) (0.017) 
Other race -0.020 0.042* 0.058** -0.030 0.014 0.062*** -0.012 0.052** 0.034 
 (0.032) (0.019) (0.018) (0.032) (0.018) (0.019) (0.032) (0.017) (0.017) 
FRPL -0.083*** -0.055*** -0.065*** -0.058*** -0.055*** -0.066*** -0.050*** -0.055*** -0.060*** 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) 
ELL -0.041 0.009 0.011 -0.032 0.009 0.043 -0.077** 0.005 0.019 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.061) (0.023) (0.025) (0.048) (0.026) (0.026) (0.055) 
SWD -0.136*** -0.101*** -0.058 -0.124*** -0.116*** -0.021 -0.146*** -0.095*** -0.015 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.033) (0.023) (0.020) (0.031) (0.024) (0.021) (0.030) 
Prior test score 0.543*** 0.547*** 0.494*** 0.508*** 0.526*** 0.508*** 0.500*** 0.517*** 0.500*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) 
          
Observations 15529 23606 14994 15675 24197 15959 13429 24955 15485 
R2 0.391 0.433 0.418 0.375 0.436 0.445 0.430 0.445 0.449 
 
 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. “T” represents the discontinuity in outcomes for students who received the higher of the two labels. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the school by grade by year level. All models condition on grade by year fixed effects, and school fixed effects. B/BB represents the 
Below Basic/Basic threshold, B/P represents the Basic/Proficient threshold, and P/A represents the Proficient/Advanced threshold.  
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Table 5. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds during NCLB and waiver period, math 
 
  Below Basic/Basic Basic/Proficient Proficient/Advanced 
Bandwidth 
(number of 
questions) 
 
2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 A
 
T -0.013 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 0.004 -0.005 0.011 0.011 0.020 0.024* 0.010 0.006 0.020 0.015 0.015 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.025) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
                  
T x 
waiver 
0.013 0.008 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.010 -0.013 -0.027* -0.032** -0.030* 0.029 -0.004 -0.018 -0.023 -0.023 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
                  
Obs 31054 41705 49266 53929 56255 26982 37387 47021 53380 56529 12247 17322 22809 27932 30933 
R2 0.414 0.436 0.458 0.477 0.488 0.455 0.488 0.522 0.540 0.548 0.398 0.441 0.479 0.512 0.532 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 B
 
T -0.020 0.004 0.007 0.020 0.023* -0.023 0.010 0.019 0.026** 0.026** 0.054* 0.020 0.023 0.012 0.012 
 (0.020) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.022) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) 
                  
T x 
waiver 
-0.031* -0.032* -0.032* -0.033** -0.032* -0.010 -0.027* -0.035** -0.034** -0.033** 0.034* 0.030 0.028 0.019 0.012 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
                  
Obs 25335 34504 42531 48015 51369 27476 37873 46913 53427 56835 15781 22170 28444 33488 36134 
R2 0.397 0.426 0.457 0.481 0.497 0.455 0.487 0.518 0.538 0.546 0.452 0.489 0.521 0.546 0.562 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 C
 
T 0.033 0.039** 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.044*** -0.011 -0.012 -0.015 -0.008 -0.002 0.024 -0.002 0.001 0.008 0.012 
 (0.019) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.021) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
                  
T x 
waiver 
-0.040* -0.056*** -0.059*** -0.064*** -0.066*** -0.024 -0.023 -0.028** -0.031** -0.030** -0.018 0.004 0.016 0.018 0.015 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
                  
Obs 22456 30638 38327 44149 47640 25007 34500 43508 50579 54713 17208 23687 30002 35616 38519 
R2 0.406 0.436 0.474 0.493 0.503 0.420 0.459 0.505 0.538 0.557 0.457 0.498 0.535 0.566 0.584 
 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. “T” represents the discontinuity in outcomes for students who received the higher of the two labels. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the school by grade by year level. All models condition on student covariates (race, ethnicity, FRPL, ELL, and disability status), 
school covariates (log enrollment, prior year’s percent proficient in math, percent of school that is black, Hispanic, white, FRPL, ELL, and has a disability), 
grade by year fixed effects, and school fixed effects. 
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Table 6. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds during NCLB and waiver period, reading 
 
 
  Below Basic/Basic Basic/Proficient Proficient/Advanced 
Bandwidth 
(number of 
questions) 
 
2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 A
 
T 0.009 -0.005 -0.001 0.009 0.016 -0.004 0.004 0.011 0.014 0.017* 0.019 0.007 0.005 0.011 0.010 
 (0.026) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.021) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) 
                  
T x 
waiver 
-0.021 -0.020 -0.009 -0.020 -0.026* -0.009 -0.014 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.012 -0.005 -0.006 0.000 0.001 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
                  
Obs 15529 21600 27280 32748 38032 23606 32528 40921 48993 55532 14994 20649 25758 30544 35145 
R2 0.391 0.413 0.431 0.454 0.479 0.433 0.471 0.512 0.551 0.582 0.418 0.464 0.501 0.529 0.552 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 B
 
T 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.024* -0.015 -0.021 -0.015 -0.016 -0.018* -0.010 0.002 0.011 0.021 0.021 
 (0.024) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.021) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) 
                  
T x 
waiver 
0.001 -0.004 -0.011 -0.027* -0.030* 0.014 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.010 -0.022 -0.018 -0.027 -0.031* 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
                  
Obs 15675 21689 27444 32597 37199 24197 33500 42403 50246 56379 15959 21993 27483 32719 37312 
R2 0.375 0.406 0.431 0.458 0.476 0.436 0.479 0.520 0.559 0.591 0.445 0.481 0.511 0.542 0.563 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 C
 
T 0.032 0.022 0.019 0.027* 0.030* -0.017 -0.012 -0.010 -0.004 -0.005 0.003 -0.004 0.009 0.011 0.017 
 (0.026) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.020) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) 
                  
T x 
waiver 
-0.046* -0.041* -0.045** -0.045** -0.053*** -0.008 -0.014 -0.013 -0.018 -0.019* 0.026 0.035* 0.028 0.018 0.017 
(0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
                  
Obs 13429 18843 24125 29452 34083 24955 34425 43457 51542 57801 15485 21066 26234 31246 35756 
R2 0.430 0.447 0.468 0.493 0.508 0.445 0.484 0.533 0.573 0.604 0.449 0.486 0.519 0.548 0.566 
 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. “T” represents the discontinuity in outcomes for students who received the higher of the two labels. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the school by grade by year level. All models condition on student covariates (race, ethnicity, FRPL, ELL, and disability status), 
school covariates (log enrollment, prior year’s percent proficient in reading, percent of school that is black, Hispanic, white, FRPL, ELL, and has a disability), 
grade by year fixed effects, and school fixed effects. 
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Figures 
Figure 3. Percent of students assigned each performance label during NCLB and waiver, math 
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Figure 4. Percent of students assigned each performance label during NCLB and waiver, reading 
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Figure 5. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds during NCLB and waiver period, math 
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Figure 6. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds during NCLB and waiver period, elementary schools math 
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Figure 7. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds during NCLB and waiver period, middle schools math 
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Figure 8. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds during NCLB and waiver period, reading 
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Figure 9. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds during NCLB and waiver period, elementary schools reading 
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Figure 10. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds during NCLB and waiver period, middle schools reading 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
71 
 
Chapter 3: Alternative Explanations for the Reduced Focus on Bubble Students 
The Chapter 2 results provide evidence that schools in Greenfield County Public Schools 
(GCPS) focused on bubble students during No Child Left Behind (NCLB) but were no longer 
doing so (at least in the same way) under the waiver accountability system. Those analyses show 
that lower-performing students were harmed during NCLB and benefitted after the waiver was 
implemented (2012-13 to 2013-14). One explanation for these results is that the onset of the 
waiver regime shifted the incentives facing schools, causing them to pay more attention to lower-
achieving students. The introduction of the waiver is not the only explanation, however, and this 
chapter investigates three alternate explanations for the Chapter 2 results. After a brief 
introduction to the three hypotheses, I investigate each one in turn by (a) describing the data used 
and models estimated, (b) presenting the results, and (c) discussing the findings before moving 
onto the next alternative. 
One alternate explanation is that the adoption of a new educator evaluation system, which 
occurred in 2011-12 (the year before the waiver was implemented), changed incentives so 
administrators and teachers lessened their focus on bubble students. Under the old evaluation 
system, educators were rated primarily based on observation scores from their supervisors. 
Under the new evaluation system, 35% of principal and teacher evaluation scores were 
comprised of value-add measures from their students’ state test scores. The state evaluated 
teachers using these value-add scores in order to “maintain a focus on advancing each child 
against the current baseline results” (ESEA Flexibility Request, 2012, p. 34). These growth 
metrics would theoretically reduce the pressure for teachers to focus on proficiency rates (and 
bubble students). No important stakes were attached to the new evaluations for current teachers, 
however, which may limit how much these new incentives would induce teachers to change their 
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behavior. On the other hand, the new incentives could have shifted behavior if teachers believed 
that higher stakes would be introduced over time or if they simply wanted to look good when 
evaluated.  
A second alternate explanation for the increased focus on lower-performing students 
during the waiver is that schools realized that it did not make sense to draw distinctions between 
students who lay just to the left and just to the right of the Proficient threshold (or any threshold). 
Instead, schools may have changed the way they determined who was a bubble student. Under 
this hypothesis schools continued to practice triage, they simply changed the way they 
determined their bubble students beginning in 2012-13. Instead of using the test-score labels 
investigated in Chapter 2, schools may have used a district-furnished label which specifically 
identified the bubble students. If schools used this label to identify bubble students, this would 
explain why the regression discontinuity analysis from the previous chapter no longer found 
evidence of triage in the later years of the sample.  
Beginning in 2012-13, the district combined multiple pieces of student-level data to 
classify students based on whether they had low-, moderate-, or high-probabilities of meeting 
proficiency on the state test. Students in those groups were labeled “Multi-Year Plan,” “Priority,” 
or “Enrichment,” respectively, as seen in the Identification of Target Students document shown 
in Figure 2. This document directed schools to “prioritize Target students” and was shared with 
all elementary and middle school principals. These actions—dividing students into three groups 
based on their closeness to meeting proficiency and directing schools to focus on the middle 
group—represent district-endorsed triage. The district basically said to schools: the students 
labeled Priority are the bubble students, and you should focus on them. Comparing relative 
differences in outcomes for students in these groups before and after the waiver can also allay 
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any lingering concerns from the previous chapter that schools would not have treated students 
differently based on their benchmark labels. 
A third alternative is that additional funding provided by the district mitigated the 
negative effects of triage on low-achievers. The district research team identified 29 low-
performing schools that could benefit from additional federal funds available in 2012-13 (the 
first year of the waiver). Each of the 29 school leaders turned in a Targeted Academic 
Intervention Proposal (TAIP), detailing how the school would use the money to restructure their 
school day to offer targeted interventions. The additional TAIP funds for this selected group of 
schools could explain why the Chapter 2 analysis fails to find the focus on bubble students 
during the waiver. Triage occurs when there are limited resources: schools prioritize students 
close to proficiency and then divert resources to them. If schools received additional money to 
offer interventions for bubble students, then they would not need to divert resources from non-
bubble students.  
Alternative 1: Adoption of a New Educator Evaluation System in 2011-12 
 This analysis investigates the hypothesis that the increased focus on low-performers 
found in Chapter 2 was because the new educator evaluation system included value-add growth 
metrics. This is investigated by exploiting the fact that the new evaluation system was 
implemented a year before the waiver took effect. 
Data 
This analysis uses the same testing data from Chapter 2, except that the 2012-13 and 
2013-14 students are dropped from the sample. A binary variable Evaluation indicates which 
evaluation system was in effect during the school year. A value of zero represents the old 
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evaluation system (2009-10 through 2010-11), which primarily used observation scores to rate 
educators, and a value of one represents the first year of the new educator evaluation system 
(2011-12), when value-add growth metrics comprised 35% of teacher and principal ratings. 
Methods 
The same regression models from Chapter 2 (Equation 1) are estimated on the test-score 
labels before and after the new evaluation system was introduced. That is, ordinary least squares 
(OLS) is used to calculate the discontinuity at each threshold (Basic, Proficient, and Advanced) 
on each benchmark, and an interaction term is included to quantify the difference in the 
discontinuity when the new evaluation system was implemented. The equation is as follows:  
Ysijt = β0 + β1Tsijt + β2 (Tsijt x Evaluationt) + β3 num_correctsijt + β4 (Tsijt x num_correctsijt) +       (3) 
δXit + γZjt + ηj + θt + eijt 
In these models, Ysijt represents the standardized end-of-year state test score on the 
subject-area test s for student i in school j, in year t. Tsijt represents treatment (a binary variable 
indicating that the student received the higher of the two performance labels in subject s), 
Evaluationt is a binary variable indicating that the state was under the new evaluation system in 
year t, num_correctsijt represents the distance from the cutoff score (students who score below the 
cut-off have negative values for this, students who score at or above the cut-off have zero or 
positive values), Xit is a vector of student controls (for student i in year t, including prior year 
state test score, race, FRPL, ELL, and disability status), Zjt is a vector of time-varying school 
controls (for school j in year t, including log enrollment, prior year’s percent proficient in subject 
s, and the percent of students in the school who are Black, Hispanic, White, FRPL, ELL, and 
have a disability), ηj represent school fixed effects, θt are grade-by-year fixed effects, and eijt is 
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the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the school by grade by year level. As with the 
previous chapter, these models are run across varying bandwidths of the number of benchmark 
questions answered correctly, from two to six questions on either side of each threshold. 
Because the models are the same from Chapter 2, I now look for a change associated with 
the adoption of the evaluation system in 2011-12 in the same way that I previously looked for a 
change associated with the waiver. If schools behaved more equitably in response to the waiver 
incentives but not the evaluation system, then the estimated discontinuities at each threshold 
should be close to zero for the “T x Evaluation” coefficients. This would mean that there was no 
change in school behavior based on the adoption of the evaluation system prior to the waiver. On 
the other hand, if schools did respond to the incentives of the evaluation system by paying more 
attention to the lower-performing students, then the coefficient on the interaction would be 
negative9. 
Results 
Because the first hypothesis is tested using the same methods from Chapter 2, the results 
are presented similarly. The estimated discontinuities at each label threshold before and after the 
implementation of the new evaluation system are shown in Table 7 (math) and Table 8 (reading), 
with those estimates graphed in Figures 11 and 12, respectively. 
                                                          
9 One aspect of comparing 2011-12 outcomes with previous years is that it removes these observations from the 
previous chapter’s NCLB estimates. As a preliminary step to see whether the Chapter 2 results depended on 2011-12 
data being included in the NCLB period, I checked two variations to those analyses. These involved (a) recoding 
2011-12 to be included as the waiver and (b) dropping 2011-12 altogether (so the NCLB era included 2009-10 and 
2010-11 and the waiver era included 2012-13 and 2013-14). The math results for 2011-12 recoded as the waiver are 
shown in Appendix Figure B1 and with 2011-12 dropped altogether are shown in Appendix Figure B2. The same 
results for reading are shown in Appendix Figures B3 and B4, respectively. Corresponding results were very similar 
to those presented in Chapter 2, indicating that those results did not depend on including 2011-12 in the NCLB era. 
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 Math. The inclusion of growth metrics in the educator evaluation system appears to have 
benefitted lower-performing students in math although not as broadly as reported in the previous 
chapter. Chapter 2 demonstrated that after the adoption of the waiver, there were consistent and 
significant negative estimates for the “T x Waiver” coefficient at both the Basic and Proficient 
thresholds and on both the second and third math benchmarks. The current results shown in 
Table 7 indicate that the new evaluation system led to a shift in focus only at the Basic threshold 
and only on math Benchmark C.  
As with the previous chapter, the estimated discontinuities at the Basic threshold on the 
third math benchmark (“T”) are consistently positive (although the estimates in this chapter are 
statistically significant only at the higher bandwidths). This indicates that, prior to the evaluation 
policy change, students barely labeled Basic gained more than those barely labeled Below Basic. 
That is, bubble students gained more than low performers during NCLB. These estimates 
correspond to the Chapter 2 results and are similar in magnitude (β≈ 0.040). The differential 
effect of the Basic label after the adoption of the new evaluation system is consistently negative 
at the Basic threshold on the third benchmark (ranging from -0.010 to -0.045). Because the 
negative coefficients represent the differential effect for students who receive the higher label, 
these estimates indicate that students who barely scored Below Basic on Benchmark C gained 
about 0.04 standard deviations more in 2011-12 than similar students in previous years 
(estimates which are statistically significant except at the narrowest bandwidth). These gains 
counteract the negative effect of the Below Basic label found during NCLB. These results are 
similar to those from the previous chapter, although the estimated differential effect of the new 
evaluation system is slightly smaller in magnitude (the previous chapter estimated that the 
differential effect during the waiver was about 0.06 standard deviations).  
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Reading. As with math, the adoption of the new evaluation system appears to have 
benefitted lower-performing students near the Basic threshold on reading Benchmark C. The 
discontinuities for the time period prior to the policy change (“T”) are positive and statistically 
significant at higher bandwidths (β= 0.030 to 0.040). These results are similar to those from 
Chapter 2 and provide more evidence that schools focused on Basic students over Below Basic 
students during NCLB. The estimated coefficients shown in Table 8 for “T x Evaluation” at the 
Basic threshold on Benchmark C are consistently negative (ranging from -0.010 to -0.065) but 
get larger in magnitude and are significant only as the bandwidth widens. This provides some 
evidence that students barely labeled Below Basic in reading gained more after the introduction 
of the new evaluation system. These negative differences in the “Evaluation” period indicate that 
the focus on bubble students was less evident in 2011-12. This suggests that educators responded 
to the change in incentives from the new evaluation system and shifted attention towards the 
lower-achieving students. The differential discontinuities for reading after that policy change are 
less consistent across bandwidths, however, than those from Chapter 2.  
Discussion 
The Chapter 2 results indicate that the waiver ameliorated the earlier negative effect of 
NCLB for students who barely score Below Basic on the third benchmark in both subjects. 
Those results are consistent across all bandwidths, which provides strong evidence that schools 
changed their behavior during the waiver period compared to NCLB. This first analysis 
investigated the hypothesis that the shift in focus to non-bubble students found during the waiver 
could be attributable to a change in educator incentives adopted the previous year. These results 
suggest that schools began to shift their attention towards lower-performing students in 2011-12, 
as would be predicted by the incentives created by including growth scores. This indicates that 
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the changes to the evaluation system contributed to the gains found for lower-achieving students. 
Yet the results from the 2011-12 data show more variation in statistical significance across 
bandwidths than those from the previous chapter. Furthermore, the findings in this analysis are 
concentrated only at the Basic threshold on the third benchmark. This suggests that the new 
evaluation system was not the only factor in reducing the focus on bubble students, at least not in 
its first year. The evidence points toward the change in incentives created by the adoption of the 
waiver system or (possibly) the evaluation system as contributing to the changes found in 
Chapter 2. 
The state intended for the waiver accountability system and the educator evaluation 
system to work in tandem (a) to increase overall student achievement and (b) to grow “every 
student, every year.” From these results, it appears that the state was successful in shifting 
attention away from bubble students and down the test score distribution. The state changed 
incentives twice: once for evaluating educators and once for rating schools. It is possible that the 
Chapter 2 findings are the result of the second year of the evaluation system and not the 
introduction of the waiver. While I cannot disentangle the effects of these different policy 
changes, the explanation for both is the same: if incentives change, schools respond. The effects 
of these different policies are worth exploring further to see which incentives appear to cause 
shifting behavior. For instance, the new evaluation system applied only to new teachers. Further 
research might look in to whether the more equitable behavior is concentrated amongst new 
teachers or whether tenured teachers also responded to the new evaluation system. 
Alternative 2: Schools Changed How They Defined Bubble Students during the Waiver 
The second alternative examines the hypothesis that schools were still focusing on bubble 
students after the waiver was implemented but that they changed their definition of who the 
79 
 
bubble students were. This could occur if schools realized that it did not make sense to treat 
students differently based on which side of a label threshold they scored. The hypothesis 
investigated here is that the district-supplied Priority label facilitated the change in how schools 
identified bubble students beginning in 2012-13, when GCPS created the more prescriptive 
labels and shared them with schools. 
These prescriptive labels are valuable for several reasons to explore whether schools’ 
behavior changed over time. First, the fact that the district provided these labels and directed 
schools to focus on Priority students makes it plausible that schools actually targeted these 
students. Because these labels identify the targeted group, this removes the guesswork from the 
analysis about whom the schools would consider bubble students. Second, the labels, the 
descriptions, and the color-coding of the Identification of Target Students document (Figure 2) 
reflect the three triage groups of too low, suitable, and too high, respectively. Third, these groups 
overlap the thresholds tested in Chapter 2, with students close to the Basic threshold labeled 
“Multi-Year Plan” (MYP), students close to the Proficiency threshold (i.e., the bubble students) 
labeled “Priority,” and students close to the Advanced threshold labeled “Enrichment.”  
It is also plausible that even before receiving these prescriptive labels in 2012-13, schools 
identified bubble students not based on the Basic label (as investigated in Chapter 2) but instead 
in a way that is similar to the district’s Priority label. That is, schools viewed students as “on the 
bubble” if they answered within a few questions above and below the Proficient label on the 
benchmark. This analysis also explores this hypothesis by using the district definitions to identify 
which students would have received the prescriptive labels in the NCLB era.  
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Data 
This analysis uses the same student data as Chapter 2 (2009-10 through 2013-14) with 
several additional variables included. 
Projected performance. Beginning in 2011-12, the state electronically shared with 
districts individual student projections in math and reading. These projections range from 0 to 
100 and were calculated separately for math and reading based on each student’s entire test 
history. The projection variables shared by the state included (a) the projected percentile for the 
student’s end-of-year performance, (b) the probability that the student would score Advanced, (c) 
the probability that the student would score Proficient, and (d) the probability that the student 
would score Basic. In 2012-13, the district used the individual probabilities provided by the state 
to classify students as Advanced, Proficient, Basic, or Below Basic as follows (these 
performance labels represent each student’s state projection and are separate from the 
benchmark labels assigned to students):  
 If P(Advanced) ≥ 50%, the district labeled students “Advanced”  
 If P(Proficient) ≥ 50% and P(Advanced) < 50%, the district labeled students 
“Proficient”  
 If P(Basic) ≥ 50% and P(Proficient) < 50%, the district labeled students “Basic” 
 If P(Basic) < 50%, the district labeled students “Below Basic” 
Prescriptive labels. In 2012-13, the district research office used two different metrics to 
assign students prescriptive labels. In that year, each student’s current performance and state 
projection placed them on a 5 x 4 matrix, as shown in the Identification of Target Students 
document in Figure 2. The test-score label from Benchmark B comprises the top row in Figure 2 
and represents each student’s current performance. As analyzed in the previous chapter, each 
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student’s second benchmark score was assigned a label of Advanced, Proficient, Basic, or Below 
Basic based on the number of questions answered correctly. The district used each student’s 
label derived from the state projection, as described above, to comprise the left-hand column in 
Figure 2. Based on the combination of their current and projected performance, each individual 
was labeled as Priority 1, Priority 2, Enrichment, MYP, or No Label. Students who were missing 
a state projection (primarily third graders who had not yet taken a state test) had their 
prescriptive label determined solely by their benchmark score, as shown in the bottom row of 
Figure 2. Using the combination of their benchmark scores and state projections, I assigned each 
student in the dataset their prescriptive label of MYP, Priority10, or Enrichment11.  
This analysis is intended to investigate whether schools changed the way they identified 
their bubble students during the waiver by using this district-provided Priority label. To examine 
whether this differed from how they behaved during NCLB, I assigned prescriptive labels to 
students in previous years based on what label they would have received if the district had 
                                                          
10 As will be shown in the next chapter, school leaders did not distinguish between Priority 1 and Priority 2 students. 
I follow this convention and call these students collectively “Priority” students. 
11 The district did not provide schools with a list of students and their corresponding prescriptive label. Instead, they 
created a report in the online data warehouse called the Virtual Data Wall Report (shown in Appendix Figure B5), 
which schools could use to identify their Priority students. Because of this, it is unclear in some cases which 
prescriptive label a student would have received from their school. While the district provided guidelines to schools 
regarding these labels, they allowed school leaders some leeway in determining their Priority students. As noted at 
the bottom of the Identification of Target Students matrix (Figure 2), the district indicated that the students whose 
scores have them fall “within a few (3-4) items of [the] number correct cut score for Proficient level” should be 
included in the Priority group. This flexibility means that each individual school could determine whether their 
“bubble” would (a) include three questions on either side of the Proficiency line or (b) be broadened to include 
students within four question on either side. Appendix Figure B6 recreates the Identification of Target Students 
matrix to show the leeway provided to schools in defining these labels. The dotted lines in Appendix Figure B5 
indicate that some of the labels are flexible and determined at the school level. Schools were given flexibility to 
include students within four question of proficiency only for these groups of students: (a) students labeled Proficient 
on both metrics, (b) students labeled Basic on both metrics, (c) students missing a projection and scoring Proficient 
on the benchmark, and (d) students missing a projection and scoring Basic on the benchmark. Because it is unclear 
which label students who were exactly four questions from proficiency would be assigned, I opted to leave their 
label blank. About 7% of the sample are in one of those four groups and answer exactly four questions above or 
below proficiency.  
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created the prescriptive labels earlier. Because the state supplied projections in 2011-12, I use the 
same methods just described to assign prescriptive labels to students in that year (even though 
the district did not use that information until 2012-13). For the 2009-10 and 2010-11 school 
years, when the state did not electronically share projected performance, I use the assignment 
rules from the bottom row of Figure 2 to classify students (which are for students who are 
missing projections). 
To be clear, schools had access to the specific prescriptive labels of MYP, Priority, and 
Enrichment only in 2012-13 and 2013-14. These labels correspond with the students whom 
schools in earlier eras might have considered low, bubble, and high, respectively. This definition 
of bubble students—scoring some distance on either side of proficiency—is similar to strategies 
used in prior triage research (e.g., Ladd & Lauen, 2010; Springer, 2008b). The main difference is 
that rather than assigning more or less arbitrary bounds around the proficiency line, I use the 
district’s definition of within three questions of proficiency on the benchmark. Another benefit of 
this district benchmark data is that Chapter 2 provides evidence that schools did use this 
assessment information, especially the third benchmark scores. 
Figure 13 shows the percent of the sample labeled MYP, Priority, and Enrichment in 
math for each accountability era. During NCLB, the percent of students in each category is 
relatively consistent across math benchmarks: about 46% are MYP, 37% are Priority, and 17% 
are Enrichment. On the other hand, during the waiver, the percent of MYP students decreased 
from 45% on Benchmark A to 39% on Benchmark C with a corresponding increase in 
Enrichment students from 17% to 22%. Priority students in math during the waiver consistently 
represent about 39% of the sample. Figure 14 shows the same information for reading, when the 
labels are relatively consistent across benchmarks and eras. MYP students make up 45-48% of 
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the reading sample, Priority students represent 31-34%, and Enrichment students comprise 20-
23%.  
Methods 
In this analysis, the outcomes are compared across accountability eras based on whether 
students received (or would have received) the Priority, MYP, or Enrichment label. If schools 
targeted Priority students, as the district encouraged them to do beginning in 2012-13 year, then 
these students should gain significantly more than the other students. If schools distinguished 
between Below Basic and Basic students when they had those labels but then used the Priority 
label once it was supplied by the district, this could explain why Chapter 2 found that the Basic 
threshold no longer mattered during the waiver.  
I use a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to examine this hypothesis empirically. 
This change from the local linear regression discontinuity (RD) method used in Chapter 2 
reflects both (a) the hypothesis being investigated and (b) the district’s classification of a group 
of students as priority. The underlying motivation for using local linear RD in the previous 
chapter is that schools would treat students differently based on if they were just above or just 
below a particular label threshold. While the previous chapter found discontinuities in average 
outcomes for students close to some thresholds, schools may have realized that it did not make a 
lot of sense to draw sharp distinctions between students with similar benchmark scores but who 
were clustered on opposite sides of a threshold. Schools may have instead viewed students close 
to the proficiency line as bubble students rather than distinguishing between Proficient and Basic 
students (something that is true at other thresholds as well). Other researchers have had to 
designate arbitrary upper and lower bounds around proficiency to identify the bubble students, 
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but I am able to use the district-supplied label which effectively identified Priority students as 
deserving special treatment. 
This DID method compares in one model the performance of the Priority students with 
those who are considered too low or too high to receive that label. Higher order polynomials of 
each assessment variable (benchmark score, prior year test score, projected performance) control 
for students’ underlying achievement patterns which might explain why the outcomes of students 
labeled Priority differed from students labeled MYP or Enrichment. The binary variables 
representing the low- and high-achievers are included in the model to quantify the effect of the 
label beyond students’ achievement histories. As with Chapter 2, the analyses are run separately 
for each of the three benchmarks.  
I use the following DID model to estimate the effect of the label on student outcomes. 
Ysijt = β0 + β1Multi-YearPlansijt + β2Enrichmentsijt  +             (4) 
β3 (Multi-YearPlansijt x Waiver) + β4 (Enrichmentsijt x Waiver) + 
∑ 𝜆𝑗𝐴𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑗𝑘
𝑗=1  + δXit + γZjt  + ηj + θt  + eijt 
In this equation, Ysijt represents the standardized state test score (for student i in subject s 
in school j in year t), Multi-YearPlansijt represents a binary variable equaling one if the student 
was labeled as MYP, Enrichmentsijt represents a binary variable equaling one if the student was 
labeled as Enrichment, Waiver is a binary variable equaling one if the year is 2012-13 or later, 
Achievementsijt represents various testing variables (up to cubic polynomials for each of prior 
year test score, projected percentile, benchmark raw score [centered at proficiency] and the 
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interaction of each test score with one another)12, Xit is a vector of student characteristics (race 
and ethnicity, FRPL, ELL status, and disability status), Zjt is a vector of time-varying school 
controls (for school j in year t, including log enrollment, prior year’s percent proficient in subject 
s, and the percent of students who are Black, Hispanic, White, FRPL, ELL, and have a 
disability), ηj represent school fixed effects, θt are grade-by-year fixed effects, and eijt is the error 
term. Standard errors are clustered at the school by grade by year level.  
The targeted (Priority) students are the omitted group in this equation. Two coefficients 
of interest are β1 and β2, which represent the difference in outcome for low- and high-performers 
compared to bubble students during NCLB. Both of these coefficients would be negative if 
schools used these labels to engage in triage, which would support the hypothesis that schools 
used this alternate definition of bubble students during NCLB.  
The other coefficients of interest are β3 and β4, which represent the differential outcome 
for low- and high-performers compared to bubble students during the waiver. Positive estimates 
for β3 and β4 would indicate that low- and high-achievers improved during the waiver. If schools 
shifted their definition of bubble students toward the group identified by the district Priority label 
in 2012-13, then β3 and β4 would be negative, implying that the low- and high-performers were 
                                                          
12 A number of students were missing achievement data, especially prior year test score. Because 3rd graders take the 
state test for the first time at the end of the school year, they would be excluded from this analysis due to missing 
prior test scores. Because 3rd graders are part of the group that counts twice towards the accountability system during 
the waiver, it was important to include them in the analysis. To include students in the analysis who were missing 
some achievement data, all students with missing test variables were assigned a score of zero on that variable, and 
the test score variables from Equation 4 were interacted with a variable indicating each student’s pattern of 
missingness for the achievement variables. This allows for each student to have their outcome predicted by using all 
of the test score information available while minimizing the number of students excluded from the analyses. 
86 
 
harmed by this shift in attention to Priority students. Due to the benchmark analyses run so far, 
the strongest evidence is expected on the third benchmark13. 
Results  
The results from this model are shown in Table 9 for both math and reading. In math, 
there is evidence of triage based on the third benchmark during NCLB using this alternate 
definition of bubble students. On Benchmark C, both low- and high-performers gain significantly 
less than bubble students in these years. The estimate for low-performers (β= -0.031, p<0.001) is 
similar in magnitude to the discontinuities found in Chapter 2 for Below Basic students close to 
the Basic threshold. Furthermore, the results from this model indicate that the low-performing 
students (those labeled MYP by the district) benefitted during the waiver. The estimate for MYP 
x Waiver on the third benchmark is 0.043 (p>0.001), indicating that these students gained 
significantly more during the waiver than NCLB. Again, these gains for low-performing math 
students during the waiver are similar in magnitude to the differential discontinuities estimated in 
Chapter 2.  
The negative effects for high-performing math students (β= -0.021, p<0.001) during 
NCLB were not found in the previous chapter. In contrast to the previous chapter, the definition 
                                                          
13 This analysis differs from Chapter 2 in two ways: (a) the labels used (Below Basic/Basic/Proficient/Advanced 
compared to MYP/Priority/Enrichment) and (b) the model (local linear RD compared to DID). The results from 
Chapter 2 were tested for sensitivity by running the DID model from Equation 4 on the data and labels from Chapter 
2 (i.e., substituting the binary variables of Below Basic, Proficient, and Advanced for the new district-provided 
labels of MYP and Enrichment). The previous chapter’s results are generally confirmed when using the DID 
methods (shown in Appendix Table B1) instead of local linear RD. Students labeled Below Basic on the later 
benchmarks score significantly worse than Basic students during NCLB, with those losses mitigated after the waiver 
was implemented. The estimates are similar in magnitude across the two methods. While the significant results from 
Chapter 2 were affirmed here, using the DID models resulted in additional significant differences between 
performance labels. These labels were relatively small in magnitude, however, and similar in size to the estimated 
effects found in Ch. 2. For example, in reading, the model in Equation 4 detected a significant negative effect of the 
Proficient label on Benchmark B (β= -0.017, p<0.05). The estimated discontinuities for students close to this 
threshold from Chapter 2 were very similar (ranging from -0.015 to -0.021). The increased significance is likely due 
to the smaller standard errors resulting from the larger sample used in the DID models, which includes all students 
rather than limiting the sample to students around the threshold. 
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of high performers used here groups students near the Advanced threshold together. This 
provides evidence that both low- and high-performers did worse during NCLB than bubble 
students (i.e., that schools engaged in triage). The waiver does not appear to have benefitted high 
performers. Students labeled Enrichment on Benchmarks A and B gained significantly less 
during the waiver than NCLB. Overall, using a different definition for bubble students does not 
alter the conclusion from Chapter 2 that schools practiced less triage during the waiver. 
The reading results from this analysis differ more from those in Chapter 2 than the math 
results. The previous chapter found some evidence that Below Basic students close to the Basic 
threshold on the third reading benchmark gained less during NCLB. The current results indicate 
that during NCLB, low performers on the third reading benchmark gained significantly more 
than bubble students (β=0.033, p<0.001). These results, then, do not indicate that schools 
focused on this group of bubble students in reading during NCLB. Given that this model found 
low-achievers in reading gained more than bubble students during NCLB, it is not particularly 
surprising that no differential effect is detected for being labeled MYP in reading during the 
waiver. Chapter 2 found that low-performing reading students benefitted during the waiver, but 
those gains occurred in models which showed that those students had been harmed during 
NCLB. There are no differences in outcomes detected in either era for high-performing students 
in reading.  
Discussion 
This analysis examined a second alternative for the reduced focus on bubble students 
found in Chapter 2: schools continued to triage under the waiver, but they defined bubble 
students differently. Rather than using the Below Basic, Basic, Proficient, and Advanced test-
score labels from Chapter 2, this analysis substituted the district-supplied prescriptive labels of 
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MYP, Priority, and Enrichment. The math results are similar to those found in the previous 
chapter: (a) schools engaged in triage in math during NCLB and (b) low-performers in math 
benefitted from the waiver. These results further strengthen the case that the reduced focus on 
bubble students found in Chapter 2 was real and not an artifact of the way bubble students were 
defined. 
So far, analyses have compared outcomes for students (a) across different incentives 
(both school accountability and educator evaluation systems), (b) using different definitions of 
bubble students, and (c) running different statistical models. The results thus far indicate that 
low-performers benefit under new incentives. Both the new educator evaluation system and the 
waiver accountability system changed the incentives facing educators, and low-achievers in 
GCPS gained after these changes. The gains for low-performers after these policy shifts, 
however, counteract previous harm done to them. These results demonstrate that policy 
incentives matter. That the negative effects found so far are focused on low-performers should be 
concerning for policymakers who intend accountability policy to support the learning of all 
students. 
Alternative 3: Additional Funding Provided by the District Mitigated the Need to Divert 
Resources 
 The first two analyses in this chapter suggest that the reduced focus on bubble students 
found in Chapter 2 was due to, at least in part, shifts in the incentives of the educator evaluation 
system but not due to changes in how schools defined bubble students. The third hypothesis 
relates to the additional TAIP funding the district provided to 29 schools in 2012-13. If these 
schools had been engaging in triage by diverting resources towards bubble students, then the 
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additional resources provided by the TAIP could limit triage because bubble students could be 
targeted without having to divert resources from other students.  
The TAIP funding is investigated in two ways. First, in this chapter, I modify the 
previous chapter’s models to control for whether a school would receive TAIP funding in 2012-
13. Additional variables and interactions are included to allow the TAIP money to moderate the 
effect of treatment (i.e., receiving the higher of two labels). This investigates whether the TAIP 
funding helps explain the gains found for low-performing students during the waiver. Second, 
the TAIP documents are analyzed in-depth in the next chapter. That analysis reveals which 
students were targeted with what resources, information that gets inside the black box and 
answers directly whether TAIP funds were used to support low-performing students. 
Data  
The student-level data from the previous chapter is used. The 29 schools that received 
additional funds from the district filled out TAIPs, which describe their interventions for 
restructuring the school day. While these proposals are analyzed in-depth in the next chapter, this 
analysis investigates whether students who attended schools that would receive additional funds 
in 2012-13 had systematically different outcomes from students who attended schools that would 
not receive funds. To that end, a binary variable (HasTAIP) equals one for students who attended 
one of the 29 TAIP-funded schools. This variable takes a value of one across all years in the 
sample for students who attended these schools. In addition, because 2012-13 was the only year 
that TAIP funding was provided to schools, an indicator variable 2013 is included in several 
interactions. 
Because the Chapter 2 results were concentrated at the Basic and Proficient thresholds on 
Benchmarks B and C, these analyses are limited to those thresholds and benchmarks. 
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Methods 
 To test the hypothesis that the increased focus on low-performers during the waiver was 
due to the TAIP funding given to 29 schools in 2012-13, the previous chapter’s models are 
modified to interact the treatment variables with variables indicating (a) whether students 
attended schools that would receive TAIP funding in 2012-13 and (b) whether the year is 2012-
13. This further modifies the RD model so that it is a difference-in-difference-in-differences 
(DIDID) comparison across TAIP schools, waiver, and year. Even though TAIP funding was 
offered to schools only in 2012-13, the entire sample—from 2009-10 through 2013-14—is 
included in this model. The 2013-14 school year was during the waiver, but schools did not 
receive TAIP funding in that year. Including both a waiver (which has a value of one for both 
2012-13 and 2013-14) and a 2013 indicator in this model allows for estimating whether there 
continues to be a waiver effect after controlling for the TAIP funding. 
Like the previous chapter, the sample is limited on each benchmark to students who 
received the labels on either side of a threshold, and then local linear RD models are run to 
estimate the discontinuities in outcomes for students who were assigned the higher of the two 
labels across varying bandwidths. The previous chapter included a treatment modifier (T x 
waiver) to estimate the differential effect of receiving the higher label during the waiver; this 
analysis includes the two additional treatment modifiers as shown below in Equation 5.  
Ysijt = β1Tsijt + β2 (Tsijt x HasTAIPj) + β3 (Tsijt x Waivert) + β4 (HasTAIPj x Waivert) +                  (5) 
β5 (Tsijt x HasTAIPj x Waivert) + β6 (Tsijt x 2013t) + β7 (HasTAIPj x 2013t) +                         
β8 (Tsijt x HasTAIPj x 2013t) + β9 num_correctsijt + β10 (Tsijt x num_correctsijt) +                
δXit + γYjt + ηj + θt  + eijt 
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In this model, Ysijt represents the standardized end-of-year state test score on the subject-
area test s for student i in school j in year t. Tsijt represents treatment (a binary variable indicating 
that the student received the higher of the two performance labels in subject s), HasTAIPt is a 
binary variable indicating that the school would receive funding in 2012-13, Waivert is a binary 
variable indicating that the state was under the waiver accountability system in year t, 2013t is a 
binary variable indicating that the year was 2012-13, num_correctsijt represents the distance from 
the threshold (students who score below the cut-score have negative values, students who score 
at or above have zero or positive values), Xit is a vector of student controls (for student i in year t, 
including prior year state test score, race, FRPL, ELL, and disability status), Yjt is a vector of 
time-varying school controls (for school j in year t, including log enrollment, prior year’s 
percentage of students scoring proficient in subject s, and the percentage of students who are 
Black, Hispanic, White, FRPL, ELL, and have a disability), ηj are school fixed effects, θt are 
grade-by-year fixed effects, and eijt is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the school 
by grade level. 
The omitted group in this model are the students who received the lower of the two labels 
during NCLB who attended schools that would not receive TAIP funding. The β1 and β3 are the 
same estimates from Chapter 2, which represent the effect of receiving the higher label during 
NCLB (T) and the differential effect during the waiver (T x waiver), respectively. Because the 
TAIP funding and year are controlled for in this analysis, the β3 estimates (T x waiver) are of 
main interest in this model to test the hypothesis that the TAIP funding explains the previous 
chapter’s results. If the β3 estimates have the same direction and significance as those in the 
previous chapter, then the TAIP funding does not explain the shift in focus to low-performers. If 
92 
 
the β3 estimates are of a different sign or zero, then that suggests that the TAIP funding 
contributed to the gains for low-achievers. 
While the β3 coefficient relates to the hypothesis being tested in this chapter, Equation 5 
also allows for investigating several other relationships of interest regarding the TAIP funding, 
especially to preview analyzing the actual TAIPs in the next chapter. As will be explained in 
more detail in Chapter 4, the district offered TAIP funding to schools and encouraged them to 
target students labeled as Priority with academic interventions (i.e., the students on the bubble 
around proficiency). Even though the TAIP funding was offered in the first year of the waiver 
and the second year of the new evaluation system—policy changes that my earlier analyses 
indicated benefitted Below Basic students—a number of TAIP schools offered these 
interventions to Basic students14. In the context of this analysis, then, the threshold where 
students were most likely targeted was at the Basic threshold, with Basic students receiving 
TAIP interventions, and Below Basic students being left out of them. This threshold is already of 
interest due to the main effects from the previous chapter being concentrated here. At this 
threshold, the Basic students are the treated students and have a value of one for the treatment (T) 
variable.  
Did targeted students benefit from the TAIP funding? If schools targeted Basic students 
with the TAIP interventions, and if Basic students benefitted from those interventions, then Basic 
students in 2012-13 in TAIP schools should have better outcomes than similar students in those 
schools the following year, when no additional funding was available. The most straightforward 
way to answer this question is to look at the coefficient on T x HasTAIP x 2013 (β8). This DIDID 
                                                          
14 Evidence for this will be forthcoming in Chapter 4. 
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estimator represents the difference in average outcome for Basic students in TAIP schools in 
2012-13 and 2013-14 after accounting for the differences between (a) Basic students in those two 
years in non-TAIP schools (T x 2013) and (b) Below Basic students in those two years in TAIP 
schools (HasTAIP x 2013). If the β8 estimates are positive, then Basic students had better 
outcomes than similar students in the same schools when they did not have additional funding. If 
the difference is zero, then students in both groups had similar average outcomes, meaning the 
TAIP funds did not benefit the Basic students. This DIDID estimator also represents the 
difference between treated Basic students and non-treated Below Basic students in TAIP schools 
during 2012-13, which is another way of indicating whether the TAIP targeting affected 
outcomes. 
Did non-targeted students benefit from the TAIP funding? If the TAIP funding allowed 
schools to target the Basic students without having to take resources from Below Basic students, 
then non-targeted students in TAIP schools in 2012-13 (when TAIP funding was available) 
should do better than non-targeted students in those schools the following year (when there were 
no additional funds). This question is answered by the β7 coefficient (HasTAIP x 2013), which 
represents the difference in average outcome between Below Basic students in the TAIP year 
with similar students the following year. A positive value for β7 would provide evidence that the 
TAIP money allowed schools to target Basic students without harming Below Basic students.  
The Basic threshold is of more interest in this analysis than the Proficient threshold 
because both (a) there was less evidence in Chapter 2 of a difference in treatment at the 
Proficient threshold in either subject, and (b) the second alternative explored in this chapter 
indicates that this might be because schools treated students around this threshold similarly (i.e., 
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viewed them as bubble students). Because of these reasons, the main differences in outcomes are 
expected at the Basic threshold, although the Proficient threshold is still explored.  
At the Proficient threshold, the treatment indicator refers to Proficient students. At this 
threshold, the students labeled as Basic have a zero value for T, although that does not mean they 
are non-targeted (Basic students just below proficiency are likely targeted by schools), it simply 
means they received the lower of the two labels. Because of this, β8 (T x HasTAIP x 2013) refers 
to the DIDID estimate between Proficient students in TAIP schools in 2013 and both (a) 
Proficient students in TAIP schools in 2014 and (b) Basic students in TAIP schools in 2013. 
These students may have been targeted or schools may have viewed them as “safe” cases, 
making the comparison between them (i.e., β8) less interesting than the comparison between 
students just below that threshold (i.e.,  β7, HasTAIP x 2013). The β7 value represents the 
difference in average outcome between Basic students in TAIP schools in the funded and 
following years. This coefficient would be positive if the TAIP-funding was targeted at Basic 
students and was effective. 
Results 
Math. Table 10 shows the results for students who scored just above and below the Basic 
threshold on the second and third math benchmarks. The estimated discontinuity at this threshold 
on Benchmark C during NCLB is significant and positive (ranging from 0.024 to 0.039, p<0.05). 
These estimates are similar in magnitude to those from the previous chapter and affirm that 
schools focused more on math students labeled Basic than those labeled Below Basic during 
NCLB. 
 The previous chapter found that Below Basic students gained during the waiver, with 
significant negative coefficients at this threshold for the T x waiver interaction on both 
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Benchmark B (β≈ -0.03) and Benchmark C (β≈ -0.06). Those estimates are compared with the 
same interaction in the new model (i.e., β3, Basic x waiver) to see if the TAIP funding explains 
those results. The Basic x waiver estimates in Table 10 are consistently negative but somewhat 
smaller in magnitude than the previous chapter’s estimates, with Benchmark B ranging from -
0.019 to -0.028, and Benchmark C ranging from -0.031 to -0.050. The standard errors in these 
models are much larger than those from Chapter 2, meaning these estimates are not statistically 
significant. Because the magnitude and direction of these estimates are similar to the previous 
results, however, this analysis indicates that the TAIP funding does not explain the gains for 
Below Basic students during the waiver. 
 How did the additional resources affect students just above the Basic threshold during 
2013, when the funding was available, compared to 2014, when it was not? The DIDID estimates 
of Basic x HasTAIP x 2013 on Benchmark C are relatively large and positive (ranging from 
0.050 to 0.068), indicating that Basic students in TAIP schools in 2013 did better compared to 
(a) Basic students in TAIP schools in 2014 and (b) Below Basic students in TAIP schools in 
2013. This suggests that Basic students benefitted from the TAIP funds, although these estimates 
are imprecisely measured on this benchmark and inconsistent for Benchmark B. 
 Given that the Basic students did better in 2012-13 (suggesting that the TAIP-targeting 
benefitted those students), did the non-treated (Below Basic) students in TAIP schools do better 
in 2012-13 than similar students in 2013-14? The HasTAIP x 2013 estimates in Table 10 are 
consistently negative across benchmarks, with the majority of them ranging from -0.042 to -
0.102. Although these estimates are imprecisely measured, they are in the opposite direction than 
was hypothesized; the negative coefficients indicate that these lower-performing students did 
worse in the year that funding was available than they did the following year. This is 
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counterintuitive because the additional funds should have allowed schools to provide Basic 
students with special treatment without harming Below Basic students and leads to questions 
about how TAIP funds were spent. 
 Table 11 shows the estimates for students close to the Proficient threshold on 
Benchmarks B and C. The T x waiver coefficients at this threshold in Chapter 2 were less stable 
than at the Basic threshold. The estimates were consistently negative across bandwidths 
(between -0.02 and -0.03) but statistically significant only at the wider bandwidths. These results 
suggested that schools shifted their focus during the waiver from Proficient to Basic students. 
The estimates in Table 11 for Proficient x waiver are similar in sign and magnitude on 
Benchmark C, meaning the TAIP funding does not account for the gains for Basic students (over 
Proficient students).  
How did the TAIP-funding affect the Proficient students (i.e., the students who have a 
value of one for T in this table)? The estimated difference between Proficient students’ average 
outcomes in 2013 and 2014 in TAIP schools (Proficient x hasTAIP x 2013) are consistently 
positive across both benchmarks (ranging from 0.040 to 0.099). The estimates are larger in 
magnitude and significant on the Benchmark B, meaning that students who scored just above 
proficiency did better when their school had TAIP funds than the following year. This triple 
difference estimator also represents the DIDID estimator between Proficient and Basic students 
in the TAIP-funded year. That the Proficient students scored significantly higher than Basic 
students is somewhat puzzling, given that the Basic students were likely targeted as well.  
The comparisons between the students labeled Basic who were just below proficiency in 
TAIP schools in 2013 and 2014 are labeled HasTAIP x 2013 in Table 11. These estimates are 
consistently negative across benchmarks, indicating that Basic students just below proficiency 
97 
 
did worse when their schools had TAIP funding than the following year. Once again, this is a 
counterintuitive finding and leads to questions about how schools spent the TAIP funds. 
Reading. The reading effects found in Chapter 2 were more narrowly focused than those 
in math. There was only some evidence that schools focused more on Basic students than Below 
Basic students during NCLB, with consistently positive estimates on Benchmark C (although 
those estimates were significant only on the higher bandwidths). This is also the only threshold 
and benchmark that showed a consistent shift in focus to Below Basic students during the waiver 
(β≈ -0.045). Table 12 includes the results from Equation 5 at the Basic threshold for reading 
Benchmarks B and C. Although they are not significant, the estimates for β3 (T x waiver) are 
similar in magnitude to those from the previous chapter, with most of them between -0.04 and -
0.05. This indicates that the TAIP funding does not explain the gains for students labeled Below 
Basic on the third reading benchmark. 
The effects of the TAIP funding on reading students are now considered. The DIDID 
estimates (Basic x HasTAIP x 2013) are consistently positive across both benchmarks and larger 
in magnitude on Benchmark C (ranging from 0.090 to 0.136) than on Benchmark B (ranging 
from 0.015 to 0.055). These positive estimates indicate that students who scored just above the 
Basic threshold did better when their school got TAIP funds than the following year. They also 
indicate that the TAIP-targeted students did better than the non-targeted students during the 
funded year. These positive estimates were also found in math and suggest that schools used 
TAIP funds to target Basic students, with a positive effect on state test scores.  
The final comparison is in TAIP schools between Below Basic students in 2012-13 and in 
2013-14 (i.e., the non-treated students, represented by HasTAIP x 2013 in Table 12). While these 
students should have better outcomes in 2012-13 if the TAIP resources allowed schools to target 
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Basic students without diverting resources from Below Basic students, the estimates are 
consistently negative across both benchmarks. The Benchmark C results are relatively large in 
magnitude and statistically significant across all bandwidths (ranging from -0.132 to -0.165, 
p<0.05). These estimates indicate that the students barely labeled Below Basic did significantly 
worse in in 2012-13, when their schools had additional TAIP funds, than in 2013-14. A similar 
result was found in math which suggests that schools used the TAIP funding in ways that harmed 
low-performers15. 
Discussion 
The main purpose of this analysis was to explore the hypothesis that the shift in focus to 
lower-performing students found in Chapter 2 was due to the TAIP funds. The results do not 
support this hypothesis. Even when controlling for the TAIP funds and year, there is still 
evidence that Below Basic students in both math and reading benefitted during the waiver. 
Neither do the TAIP funds explain the leftward shift found on math Benchmark C at the 
Proficiency threshold. 
The effects of the TAIP funding on outcomes went against expectation for the non-
targeted students. In both math and reading, students who were barely labeled Below Basic had 
worse outcomes in the year their schools received funding than the following year. These 
students were hypothesized to do better in 2012-13 because the additional TAIP resources would 
allow schools to target the Basic students without having to divert resources from other (Below 
                                                          
15 The reading results for the Proficient threshold are shown in Appendix Table B3 because Chapter 2 found no 
consistent significant differences in average outcome at this threshold. Appendix Table B3 shows that students who 
score just above proficiency had better state test scores during the TAIP-funding year than the following year (i.e., 
Proficient x HasTAIP x waiver estimates are positive). This suggests that these students were included in the 
targeted interventions and that they were effective. Conversely, however, the students who score just below 
proficiency on reading Benchmark B have worse outcomes in the TAIP year than in 2013-14 (i.e., HasTAIP x 2013). 
Because these students were likely targeted with interventions, it is again confusing that these students would have 
worse outcomes when the TAIP funds were available. 
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Basic) students. The positive coefficients on the DIDID estimator across subjects indicates that 
schools did in fact target the Basic students and that the targeting had a positive effect on their 
state test scores. Yet the targeting appears to have harmed low-performers. These results raise 
questions about how schools were using TAIP funds. Luckily, the TAIP documents analyzed 
next include precisely that information. 
Conclusion 
 Chapter 2 reported that schools focused more on bubble students during NCLB and 
shifted attention towards lower-achieving students after the waiver was implemented. These 
results were stronger in math than in reading, and strategic behavior occurred after the third 
benchmark results. This chapter examined several alternate hypotheses for these results.  
 The first alternative hypothesized that it was not the change in incentives from the waiver 
accountability system which shifted behavior but instead the inclusion of value-add scores to 
evaluate educators. This was investigated by exploiting the fact that the new evaluation policy 
was implemented a year before the waiver took effect. This analysis found significant gains for 
Below Basic students beginning in 2011-12, which indicates that the new evaluation system was 
a contributing factor to the gains for lower-performing students.  
 The second hypothesis posited that schools used a different definition of bubble students 
than the test-score labels analyzed in Chapter 2. This hypothesis was examined by using the 
district-supplied Priority label to identify bubble students, as well as those who were too low or 
too high. The results are similar to those from Chapter 2: low-achieving students gain less during 
NCLB and rebound during the waiver. The evidence is stronger in math than in reading. 
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These results consistently indicate that low-performers benefit under new incentives, but 
these increases occur because they counteract harm done to these students during NCLB. These 
results indicate that (a) incentives matter and (b) the negative effects are focused on low 
performers. 
The final alternative hypothesized that additional funding in 2012-13 allowed schools to 
focus on bubble (Basic) students without needing to divert resources from low-performers 
(Below Basic). The improved performance for low-performers was found even when the Chapter 
2 models were modified to control for the TAIP funds and year.  
 A limitation of these black box analyses is that the mechanisms which contribute to the 
differences in relative test gains for students across these groups cannot be identified. Without 
knowing what schools did to target students, it is difficult to interpret the results. In a handful of 
schools, however, there is an opportunity to peek inside the black box. The TAIP proposals 
investigated in Chapter 4 provide insight into principals’ views of how best to spend the TAIP 
funds, including which students schools planned to target and what resources would be provided 
to them. 
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Tables 
Table 7. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds before and after adoption of a new educator evaluation system, math 
 
  Below Basic/Basic Basic/Proficient Proficient/Advanced 
Bandwidth 
(number of 
questions) 
 
2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 A
 
T -0.002 -0.000 -0.018 -0.017 -0.007 -0.004 0.019 0.007 0.013 0.020 -0.010 -0.038 -0.014 -0.008 -0.004 
 (0.024) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.030) (0.023) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) 
                
T x 
Eval 
0.008 0.006 0.015 0.020 0.015 -0.036* -0.031 -0.030 -0.028 -0.027 0.019 0.008 -0.011 -0.022 -0.018 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
                
Obs 20247 27160 31869 34701 36196 17072 23730 29798 33493 35445 7555 10690 14128 17385 18977 
R2 0.447 0.469 0.490 0.506 0.516 0.492 0.522 0.554 0.567 0.573 0.420 0.466 0.510 0.542 0.560 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 B
 
T -0.038 -0.007 0.005 0.019 0.021 -0.006 0.002 0.007 0.016 0.017 0.086** 0.028 0.028 0.000 -0.007 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.021) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.028) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) 
                
T x 
Eval 
0.016 0.012 0.003 -0.001 0.004 -0.026 -0.020 -0.015 -0.004 -0.002 -0.039 -0.032 -0.019 -0.008 -0.004 
(0.022) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
                
Obs 17060 23184 28193 31415 33389 17189 23658 29542 33619 35498 9017 12760 16477 19714 21443 
R2 0.421 0.447 0.476 0.501 0.516 0.485 0.518 0.548 0.563 0.567 0.460 0.499 0.529 0.563 0.582 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 C
 
T 0.006 0.024 0.038** 0.042** 0.040** -0.007 -0.012 -0.019 -0.011 -0.003 0.054 0.028 0.030 0.027 0.022 
 (0.022) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.028) (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) 
                
T x 
Eval 
-0.010 -0.036* -0.043* -0.045** -0.041** -0.011 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 0.017 0.026 0.023 0.025 0.025 
(0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
                
Obs 16509 22461 27968 31728 33261 15841 21834 27690 32285 35009 9089 12756 16401 19859 21561 
R2 0.412 0.447 0.486 0.508 0.517 0.437 0.478 0.528 0.559 0.576 0.458 0.499 0.537 0.571 0.592 
 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. “T” represents the discontinuity in outcomes for students who received the higher of the two labels. “T x Eval” 
represents the difference in the discontinuity during 2011-12, when the new educator evaluation system was implemented. Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at the school by grade by year level. All models condition on student covariates (race, ethnicity, FRPL, ELL, and disability status), school covariates 
(log enrollment, prior year’s percent proficient in math, percent of school that is black, Hispanic, white, FRPL, ELL, and has a disability), grade by year fixed 
effects, and school fixed effects.
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Table 8. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds before and after adoption of a new educator evaluation system, reading 
 
  Below Basic/Basic Basic/Proficient Proficient/Advanced 
Bandwidth 
(number of 
questions) 
 
2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 A
 
T 0.011 -0.000 0.016 0.012 0.018 0.004 0.001 0.016 0.021 0.021* 0.040 0.024 0.016 0.026 0.022 
 (0.032) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.022) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.025) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) 
                
T x 
Eval 
0.020 -0.008 -0.013 -0.021 -0.031 0.009 0.002 -0.005 -0.009 -0.010 -0.012 -0.022 -0.020 -0.017 -0.013 
(0.025) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.023) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
                
Obs 10111 14003 17725 21259 24615 15137 20861 26088 31265 35200 10008 13795 17174 20257 23136 
R2 0.405 0.425 0.440 0.464 0.487 0.450 0.485 0.522 0.558 0.585 0.438 0.480 0.519 0.546 0.568 
                 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 B
 
T 0.025 0.006 0.007 -0.001 0.017 -0.033 -0.034* -0.025 -0.018 -0.018 -0.003 -0.004 0.015 0.018 0.020 
 (0.028) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.025) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) 
                
T x 
Eval 
-0.000 -0.008 -0.024 -0.037* -0.043** -0.011 0.001 0.000 -0.012 -0.013 0.014 0.002 -0.006 -0.009 -0.017 
(0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
                
Obs 10382 14399 18225 21522 24258 15493 21414 27029 32131 35781 10643 14643 18182 21552 24524 
R2 0.372 0.406 0.436 0.465 0.482 0.435 0.478 0.521 0.561 0.592 0.456 0.491 0.520 0.551 0.572 
                 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 C
 
T 0.043 0.032 0.031 0.042** 0.040** 0.008 -0.004 0.003 0.000 -0.002 0.034 0.021 0.019 0.009 0.016 
 (0.030) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.025) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) 
                
T x 
Eval 
-0.009 -0.033 -0.051** -0.060*** -0.065*** -0.022 -0.026 -0.031* -0.025* -0.019 -0.035 -0.028 -0.021 -0.017 -0.019 
(0.025) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
                
Obs 9851 13878 17711 21565 24770 15914 21902 27724 32761 36744 9832 13412 16696 19865 22483 
R2 0.429 0.449 0.474 0.500 0.515 0.443 0.485 0.534 0.575 0.607 0.450 0.489 0.523 0.550 0.565 
 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. “T” represents the discontinuity in outcomes for students who received the higher of the two labels. “T x Eval” 
represents the difference in the discontinuity during 2011-12, when the new educator evaluation system was implemented. Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at the school by grade by year level. All models condition on student covariates (race, ethnicity, FRPL, ELL, and disability status), school covariates 
(log enrollment, prior year’s percent proficient in reading, percent of school that is black, Hispanic, white, FRPL, ELL, and has a disability), grade by year fixed 
effects, and school fixed effects
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Table 9. Regression results by prescriptive label during NCLB and waiver 
 Math  Reading 
 Benchmark A Benchmark B Benchmark C  Benchmark A Benchmark B Benchmark C 
Multi-Year Plan -0.007 -0.019* -0.030***  -0.005 -0.011 0.033*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Enrichment 0.003 0.001 -0.021*  0.015 0.018 -0.003 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Multi-Year Plan x Waiver 0.002 0.006 0.043***  -0.005 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.011)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Enrichment x Waiver -0.062*** -0.031* 0.006  0.016 -0.010 0.002 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
        
Observations 122185 125035 126349  126172 128230 127436 
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.67 0.71  0.71 0.73 0.74 
 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. NCLB includes 2009-10 through 2011-12 data. Waiver includes 2012-13 through 2013-14 data. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the school by grade by year level. All models condition on student testing variables up to cubic polynomials and interactions between 
all the variables (prior year state test z-score; projected percentile; raw score on the benchmark, centered on proficiency), student demographics (race, ethnicity, 
FRPL, ELL, and disability status), school covariates (log enrollment, prior year’s percent proficient in that subject, percent of school that is black, Hispanic, 
white, FRPL, ELL, and has a disability), school fixed effects, and grade by year fixed effects.   
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Table 10. Estimated discontinuities at Below Basic/Basic threshold by TAIP funding and 2012-13, math  
 Benchmark B Benchmark C 
Bandwidth (number of questions)  2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 
           
Basic -0.027 -0.002 0.006 0.019 0.021 0.024 0.033* 0.038** 0.039** 0.037** 
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Basic x has TAIP 0.015 0.013 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.019 0.014 0.012 0.016 0.016 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Basic x waiver -0.023 -0.019 -0.027 -0.028 -0.028 -0.031 -0.042 -0.049 -0.050 -0.049 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.029) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) 
Has TAIP x waiver 0.064 0.081 0.087 0.087 0.094* 0.094 0.077 0.050 0.066 0.086* 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.050) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) 
Basic x has TAIP x waiver  -0.004 -0.021 -0.022 -0.022 -0.028 -0.027 -0.041 -0.031 -0.037 -0.052 
 (0.042) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.045) (0.041) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) 
Basic x 2013 0.009 -0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.020 -0.022 -0.016 -0.021 -0.020 
 (0.035) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.037) (0.034) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
Has TAIP x 2013 -0.014 -0.042 -0.058 -0.061 -0.074 -0.102 -0.097 -0.065 -0.078 -0.089 
 (0.058) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.060) (0.055) (0.053) (0.052) (0.051) 
Basic x has TAIP x 2013 -0.042 -0.005 0.014 0.015 0.030 0.058 0.065 0.050 0.056 0.068 
 (0.050) (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) (0.041) (0.055) (0.049) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) 
           
Observations 25335 34504 42531 48015 51369 22456 30638 38327 44149 47640 
R2 0.691 0.687 0.685 0.686 0.688 0.728 0.726 0.723 0.723 0.726 
 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school by grade by year level. All models condition on student 
covariates (race, ethnicity, FRPL, ELL, and disability status), school covariates (log enrollment, prior year’s percent proficient in reading, percent of school that 
is black, Hispanic, white, FRPL, ELL, and has a disability), grade by year fixed effects, and school fixed effects.
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Table 11. Estimated discontinuities at Basic/Proficient threshold by TAIP funding and 2012-13, math 
 Benchmark B Benchmark C 
Bandwidth (number of questions)  2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 
           
Proficient -0.040* -0.009 0.003 0.009 0.008 -0.016 -0.016 -0.020 -0.015 -0.010 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Proficient x has TAIP 0.040* 0.044** 0.037** 0.037** 0.041** 0.011 0.007 0.011 0.015 0.016 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Proficient x waiver 0.039 0.009 0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.009 -0.011 -0.028 -0.038 -0.037 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Has TAIP x waiver 0.111** 0.093* 0.101** 0.083* 0.078* 0.036 0.041 0.040 0.035 0.031 
 (0.041) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.034) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) 
Proficient x has TAIP x 
waiver  -0.111*** -0.088** -0.101*** -0.077** -0.075** -0.059 -0.062* -0.048 -0.037 -0.036 
 (0.034) (0.030) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.037) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Proficient x 2013 -0.044 -0.020 -0.029 -0.021 -0.013 -0.003 -0.000 0.014 0.028 0.031 
 (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.031) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Has TAIP x 2013 -0.077 -0.051 -0.058 -0.051 -0.044 -0.022 -0.031 -0.026 -0.015 -0.012 
 (0.051) (0.047) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) (0.048) (0.043) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) 
Proficient x has TAIP x 2013 0.099* 0.066 0.092** 0.076* 0.071* 0.053 0.069 0.062 0.042 0.040 
 (0.041) (0.038) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.046) (0.038) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) 
           
Observations 27476 37873 46913 53427 56835 25007 34500 43508 50579 54713 
R2 0.461 0.490 0.519 0.538 0.547 0.425 0.462 0.506 0.537 0.558 
 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school by grade by year level. All models condition on student 
covariates (race, ethnicity, FRPL, ELL, and disability status), school covariates (log enrollment, prior year’s percent proficient in reading, percent of school that 
is black, Hispanic, white, FRPL, ELL, and has a disability), grade by year fixed effects, and school fixed effects.
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Table 12. Estimated discontinuities at Below Basic/Basic threshold by TAIP funding and 2012-13, reading 
 Benchmark B Benchmark C 
Bandwidth (number of questions)  2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 
           
Basic -0.007 -0.004 0.004 0.003 0.021 0.017 0.011 0.012 0.022 0.026 
 (0.025) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.027) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) 
Basic x has TAIP 0.022 0.014 0.003 0.013 0.008 0.030 0.024 0.016 0.009 0.009 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Basic x waiver 0.032 0.024 0.012 -0.012 -0.017 -0.016 -0.049 -0.043 -0.047 -0.052* 
 (0.030) (0.025) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.040) (0.033) (0.031) (0.026) (0.026) 
Has TAIP x waiver 0.072 0.056 0.069* 0.055 0.056 0.090 0.089 0.087 0.082 0.086 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.066) (0.054) (0.051) (0.047) (0.046) 
Basic x has TAIP x waiver  -0.039 -0.042 -0.035 -0.028 -0.031 -0.110 -0.080 -0.077 -0.065 -0.080 
 (0.045) (0.040) (0.036) (0.033) (0.032) (0.072) (0.056) (0.055) (0.050) (0.048) 
Basic x 2013 -0.038 -0.036 -0.042 -0.022 -0.014 -0.022 0.028 0.004 0.004 -0.006 
 (0.036) (0.031) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.046) (0.039) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031) 
Has TAIP x 2013 -0.043 -0.042 -0.076 -0.058 -0.057 -0.147* -0.132* -0.142* -0.147** -0.165** 
 (0.050) (0.043) (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.074) (0.061) (0.057) (0.054) (0.053) 
Basic x has TAIP x 2013 0.015 0.038 0.055 0.035 0.032 0.115 0.090 0.104 0.099 0.136* 
 (0.059) (0.049) (0.043) (0.040) (0.038) (0.081) (0.065) (0.061) (0.057) (0.055) 
           
Observations 15675 21689 27444 32597 37199 13429 18843 24125 29452 34083 
R2 0.807 0.806 0.799 0.794 0.787 0.816 0.813 0.808 0.801 0.794 
 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school by grade by year level. All models condition on student 
covariates (race, ethnicity, FRPL, ELL, and disability status), school covariates (log enrollment, prior year’s percent proficient in reading, percent of school that 
is black, Hispanic, white, FRPL, ELL, and has a disability), grade by year fixed effects, and school fixed effects.
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Figures 
Figure 11. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds before and after new educator evaluation system, math 
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Figure 12. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds before and after new educator evaluation system, reading 
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Figure 13. Percent of sample assigned each prescriptive label during NCLB and waiver, math 
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 Figure 14. Percent of sample assigned each prescriptive label during NCLB and waiver, reading 
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Chapter 4: What Does Strategic Behavior Look Like in District-Endorsed Educational 
Triage? 
 
The last alternative examined in Chapter 3 was that the additional funding for targeted 
academic interventions might have obviated the need for schools to engage in triage. Those 
results uncovered some puzzling findings regarding the 29 schools that turned in Targeted 
Academic Intervention Proposals (TAIPs) in 2012-13. While there was evidence that the targeted 
(Basic) students had better outcomes when their schools had TAIP funds, non-targeted (Below 
Basic) students did worse than their counterparts the following year. Those results suggest that 
TAIP schools used the additional funds in ways that harmed the non-targeted students. 
Interpreting the previous chapter’s TAIP analysis results is hampered because it is a 
standard quantitative black box study which does not provide information about what is actually 
happening in schools. The TAIP program provides an opportunity to get inside the black box 
because to receive the supplemental funding, school leaders in the selected schools completed 
TAIPs. In the TAIP documents, school leaders proposed how they would spend the money to 
restructure the school day to offer academic interventions for the two months before the state 
test. The proposals detail both the structure of the interventions and the students to whom the 
school planned to offer these interventions. These documents provide insight into what strategic 
behavior looks like in a large number of schools.  
What happens when a district tells administrators which students are close to meeting 
proficiency and then gives them additional money to target those students? Did the schools target 
the Priority students or did they include more students? Did schools allocate the resources in a 
way that circumvented the need to triage, or did they target bubble students by diverting 
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resources from low- and high-achievers? Given that test scores are typically used as proxies for 
this kind of strategic behaviors, are these school-level interventions of sufficient quality to 
improve test scores? This chapter uses the TAIPs in order to (a) identify the targeted students and 
(b) describe and analyze the features of the interventions.  
RQ1: Which students did school leaders plan to target with interventions? The district 
pressed TAIP schools to specifically target interventions to the Priority students. The evidence 
for this includes the Identification of Target Students document shown in Figure 2. The labels, 
descriptors, and color-coding all align with dividing students into triage groups, with the Priority 
students representing the bubble students. That document specifies that schools should “prioritize 
Target students” and then labels a group of students as “Priority.” In addition, the title of the 
TAIP document indicates that the money is intended for targeted academic interventions, which 
implies they are for “target” students. The consistency of this wording sends a message to school 
leaders that the interventions should be provided to targeted students, which are those who are 
labeled Priority.  
Despite the district message to focus on the Priority students, school leaders could decide 
which students needed additional support based on their own schools’ needs. Most TAIPs 
included information about which students were targeted and what data school leaders used to 
identify those students. Although the Priority students are the expected focal group, schools used 
several different metrics to determine which students would be targeted. The TAIPs provide 
information on the idiosyncratic way that each school identified their target students16. Exploring 
                                                          
16 I want to clarify the difference between some similar terms used in this chapter to describe students (i.e., bubble, 
Priority, and target). As has been discussed throughout this dissertation, the term “bubble students” refers to the 
group of students who are close to the proficiency line, with low- and high-performers referring to students who are 
not “on the bubble” of proficiency. These groups are nebulously defined by researchers and by schools, and refer to 
broad groups of students. On the other hand, Priority students are the specific students who were assigned the 
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this question is important because it represents equity concerns: which students had access to 
additional resources and which students were left out? 
RQ2: What resources were used for the targeted interventions, and how were the 
interventions structured? The proposed interventions represent what school leaders thought was 
the best way to spend additional resources in order to increase student test scores before the state 
test. Exploring this question provides a direct view into the black box regarding how schools 
reacted to student testing data and the accountability incentives in 2012-13. Knowing how 
principals designed these interventions offers insight into how disruptive these interventions 
would be at the classroom and student level.  
Because quantitative researchers often lack resource allocation information at the school 
level, they use test scores as proxies (Springer, 2008b). The underlying assumption is that the 
resources allocated to students are effective in raising test scores (as shown in the logic model in 
Figure 1). This implicit assumption suggests two possible explanations for null quantitative 
results: either (a) schools are not engaging in the strategic behavior or (b) the metrics being 
used—test score gains—are not picking up the underlying behavior. Rather than looking at 
proxies, the TAIPs afford the opportunity to explore at a detailed level how school leaders 
planned to allocate resources. 
                                                          
Priority 1 or Priority 2 label from the district based on their benchmark and projected scores. These students have 
test scores which place them around the proficiency line, making these students the likely ones to be considered 
bubble by their schools (especially given the district's encouragement and financial support to focus on those 
students in the lead-up to the state test). A final distinction is made for target students. This term refers to the 
specific group of students that TAIP schools planned to target with their interventions. As just noted, each school 
leader determined which students would be targeted with interventions. Schools could target bubble students based 
on their Priority label or based on another metric, or schools could target more broadly than students close to 
proficiency. The term “target student” represents the most localized, school-level view of focal students in this 
dissertation.  
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To look further into these possible explanations for null results in triage work, the 
proposed interventions are grouped into four broad types based on features including (a) who 
provides the intervention, (b) when during the school day it occurs, and (c) which students are 
targeted (i.e., whether the interventions are equitably accessible by students in need). These 
dimensions are analyzed to consider whether or not the TAIP interventions might improve test 
scores by providing enhanced learning opportunities. Because the additional funding should 
allow TAIP schools to avoid needing to triage, this analysis examines whether the resources 
which were offered to target students came in addition to the typical resources provided to all 
students or whether resources were diverted from other students. This detailed analysis on a 
relatively large sample of schools bridges the gap between the prior triage work which uses 
qualitative methods on case studies of individual schools (e.g., Booher-Jennings, 2005; Horn, 
2016) and that which uses quantitative methods on administrative data for large numbers of 
students (e.g., Ballou & Springer, 2016; Krieg, 2008; Ladd & Lauen, 2010).  
Sample, Data, and Methods 
Sample 
Twenty-nine schools in GCPS submitted TAIPs, including 15 elementary and 14 middle 
schools. These TAIP schools were selected by members of the district research team who 
decided which schools should receive additional funds and how much they should get. The 
schools were selected based on the number of Priority students in the school, where the amount 
of funding was considered “adequate to implement a strategy” (meeting with GCPS research 
team). The district research team indicated that these schools were among the lowest-performing 
in the district. 
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The summary statistics shown in Table 13 compare the 29 TAIP schools with the schools 
in the district that did not submit a plan. Elementary schools that submitted TAIPs have slightly 
lower percentages of students who scored Proficient or Advanced in both subjects the previous 
year compared to schools without plans. The prior year performance categories are similar in the 
middle schools. Both middle and elementary TAIP schools have slightly higher percentages of 
Priority and Multi-Year Plan students than non-TAIP schools. This indicates that lower 
performing schools received TAIP funding.  
Demographic comparisons of the schools are shown in the bottom panel of Table 13. 
There are fewer black students in TAIP schools than in non-TAIP schools in both elementary 
(30% vs 49%) and middle schools (42% vs 56%). These differences were offset by an increased 
percentage of Hispanic students in TAIP schools, although the percent of white students was 
similar across school groups. TAIP elementary schools had slightly higher percentages of 
students eligible for free and reduced price lunch than non-TAIP schools (83% vs 75%) as well 
as a substantially higher percent of English language learners (37% vs 1%). The percent of 
students with disabilities and the mobility rate were relatively consistent across all groups, 
comprising about 12% and 30% of the school, respectively. Overall, schools that received TAIP 
funding had lower performing students than other schools in GCPS. 
Data Collection 
Data for this analysis were collected through document review and student-level 
quantitative data. Documents included TAIPs from 29 schools, internal email communication 
between the district research team and school administrators, training documents from principal 
meetings, and examples of reports available to principals and teachers through the district data 
warehouse. The quantitative data were used to identify the targeted students in the TAIP schools.  
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Targeted Academic Intervention Proposals. Administrators at each school completed a 
TAIP based on the blank template shown in Figure 15. The template included a place for schools 
to describe how they would restructure the school day to provide targeted academic 
interventions. These proposals were used to create a school-level database. Two schools’ TAIPs 
are recreated in Figure 16 to illustrate some of the methodological decisions made in these 
analyses. 
For each intervention, the TAIP document prompted school leaders to “Briefly describe 
the proposed program. (Include a description of student and teacher selection processes, a plan 
for communicating with stakeholders and encouraging student participation).” Each proposal 
included blanks to indicate the intervention targets (grade level and subject), number of students 
participating, proposed beginning and end date, and how many days per week the intervention 
would last. The principals input their digital signature on the TAIP, and the district responded 
with (a) approve as requested, (b) approve with indicated modifications, or (c) not approved with 
additional information needed. All 29 plans were marked as “approve as requested.”  
Student testing data. The school-level information gathered from the TAIPs was 
matched with the student-level dataset used in previous chapters for students in the 2012-13 
school year. This was done to triangulate the information between the TAIPs and the quantitative 
data in order to verify an accurate representation of which students were actually targeted17. 
                                                          
17 During this analysis, the information from the TAIPs was linked to the student-level testing data to identify which 
students the school proposed to actually target (i.e., treat). I attempted to quantify the test score effects of these 
interventions but ran into several issues. TAIP schools did not target very many students, and the standard errors on 
the estimates were very large. In addition, because the district does not have data on the fidelity of implementation 
of the interventions, I do not know the extent to which plans were implemented as written.  
117 
 
Data Analysis Methods 
The purpose of this analysis is to explore how schools planned to use additional funding 
to provide interventions for students in the two months before the state test. This study is 
appropriate for naturalistic inquiry because it is intended to get inside the black box of 
quantitative research regarding school resource allocation. This work analyzes school 
documents, and the human instrument (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) is key in looking for patterns of 
school allocation decisions in those documents. 
I initially coded the TAIPs along with another graduate student in education. Both of us 
are former teachers, and our teaching influences our perspectives and my subsequent analyses. 
My public education background includes experience as both a classroom math teacher and a 
school-based instructional coach in low-performing public middle schools during NCLB. As a 
math teacher, I provided interventions to struggling students that were specifically focused on 
increasing their state test scores. As an instructional coach, my principal tasked me with using 
student data to identify students for remediation, scheduling interventions during the school day, 
and planning the curriculum for the interventions. In that work, I completed documents—which 
are similar to those analyzed here—detailing my school’s intervention strategies. The 
interventions described in the TAIPs are similar to ones I designed or knew about through 
conversations with instructional coaches at other schools. The other graduate student was a 
former English teacher, which helped provide a perspective into the other tested content area. 
This student had experience providing reading interventions to students in her low-performing 
school. Together, our education backgrounds provided insight into the quality of the 
interventions and whether we believed they would offer students enhanced learning 
opportunities.  
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The documents were coded utilizing the constant comparison method (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967), which informed ongoing analyses based on previously collected data. While schools were 
expected to focus on Priority students, I took a grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967) to allow information learned during coding to describe alternate behaviors by school 
administrators. This openness to alternative intervention structures was important because (a) 
funded schools did not necessarily need to divert resources from one group to another (i.e., 
engage in triage) in order to focus on students close to proficiency, (b) schools designed 
interventions in a variety of ways, and (c) some schools did not use the Priority label to identify 
their target students.  
The TAIP proposals were first coded openly (a) to identify the features of the 
intervention and which students were targeted and (b) to transfer those logistical features to a 
school-level database that could be linked with the student data. Each sentence was the unit of 
analysis for the open-coding. Common information taken directly from all TAIPs included the 
start and end dates (used to calculate the total number of school days the intervention lasted), the 
days per week of intervention, the grade level and subject targeted, and the number of students 
participating. The number of students participating was used to triangulate between the TAIP and 
student quantitative data in attempts to identify the actual students targeted by each school. 
Open-coding revealed that the plans varied extensively in the specificity of the proposed 
interventions. Each school’s description of their restructured school day was open-coded using 
logistically descriptive categories: which students were targeted, what resources were used, who 
provided the intervention, and when during the school day the intervention occurred. Some of the 
codes were generated from the language of the documents: “targeted students,” “identified 
students,” “expert teachers.” These codes were initially utilized to create a spreadsheet that 
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indicated whether the school’s intervention included different features. As new features 
appeared, additional categories were added to the spreadsheet. If a new code emerged from a 
school document, the constant comparative method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) was utilized to 
check the previously-coded interventions against these new codes. 
The initial codes captured the language used by each school leader to describe which 
students were the target of the interventions and what metrics the school used to identify these 
students. In many cases, the schools included clear descriptors of their targeted students (e.g., 
School A in Figure 16, “within three answers of being proficient on the DEA assessment”). In 
cases where the metric the school used was ambiguous (e.g., School B in Figure 16, “targeted 
students”), it was assumed that Priority 1 and 2 students were targeted. That assumption was then 
validated by triangulating the number of Priority students found in the quantitative data with the 
number of students participating in the intervention that each school leader included on the TAIP 
description18. 
The initial coding of the TAIP documents was done individually by both researchers. 
After adding any new intervention features to the school database, we individually wrote an 
analytic memo describing the school’s intervention and connections with other school proposals. 
These analytic memos included conjectures about the effectiveness of the intervention and 
explanations for why we thought the intervention would or would not increase student learning. 
These analytic memos allowed us to further refine which different intervention features would 
likely offer student enhanced learning opportunities (and, subsequently, increased test scores). In 
                                                          
18 If the two values were within 8 students of each other (generally around 10% of the stated number), that school 
was considered a match. Figure 16 shows that School B expected 75 “targeted” students to participate in the 
intervention. There were 82 seventh-grade students in the quantitative data who were labeled Priority 1 or 2 in that 
school, making this school a match. 
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addition to conjectures about the quality of the plan, the analytic memos also discussed equity 
concerns about access to the interventions, detailing which students were being targeted and 
which were left out of these interventions. This helped distinguish between interventions where 
something of value was diverted from some students to be given to others (i.e., triage) and those 
where some students received something additional beyond what all students were offered.  
The coders met weekly to discuss the types of interventions created by the schools and 
our interpretations of the codes and data. The use of emergent design (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) 
uncovered patterns in the way that schools organized their interventions not initially considered, 
with school plans differing across different dimensions. For example, every school offered small 
group instruction for their targeted students, and all but one hired substitute teachers to support 
that small group instruction. Furthermore, identifying triage in these schools was not as 
straightforward as anticipated when beginning the analysis, in part because many schools created 
multiple interventions.  
During axial coding, I recoded the TAIPs to collect data on the dimensions which 
appeared to contribute to the equity and quality of the interventions. These features include 
which adult provided the intervention, which students were targeted, and when during the school 
day they occurred. These patterns ultimately led to grouping the interventions into four main 
types: (a) triage (teacher attention), (b) pullout tutoring, (c) substitute provided, and (d) support 
all students. To bolster the credibility of these groupings, I defined the features for each type of 
intervention—described in more detail in the Results section—and then used the school database 
to identify which schools included those features. I would then reread those schools’ TAIP 
documents to see whether it reflected the broad intervention type identified. This process allowed 
me to clarify what I meant by each intervention type and then to refine that definition against the 
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school proposals. I analyzed the TAIPs fully multiple times in response to (a) new information 
from additional TAIPs, (b) information from the district, and (c) further refinement of the 
intervention types. 
During data analysis, I presented and discussed preliminary results with members of the 
district research team several times. These meetings allowed for checking my understanding of 
the district’s programs and policies with what emerged from the document review. The resulting 
discussions provided context for the next iteration of analyses. These discussions also provided 
insight into how this work has implications for district leaders and the opportunity to further 
contextualize somewhat confusing results. One goal of presenting the preliminary results to the 
district and checking my interpretation of the results was to triangulate information across these 
modes of data collection to increase the trustworthiness of the results.  
Results 
Which Students Did School Leaders Plan to Target with Interventions?  
This question was answered using the information from the TAIPs and triangulating that 
with the student quantitative data, with the results shown in Table 14. Schools indicated that on 
average 77 students would participate in the targeted interventions, ranging from 30 to 180 
students per school. In total, the 29 schools planned for a total of approximately 2200 students to 
participate in the interventions. 
Every single school targeted third- or seventh-grade students for interventions, as 
indicated by the “Intervention targets (Grade Level/Subject)” blank on each TAIP. This follows 
from the state’s waiver accountability system which rated schools based on math and reading test 
performance for both (a) third and seventh grade students separately and (b) students in grades 
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three through eight in aggregate. Despite the state’s intentions that schools support the learning 
for all students, school leaders creating the TAIPs recognized that third- and seventh-grade 
students had a larger influence on their rating than students in other grades and offered 
interventions only for students in those grades. This is underscored in School A’s TAIP 
(recreated in the top part of Figure 16) which states that “scores for 7th graders will count twice 
for overall school performance” before detailing that they plan to target seventh-grade Priority 
students. This indicates that School A’s administrator was aware of and responsive to the metrics 
the state used in the waiver accountability system. School A is not alone; although this is the 
only school to explain in detail why this grade was selected, every middle school targeted 
seventh graders and every elementary school targeted third graders. Only one elementary 
school—3% of the sample—included students from another grade in their targeted interventions. 
This is important because it highlights the first equity issue of these interventions: only students 
from certain grades had access to additional remediation while other students were ignored.   
Given that schools targeted third and seventh grade students, did they focus on Priority 
students? The results in Table 14 indicate that nearly one in three schools explicitly identified 
their targeted students as “Priority 1 and Priority 2” students, with twice as many middle schools 
than elementary schools using this description. It was harder to tell in other schools which third- 
and seventh-grade students were targeted. For example, 13 schools—including School B shown 
in the bottom panel of Figure 16—used the term “targeted students” and two additional schools 
used “identified students” to describe their focal students. Both of these terms come directly 
from the title of Figure 2, the district’s Identification of Target Students document. This strongly 
suggests that these 15 schools were referring to Priority students, and one school made this clear 
by specifying that students were “grouped based on the targeted list (Priority 1 and 2).” This 
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assumption was verified by comparing the number of students identified as Priority in the 
quantitative data with “the number of students participating” that was reported on the TAIP. 
Worth highlighting is that every school which used the “Priority” label included both Priority 1 
and Priority 2 students in the interventions. There were no examples of schools that limited their 
target students only to those who were labeled Priority 119.  
While most schools targeted students close to proficiency (i.e., bubble students), they did 
not necessarily use the Priority label to identify those students. For example, School A’s proposal 
explicitly describes their criteria for inclusion: seventh grade students who answered within three 
questions of the proficiency line on Benchmark B. Three other schools used the same metric to 
identify their target students20. In addition, about 20% of the TAIPs identified their target 
students as those who scored Basic on the benchmark exam, with five elementary schools and 
one middle school using this metric21. That elementary schools were more likely than middle 
schools to use the Basic label (which is from the benchmark) rather than the Priority label is 
likely related to the fact that third graders would not have prior year test scores. The Priority 
matrix from Figure 2 is based on students’ having a test history from the state. In cases where 
students are missing the state projection—the majority of whom are third-graders—the bottom 
line of Figure 2 indicates that schools should use the DEA benchmark score to identify their 
Priority students.  
                                                          
19 This supports the decision to combine these two labels as a single “Priority” group in the Chapter 3 analyses. 
20 This is the same definition used in Alternative 2 of Chapter 3 to identify the bubble students in the years before 
the Priority label was available. 
21 This offers evidence that schools used the benchmark test-score labels to identify their bubble students, as 
hypothesized and tested in Chapter 2. Interestingly, these schools targeted only the students labeled Basic (ignoring 
students who scored just above proficiency on the benchmark). This is aligned with the Chapter 2 findings that 
elementary students barely labeled Basic gained significantly more than students barely labeled Proficiency. 
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Although schools used different ways to describe their bubble students (e.g., Basic, 
Priority, within three questions of proficiency, targeted, identified), all in all, 93% of TAIP 
schools did in fact focus on the students close to proficiency. While almost every school 
indicated that bubble students would receive the targeted interventions (the only exceptions were 
two proposals that did not include enough information to identify the targeted students), some 
schools expanded access to the interventions to other students. Nearly 25% of schools offered 
interventions to low-performers (described as “Below Basic” in two schools), with 17% of 
schools also supporting high performers. Elementary schools were more likely to include high- 
and low-performers than middle schools. This limited expansion of support, especially for low-
achievers, highlights a second equity issue. Even though the state was under the waiver 
accountability system in this year, schools were still focused on increasing their proficiency 
rates—otherwise they would not target students close to that line—a direct result of state and 
district accountability systems which continued to use those metrics.  
While the majority of the schools had a static targeted group for the entire intervention 
period, five schools explicitly stated that the groupings of students would be flexible. Schools 
that utilize flexible groups suggest a responsiveness to individual student needs. In some of these 
schools, students were grouped based on their individual gaps in understanding, and groups 
changed as the content of the intervention changed. For example, one middle school indicated 
that “teachers will meet each week to organize groups” and another noted that “after weekly 
probes, student groups will be restructured based on student need.” Two schools indicated they 
would update their list of Priority students based on new data from the third benchmark exam. 
Middle schools were more likely to utilize flexible groups (29%) than elementary schools (13%).   
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The vast majority of the target student identification was based on student test scores. 
Only two schools mentioned any other criteria for inclusion. One school specifically targeted 
English Language Learners and another targeted students with disabilities. Both of these 
represent subgroups in the waiver accountability system used for calculating achievement gaps. 
That most schools selected students based on test scores, however, indicates that the TAIP 
schools seem more attuned to aggregate student performance than to individual subgroups. 
To summarize, targeted students are comprised nearly entirely of third- and seventh-
grade students. Of the 29 TAIP schools, 69% provided intervention to bubble students only, 7% 
supported bubble and low-performers, 17% offered remediation or enrichment for all students, 
and 7% were unclear about who was targeted. The school leaders typically used benchmark data 
shared by the district (including both the test-score and prescriptive labels investigated in 
Chapters 2 and 3). The description of the student selection process in a number of schools 
affirms some of the modeling decisions made in those chapters. 
What Resources Were Used for the Targeted Interventions, and How Were the 
Interventions Structured? 
Resources used. Most schools described their interventions without specifying the dollar 
amount required, but two schools provided a breakdown of how the TAIP funds would be used. 
These are illustrative of the types of resources that other schools mentioned in their proposals. 
One middle school asked for $15,680 to provide intervention for 160 seventh-grade students, 
with an average cost of about $98 per student. The intervention in that school would last for 30 
days, and the money would be spent on (a) two teachers paid for two hours per day for 30 days 
for forfeiting their planning time to provide intervention ($3500), (b) six seventh-grade teachers 
paid to plan after school for one hour per day for 30 days ($5200), (c) one substitute teacher 
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hired for 30 days ($3750), (d) two instructional coaches paid to plan for two hours per week for 
four weeks ($700), and (e) curricular supplies and paper ($2500).  
An elementary school requested $8500 to target 45 third-grade students (averaging about 
$189 per student). That intervention would last 26 days and fund (a) one substitute teacher hired 
for 26 days to cover the class of the best reading and math teacher so that teacher could provide 
intervention to small groups of students ($500022) and (b) two teachers paid to plan for two hours 
per day four days per week ($3500). 
These types of expenses—hiring substitutes, paying teachers to plan after school, and 
purchasing intervention supplies—were common across the TAIPs. Table 15 shows what 
percentage of elementary and middle schools included each type of intervention feature, with the 
top part indicating how administrators proposed to spend the additional money. About a quarter 
of schools—five elementary and two middle schools—paid teachers to plan after school. This 
was done, as shown in the examples above, because teachers either (a) used their planning period 
to provide small group instruction to students or (b) needed additional time after school to plan 
the interventions. Approximately one-third of schools indicated that additional funding would go 
towards curricular materials (which includes both computer programs, such as Study Island, and 
workbooks focusing on state curriculum standards) or supplies, such as paper. 
The most common expenditure across TAIPs was to hire substitute teachers. All but one 
school planned to use those funds to hire substitute teachers, and a large proportion of schools 
planned to hire two or more substitutes per day for multiple days. School leaders may already 
                                                          
22 It is unclear why the per-day substitute costs from these two schools are not the same. The cost per day would be 
$125 for the middle school but $192 for the elementary school. Because substitute payment schedules are generally 
a set value across a district, it is unlikely that the daily cost would vary so much. 
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have had specific substitute teachers in mind to provide these interventions, such as retired 
teachers from the school. For example, one middle school specified the name of the substitute 
teacher they would hire for their interventions, and one elementary school indicated that their 
proposed substitute “has a teaching degree and previous experience with the [school’s] student 
population.” No other TAIPs indicated this level of detail regarding who would fill the substitute 
requests. In total, these 29 TAIP schools would require an additional 54 substitutes daily in the 
two months before the state test, above and beyond what is needed for normal teacher absences. 
This is an important feature to note because so many schools relied on substitutes to support 
small group instruction. If schools could not fill these requests, then their proposed interventions 
could not occur. This seems a concern in an elementary school which noted that they have 
“procured commitments from substitutes who regularly accept assignments.” Prior research 
indicates that many schools have trouble getting substitutes to fill open jobs (e.g., Dorward, 
Hawkins, & Smith, 2000; Henderson, Protheroe, & Proch, 2002; National Education 
Association, 2001). The district did not share information on how frequently substitute jobs were 
filled during this time period, which is one reason why it is unknown how faithfully these plans 
were implemented. 
Every proposal restructured the school day so targeted students would receive small 
group instruction in both math and reading. This small group instruction was provided by 
different people and at different times of day across the schools in this sample, as shown in the 
bottom part of Table 15. About one-quarter of the schools restructured their school days to 
provide multiple interventions, either to provide a different group of students with remediation or 
to focus on the target students in multiple ways (and at different times during the day). This is 
why some of the percentages shown in Table 15 add up to more than 100%.  
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The ways that schools utilized the substitutes was key for facilitating the small group 
instruction. Nearly a quarter of schools had substitutes directly teaching the targeted students in 
small groups, while others had the substitutes cover a teacher’s class so the teacher could work 
with small groups of students. The teacher of record (meaning the targeted student’s math or 
reading teacher) provided the intervention in the majority of schools (55%), although middle 
schools were more likely to do so (64%) than elementary schools (47%). One elementary 
principal wrote that “[o]ur belief is the 3rd grade teachers are the best equipped to provide 
targeted instruction to get the scores up,” illustrating a focus on grade level expertise. 
Schools used a variety of terms to describe the expertise or background of the teacher 
selected to provide the intervention. Terms included “expert,” “best,” “most effective,” and “high 
performing.” In some cases, schools provided no further clarification on how the school defined 
the term (e.g., School B from Figure 16). Other schools specified that teacher selection would be 
based on the state test performance of their previous students, their current students’ benchmark 
scores, or their teaching evaluation scores. Nine schools indicated on the TAIP that expert 
teachers would provide the intervention with elementary schools using these educators more 
frequently than middle schools (40% compared to 21%). These differences make some sense 
given the context of elementary and middle schools. Elementary school teachers are responsible 
for teaching both reading and math content, but they may be better at teaching one subject than 
the other. Elementary principals may recognize the need to bring in content expertise from 
another grade to help fill in those gaps. Middle school teachers, on the other hand, are certified in 
their content area and may be better equipped to support their students’ learning than another 
teacher.  
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Nearly two-thirds of schools indicated the time during the school day the intervention 
occurred. The most frequent time was during the core math or reading class, which was utilized 
in almost 60% of all plans but more often in middle (71%) than in elementary schools (47%). In 
four schools, the intervention occurred during another class, most likely an elective or related 
arts class. This indicates that the targeted students would be pulled out of these other classes to 
receive small group instruction in addition to their normal math and reading class. Five schools 
(three elementary and two middle) created or expanded a separate intervention period for 
students. In these cases, a period of time—ranging from 30 minutes to an hour—was set aside 
during the normal schedule for all students to receive instruction at their needed levels. This 
intervention time does not require students to be pulled from a normal class because all students 
are in this intervention period at the same time23. 
The district shared the Identification of Target Students document and blank TAIP 
proposals during a principals’ meeting on February 6, 2013. The TAIP documents were 
approved by the district between February 12 and February 20, meaning that schools had fewer 
than two weeks to plan these interventions. The start dates of the interventions ranged from 
February 19 to March 4 while the end dates ranged between April 12 and April 23. The majority 
of schools began Monday, February 25 (N=13) and ended between April 19 and 23 (N=19). The 
number of days the intervention lasted varied across schools, as shown in Table 15. Sixty-two 
percent of schools held their interventions five days per week during this time period. Middle 
schools planned to have daily interventions more frequently than elementary schools (79% and 
47%, respectively), whereas about 1/3 of elementary schools proposed to hold interventions only 
three days per week. Interventions would last on average 23.7 days in elementary schools and 
                                                          
23 The way that these schools utilized the TAIP funding is explained in more detail in the next section. 
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29.0 days in middle schools. The total number of intervention days is shown in the boxplot in 
Figure 17. Elementary schools had more variation in the duration of their interventions, ranging 
from 9 to 33, with a median value of 24.5 days. Middle schools on the other hand, had a 
narrower range (from 23 to 40 days), with nine schools that varied only two days from the 
median of 29.5 days. There were approximately 150 school days in GCPS prior to the opening of 
the state test window, meaning the median intervention duration comprised 16.3% of the 
elementary school year and 19.7% of the middle school year. These interventions, then, represent 
a substantial amount of the school year prior to the state test. 
Intervention structures. Looking at the individual features of the interventions reported 
in Tables 14 and 15, it is perhaps unsurprising that previous quantitative research has found 
mixed evidence of triage. The descriptive results point to several reasons for this and help guide 
the next analyses, which categorize the interventions into four different types. First, schools did 
not act like a monolith. The 29 schools combined intervention features in a number of ways, such 
that there was variation in the type, duration, provider, and focus of the interventions. The 
variation across interventions means that analyses which combine these schools together would 
not necessarily reveal test score differences between student groups. In the next part of this 
analysis, similar interventions were grouped together based on two dimensions: (a) equity and 
(b) quality. These dimensions, explained in more detail below, represent tradeoffs facing school 
leaders when designing the interventions, tradeoffs which have a direct effect on students and 
teachers. 
The second reason for mixed evidence of triage may be that schools did not only target 
the bubble students. While the majority of TAIP schools planned to target only these students, a 
number of schools acted more equitably by supporting all students, most often during a built-in 
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intervention period. If the schools that behaved more equitably are analyzed together with 
schools that engaged in triage, then differences in outcomes between bubble students and low-
performers may not show up in aggregate test score comparisons. Equity of access was taken 
into account in two ways when grouping the TAIP interventions: (a) which students were 
targeted/had access to the interventions and (b) whether the resources provided to the targeted 
students were in addition to or at the expense of resources for students who did not have access 
to the interventions. 
Third, the interventions varied in quality (i.e., their potential to provide increased learning 
opportunities for students). The quality of the intervention is influenced by the expertise of the 
individual who provides the intervention. Simply putting an adult with a small group of students 
would not necessarily lead to higher test scores. For instance, a number of schools planned for 
the substitute to provide the intervention. There are reasons to believe these individuals have less 
content knowledge expertise in math and reading to produce the additional learning that would 
translate into test score gains (e.g., Miller, Murnane, & Willett, 2008). On the other hand, both 
the teacher of record and an expert teacher would have the content knowledge expertise to work 
with struggling students, which should provide enhanced learning opportunities for targeted 
students.  
Another aspect that influences students learning opportunities is the content and skills the 
interventions would focus on and the extent to which the intervention was aimed at meeting 
student needs. An intervention that focused on each individual’s gaps in knowledge would likely 
provide increased learning opportunities. Some schools indicated their interventions would 
include a specific, targeted focus on individual student gaps. For instance, a middle school 
indicated that they had “looked at specific data on each student and know what each of them 
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need intervention on to score proficient or advanced on [the state test].” In this school’s case, 
they focused on individual student needs. On the other hand, interventions where all students 
work on the same content rather than directly addressing student misconceptions might not 
increase student learning. For example, one school indicated that their intervention would focus 
on the “top three tested areas for [the state test].” An intervention with this one-size-fits-all 
approach may not provide enhanced learning opportunities because target students may be 
working on curricular standards that they already have mastered. Although the curricular focus is 
an important aspect of the intervention’s quality, few schools indicated the actual content focus 
beyond simply math and reading. 
Intervention Type 1: Triage (teacher attention). One of the most common TAIP 
interventions proposed by schools leaders involved the teacher of record providing small group 
instruction for their own bubble students during normal math or reading class. These schools 
used the TAIP funds to hire substitute teachers who would stay with the rest of class while the 
teacher worked with their small group of students (e.g., School A from Figure 16). In some 
cases, the teacher taught all students during the first half of the period and then pulled the bubble 
students during the second half, leaving the substitute with the low- and high-performers. Other 
schools, however, had the teacher of record would work with the bubble students the entire class 
period while the substitute teacher taught the other students.  
These interventions are labeled triage because the learning opportunities afforded to 
target students come at the expense of learning opportunities for non-targeted students. Bubble 
students get the attention of the teacher of record precisely because that teacher is not providing 
attention to other students. Even though these schools were given additional funds to target 
students, rather than providing additional resources to those students, they hired substitutes to 
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divert resources (e.g., classroom teacher time) away from non-targeted students and towards 
targeted ones. One might expect that resources would need to be shifted in this fashion only in 
the absence of funding, yet a number of schools clearly used the additional funds to facilitate 
triage. 
This use of additional funds was one of the most common responses across the TAIPs. In 
total, nine schools utilized this intervention, including three elementary and six middle schools. 
Schools planned to offer this intervention over a time period ranging from 12 to 31 days, with 
seven schools offering it for 24 or more days. This means that low-performing students in grades 
three and seven in some TAIP schools went more than five weeks before the state test without 
access to their normal math or reading teacher.   
This intervention likely provides enhanced learning opportunities for targeted students 
because they receive additional attention from their teacher. Their teacher is likely well- 
positioned to support student learning because they would be a content area expert who knows 
their students’ learning styles and individual gaps in knowledge. Some triage studies posit that 
“teacher attention” may be the mechanism through which triage occurs in the classroom (e.g., 
Krieg, 2008; Ladd & Lauen, 2010; Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010). This example of the teacher 
pulling a small group of students out for intensive tutoring represents one version of teacher 
attention.  
Relating to equity of access, the non-targeted low- and high-performers left in the 
classroom with the substitute are likely to be negatively affected by this intervention. The 
substitute teacher may not have the math or reading content knowledge to help students who did 
not understand that day’s lesson, something the teacher of record would do if she were in the 
class. Low-performing students might especially be harmed by this intervention because they 
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clearly need additional support but would not necessarily have access to their teacher. This could 
help explain why the non-targeted (Below Basic) students’ outcomes were worse when schools 
had TAIP funds than the following year (results found in the third alternative in Chapter 3). 
This intervention creates some potential practical effects for students and teachers. For 
example, when targeted students are pulled to work with their teacher every day during class, 
they are publicly identified as receiving additional help. Non-targeted students might be able to 
place themselves in the low group, which risks de-motivating those students if they believe their 
teacher sees them as too low to do well. This public intervention could also have a positive effect 
on students who realize they are part of the high-performing students.  
The movement of students and teacher for small group instruction disrupts the flow of 
class, but several schools limited the disruptiveness of this intervention. For instance, one middle 
school split the substitute between two teachers in order “to prevent a teacher from losing a 
complete instructional day with all students.” Another middle school had their instructional 
coach remain in the class with the substitute when the teacher of record worked with the targeted 
bubble students. This would provide the students who were left behind access to a content area 
expert. Although modifications like these did not occur broadly, these schools acknowledged that 
losing access to their teacher might harm students and included in their plan ways to mitigate this 
issue. 
There were two schools that had the teacher of record provide during-class interventions 
similar to triage, except the small groups were comprised of more than just bubble students. In 
these schools, the teachers would decide which students to pull for small group work, with one 
elementary school specifying that teachers would select the Basic and Below Basic students. The 
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substitute still remained with the rest of the class, but these interventions were accessible to a 
broader group of students than those labeled as “triage.”  
Intervention Type 2: Pullout tutoring. In the second intervention type, targeted students 
were pulled from a non-core class to receive small group instruction. Pullout tutoring generally 
occurred during a related arts class, such as art, band, or physical education. In schools that 
proposed pullout tutoring, all students were taught their normal math and reading class, but the 
targeted students— all of whom were bubble students—received additional tutoring at another 
time. Nine schools proposed pullout tutoring, including four elementary schools and five middle 
schools. Schools planned to offer this intervention over a time period ranging from 12 to 40 days. 
TAIPs indicated that pullout tutoring would be administered by either (a) expert teachers 
in the school, (b) the teacher of record, or (c) substitute teachers. Because of their content 
knowledge, instruction offered by either the teacher of record or another expert teacher has the 
potential to provide students with increased learning opportunities. This is why I distinguish 
pullout tutoring from interventions provided by the substitute teacher, which are grouped 
separately and described next. 
Overall, five schools indicated that the pullout would be administered by an expert 
teacher. When the “expert” or “effective” teacher provided the intervention during normal class 
time, the TAIP funds were used to hire a substitute who would cover this teacher’s class. As with 
triage, replacing a teacher with a substitute means that other students lose access to their teacher 
during their own math or reading time. School leaders did not specify whether these expert 
teachers come from another grade, but they likely do (given the focus on third- and seventh-
grade students). Because many of the TAIP interventions would last more than five school 
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weeks, this loss of time for students at other grade levels could affect their learning 
opportunities. 
Several administrators limited how much time students lost with their math and reading 
teachers by using TAIP funds to pay teachers to plan their lessons after school. In two schools, 
teachers used their normal planning time, when they did not teach students, to pull small groups 
of students from other classes. When the teacher of record provides the intervention during her 
planning period, her other students do not lose access to her. The trade-off, however, is that the 
teacher—who generally has only one off period per day—works the entire school day with no 
break other than lunch and then stays after school to plan lessons. While teachers are being paid 
for their time, the extended school day without a break could contribute to teacher burnout. Two 
schools did not make it clear who would provide the pullout tutoring. 
Because the tutoring would be provided by certified teachers, this intervention has the 
potential to provide enhanced learning opportunities. There are other factors that might influence 
the quality of the interventions. For example, pullout tutorials require lesson plans. The quality 
of those plans, and the extent to which they are focused on student learning gaps, would be key 
to increasing student learning. The TAIPs do not necessarily detail who would plan the 
intervention lessons, which limits how much can be said about their quality other than it is an 
important consideration for an effective intervention. The teachers would likely be able to 
provide individualized instruction to targeted students if they are provided with quality lesson 
plans.  
Intervention Type 3: Substitute provided. The previous two intervention types were 
offered either during math or reading class (triage) or during another class (pullout tutoring). In 
both cases, math or reading teachers in the school provided the intervention, meaning the 
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interventions were taught by content area experts. On the other hand, six schools (three 
elementary, three middle) proposed that substitutes would teach some or all of the intervention 
classes for targeted students. Three schools had the substitute provide small group instruction 
during students’ normal math or reading class, while the other three had the substitute provide 
pullout tutoring during a non-core class. In most of these schools, this substitute-provided 
intervention occurred in concert with other intervention types, but two schools offered this as the 
only intervention available to bubble students. Several schools split the use of substitutes 
between freeing up teachers to offer the interventions and working with students in a computer 
lab. Across all schools, this intervention was offered to students ranging from 18 to 33 days, with 
five of the six schools proposing it to last 29 days or more. Using additional funds to have the 
substitute teacher provide the intervention represents an example of resources being provided to 
target students in addition to their normal support.  
Substitute teachers may not have the content knowledge expertise, prior experience with 
the students, or knowledge of student misconceptions that would allow them to provide this type 
of targeted instruction (e.g., Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2009; Glatfelter, 2006; Gresham, 
Donihoo, & Cox, 2007). Being in a small group alone would not necessarily lead to improved 
learning if the substitute does not know the instructional materials or student needs. This leads to 
questions about who plans these interventions and the extent to which the interventions would 
offer additional learning opportunities for students. Some TAIPs detailed that teachers were paid 
to plan the intervention lessons after school, which implies that the lesson plans would be of 
quality and focused on student needs. It is unknown, however, how well substitutes would be 
able to implement these plans as written. Although some schools indicated that they would 
attempt to get a certified or specific teacher as substitutes, it is unclear whether that expertise was 
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available at the district level. Substitutes, then, may be an inefficient use of resources because 
targeted students would not necessarily receive enhanced learning opportunities. Having 
substitutes monitor students in the computer lab, on the other hand, may be more beneficial for 
students because many computer programs target student needs.  
When the substitute pulls students out of a non-core class for intervention, students do 
not lose time with their own teacher. The trade-off, however, is that the targeted student misses 
out on instruction from the non-core class. When the substitute provides intervention during 
normal class time, alternatively, time with the substitute replaces time with their teacher of 
record for targeted students. This is the opposite of the triage described previously. This 
substitute-provided intervention during core class actually frees up the teacher to work with low- 
and high-performers. This may actually benefit lower-performing students in the class because 
the class is smaller without the targeted students who are working with the substitute, meaning 
they could receive more attention from their own teacher during work time.  
Intervention Type 4: Support all students. All three of the intervention types described 
above were, with few exceptions, focused only on bubble students and required those students to 
miss a normal class to receive the intervention. Five schools, including three elementary and two 
middle schools, proposed offering targeted instruction to all students through a built-in 
intervention time. Because all students participate in this built-in intervention period, schools 
proposed using a combination of the teachers of record, substitute teachers, instructional 
coaches, and other expert teachers to provide targeted instruction.  
This intervention is in line with the Response to Intervention (RtI) model (Fuchs & 
Fuchs, 2006), a structure which provides increasing levels of supports for struggling students and 
involves flexible grouping and testing to ensure students are receiving targeted supports. The RtI 
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model was originally intended as a method to identify students with disabilities but is often 
utilized school-wide to support the achievement of all students (Sailor, 2009). RtI can be built 
into school schedules by creating a separate intervention period during the school day for all 
students. During this intervention period, students who have gaps in their understanding of 
current content standards can receive remediation while students who are on grade level can 
work on enrichment or other activities. Schools typically utilize flexible groups during the 
intervention period so students who have similar gaps in their knowledge can be grouped 
together for targeted instruction based on those specific standards.  
While most of the schools that offered this intervention already had this time built into 
their schedules, they used the TAIP funding for the same things already described: hiring 
substitutes, paying teachers to plan after school, and purchasing curriculum and supplies for the 
interventions24.  In these schools, substitute teachers were used to provide instruction during the 
built-in intervention time, with one elementary school having the substitute teach “the largest 
enrichment group” (meaning the substitute worked with the high-performing students). Another 
elementary school specified that the substitute would be used “to make the groups smaller” 
during this time period.  
Because the built-in intervention lasted for only one period during the school day, the 
substitute teachers hired with the TAIP money would have open time in their schedules. One 
school proposed that their substitute would plan and prepare lessons for the built-in intervention 
time (this is the school which specified they would hire a certified teacher who had experience 
with their student population, meaning the school leader believed the substitute had the expertise 
                                                          
24 The middle school which detailed the cost of their intervention (described at the beginning of the results for RQ2) 
utilized this built-in intervention time. 
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to do this type of planning). Two of the schools used the TAIP funding to create more than one 
intervention, and they planned that the substitutes would provide some of the small group 
interventions just described—either during the normal math or reading class or during a non-core 
class—or overseeing the computer lab. 
Some schools implementing this intervention used TAIP funds to pay teachers to plan 
after school, with an elementary principal noting that “teachers will need more planning time to 
prepare for the restructured school day.” It makes sense that (a) flexibly grouping students and 
(b) targeting interventions at student need merits a substantial amount of planning. This work 
requires looking at student-level data to group students based on their gaps in learning and then 
deciding how to reteach concepts that these students did not understand the first time. To be done 
well, this focus on individual students requires time and data. Some TAIP schools recognized the 
needed time and paid teachers to do it after school.  
Even within the “support all students” structure, there were examples of schools that 
provided bubble students with something in addition to or better than other students. For 
instance, two schools used TAIP funding to offer multiple interventions. This means that both (a) 
all students were supported and (b) bubble students were provided additional interventions such 
as triage or pullout tutoring. In another example, a middle school ensured that the bubble 
students would be taught by their teacher of record during the intervention period. This 
prioritization of bubble students indicates that the low-performing students would work with 
another teacher (who might not know them or their gaps very well) or with a substitute teacher 
(who may not have content knowledge). Similarly, one elementary school organized students 
into seven different groups based on their scores and made sure that the bubble students were 
placed into smaller groups than the other students. Both of these structures provide more 
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individualized attention for bubble students. This is an interesting mix of providing additional or 
better supports for bubble students within this more equitable system.  
For several reasons, the support all students intervention appears to represent the best 
practice of all the TAIP intervention types. First, it is the most equitable because the intervention 
was available to the broadest group of students. Low-performers, high-performers, and bubble 
students were all provided intervention. Second, all students had access to instruction at their 
needed level. Students struggling with the current content received needed remediation, while 
high performing students got to engage in enrichment activities. Although students across the test 
score distribution received support, these schools still focused TAIP funds only on third- and 
seventh-graders. While students from other grades were left out of the TAIP focus, schools that 
had this intervention built in to their schedules likely had it available for students in all grades. 
Third, this structure represents the least disruptive type of intervention because neither teachers 
nor students are missing out on anything to be in this intervention. It does not require students to 
be pulled from another class or to lose access to their teacher during normal class time. Given 
that most of the schools already had this structure built in to the schedule, students already had 
experience doing different things from their classmates, which limits the public identification of 
students who need additional help. Fourth, supporting all students is the least dependent 
intervention on substitute teachers or additional resources to facilitate the intervention. The triage 
or pullout tutoring would not occur if the substitutes did not show up, but the built in intervention 
time is flexible in regards to student group sizes and could be adjusted based on adult absences.  
Discussion 
The goal of this analysis was to get inside the black box and find out what schools 
planned to do with additional funds. The Targeted Academic Intervention Proposals represent 
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the 29 school leaders’ views about the best way to spend this money. A benefit of the TAIPs is 
that they offer a view into how a number of school leaders’ designed interventions and decided 
which students should have access to them. Are these the type of school behaviors that were 
intended by state accountability policy and district data sharing initiatives? The interventions 
described in Chapter 4 have implications for state and district policymakers and should broaden 
their conversations about the effect of policy on students. 
Takeaway 1: Incentives Matter 
It is clear from the state’s waiver application that they desired equity, using the phrases 
“every student” and “all students” dozens of times in that document. State policymakers intend 
for all students to improve over their baseline results every year. The design of the incentives 
under the waiver, however, did not necessarily align with those intentions and created competing 
incentives for districts, school leaders, and teachers. Furthermore, despite speaking in depth 
about equity concerns regarding schools who narrowly target bubble students, GCPS provided 
the data and encouraged schools to focus on bubble students before the state test. State policy 
influenced the district rules governing their TAIP program, which affected equity of access to 
support and resources because schools selected students for interventions based on state 
incentives. 
The use of aggregate proficiency rates for students in grades three through eight did 
not “mitigate an overemphasis on grades three and seven” (ESEA Flexibility Request, 
2012, p. 42). The state recognized that measuring schools based on single grades might lead 
schools to behave strategically, including in the waiver application that “[u]nderstanding that 
[annual measureable objectives] drive behavior, we added aggregate grades 3-8 Math and 
Reading measures to mitigate an over-emphasis on 3rd and 7th grade” (ESEA Flexibility 
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Request, 2012, p. 42). While recognizing that measuring school performance on individual 
grades might lead schools to focus on students in those grades, policymakers’ fix—including the 
aggregate score—did not work. Every TAIP school targeted third or seventh grade students with 
interventions. This emphasis on individual grades appears to be driven directly by the state 
accountability system because none of the district’s communication to the schools included 
mention of which grade to target. An important takeaway for state and federal policymakers is 
ensuring that the policy metrics and incentives match their intentions. This state appears to have 
learned its lesson, including in the subsequent accountability waiver application that “based on 
feedback gathered from stakeholders, measures that focus on individual grades (i.e., 3rd and 7th 
grade) are eliminated” (ESEA Flexibility Request, 2015, p. 45). 
Proficiency rates caused schools to focus on bubble students. While the district 
encouraged schools to target Priority students, school leaders were allowed to determine the 
focal students for interventions. The Priority label alone represents a strong signal to schools that 
these are the important students, and 93% of schools followed this signal by targeting bubble 
students. Even though some of these schools also supported other students, nearly seven in ten 
schools focused interventions solely on students close to proficiency. 
This focus on bubble students reflects both district and state accountability incentives that 
rate districts, schools, administrators, and teachers (and students), at least in part, based on 
proficiency rates. The state used proficiency rates in the waiver accountability system to (a) hold 
districts accountable, (b) identify the lowest-performing 5% of schools statewide, and (c) 
comprise 15% of principal and teacher evaluation scores. The waiver shifted individual school 
accountability from the state to districts, and GCPS’ school accountability framework included 
multiple indicators, with 15% of school ratings determined by the school’s proficiency rate.  
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The focus on bubble students is understandable, given the design of the accountability 
incentives. For example, because the state held districts accountable for proficiency, it makes 
sense that district leaders would want schools to know who their bubble students were so they 
could focus on students close to that line. In addition, the lowest-performing 5% of schools 
risked possible takeover by the state, a possibility determined solely by proficiency rates. Given 
that the schools with TAIP funding were amongst the lowest-performing in the district, it makes 
sense that these schools would want to increase this metric to avoid being in the bottom 5% of 
schools in the state. Despite including student growth metrics in the policies, the use of 
proficiency rates in both state and district accountability appears to have led directly to the TAIP 
program in GCPS where schools focused on bubble students. While I cannot extrapolate these 
behaviors beyond GCPS, or even beyond the schools that received TAIP funding, it is not 
difficult to imagine that more schools across the state felt that their rating would benefit through 
this type of focus.  
Students in need are left behind. Schools did not simply focus on bubble students, 
however, but on bubble students in grades that counted twice. Micro-targeting third- and 
seventh-grade bubble students leads to equity concerns, especially regarding the students who do 
not get access to needed supports and are left behind. For example, in all of the TAIPs, because 
the schools targeted their interventions only for third- and seventh-graders, students in other 
grades may not receive needed additional support. 
Only one in four TAIP schools expanded their TAIP interventions to include low-
performers, with even fewer providing enrichment for high-performers. The district labeled the 
lowest-performing students as needing a “Multi-Year Plan” to meet proficiency. Yet the district 
did not require that schools turn in a plan for those students, only a proposal for how schools 
145 
 
would target Priority students. By not asking schools to detail how they will improve outcomes 
for the low-performing students, and by labeling these students as “Multi-Year Plan” and color-
coding them red in Figure 2, the district implicitly wrote off those students. Low-performers 
being neglected is a major concern regarding educational triage and has equity implications in 
this district. In order to get additional resources to support their learning, students needed to be in 
an important grade and to score right around proficiency on the benchmark. This is concerning 
because schools appear to be making instructional decisions based on the metrics used to rate 
them and not necessarily on student need.  
The limited expansion of support to other students is at odds with a stated goal in the 
waiver, which describes a “focus on growing every student, every year” (ESEA Flexibility 
Request, 2012, p. 43). The state designed the evaluation system to incent individual teachers and 
principals to focus on student growth by making 35% of teacher and principal evaluation scores 
based on value-add metrics. That only a handful of TAIP schools targeted students across the test 
score distribution, however, suggests that the incentives regarding proficiency rates might be 
stronger than those regarding growth metrics.  
The TAIP analysis indicates that incentives matter. There appear to be multiple external 
pressures that led many schools to micro-target bubble students in third- and seventh-grade. This 
behavior suggests a narrow focus on the measured aspects of schools, as Campbell (1979) would 
have predicted. The TAIP proposals reflect the language and metrics from both the district and 
the state, which points to how carefully members of these role groups should consider the 
messages they send to those who implement the policy at the school level. This study indicates 
that policymakers can affect equity of access to enhanced learning opportunities through the 
incentives and metrics in accountability systems. 
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Takeaway 2: Triage Occurs Even When Additional Resources Are Available 
While schools might not have been able to implement the proposals exactly as written, it 
is clear that a large number of schools planned to engage in triage. Nine schools proposed using 
TAIP funding to hire substitute teachers who would stay with low- and high-performers while 
the teacher of record would work with small groups of bubble students during class. That these 
schools used additional resources to facilitate the diversion of resources is counterintuitive, given 
that the additional funds should have alleviated the need to shuffle resources.  
Furthermore, the loss of time with one’s teacher can have serious consequences. Miller, 
Murnane, and Willett (2008) use three years of data from a large urban district and estimate that 
fourth grade math achievement dropped by 3.2% of a standard deviation for every 10 days a 
teacher is absent. Some of the proposed interventions would last for up to three times that length, 
suggesting that students who were left behind lost something of real value.  
As just noted, nearly 70% of schools planned to focus solely on bubble students, and 
nearly half of those proposed to do so through triage (i.e., diverting resources to targeted 
students). The other schools focused on bubble students either through pullouts or by 
remediation with a substitute (i.e., providing something additional to targeted students). Because 
these pullout interventions classes occur in addition to normal classes, this intervention does not 
offer targeted students resources at the expense of non-targeted students. On the surface, that 
makes this practice seem more equitable to the non-targeted students because they do not lose 
out on their teacher during class time (like in triage), they are simply left out of receiving 
additional support25. But if students do not get additional remediation because they are viewed as 
                                                          
25 Although if the teacher is pulled from another grade, the students who are left with a substitute are certainly 
affected. 
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too low, then it is worth considering whether this allocation of resources is really more equitable 
or whether it is somehow just more palatable than directly diverting resources from low-
achieving students.  
Takeaway 3: Not All Interventions Are Equal 
School leaders used a variety of strategies to restructure their school day, each 
representing tradeoffs related to student learning opportunities, equity of access, and disruption 
of normal schedules. The most common interventions were teacher attention, or triage. This 
intervention represents real equity issues because the low-performers lose access to their teacher 
for some or all of their math or reading class. The second intervention type was pullout tutoring, 
where students receive an additional remediation class in addition to normal math and reading 
classes. The quality of this intervention relies on who provides it (specifically the content 
knowledge expertise of the provider) and the curricular focus. The third type of intervention had 
the substitute teachers provide the intervention. There appears to be an equity versus efficiency 
tradeoff happening in the use of substitutes. Having substitutes work with small groups of 
students would not necessarily increase learning and would be an inefficient use of resources if 
the subs (a) are not content area specialists and/or (b) do not know the students gaps or needs. 
The equity tradeoff, however, is that using substitutes to offer remediation limits how much time 
other students would lose with their teacher. Each of the TAIP interventions provide targeted 
instruction to only a small group of students. Schools can decide which students can access those 
resources, but each of them has limited space so some students have to be left out. 
The last type of intervention—support all students—appears to represent a best practice 
for schools. It seems the most equitable because it provides support for students across the test 
store distribution. The curriculum and student groupings are based on current student needs. It is 
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the least dependent on substitute teachers. Because the intervention time is built into the school 
day, neither students nor teachers have to adjust their normal schedules. This combination of 
factors makes the “support all students” intervention align closest with the intentions of the 
district leaders and state policymakers. 
 Despite these benefits, it is not easy to implement a high-quality RtI model school-wide 
(e.g., Burns & Gibbons, 2012). The RtI model requires teacher to use student data to flexibly 
group students by need and to plan remediation for that shared gap in knowledge. Schools need 
data that identifies what students know and on what they need additional help, but using data to 
support students in need is a challenge for administrators and teachers (Means, Padilla, 
Gallagher, & SRI International, 2010). Beyond creating a school schedule with built-in time for 
enrichment and remediation, leaders and teachers need (a) training to effectively use the student 
data and (b) time to look at the data so they can determine which students need what support. 
The actual lesson structure and activities need to be of quality, and GCPS schools likely face 
challenges in expertise and time to plan and create quality lessons that address student 
misconceptions.  
Despite these challenges, the support all students structure is focused on student growth 
for all students—including high-performers, who are often left out of the conversation. 
Policymakers at the state and district levels express a clear focus on growth for all students. Even 
though this structure is difficult to implement well, considering how to support schools to 
effectively use student data focuses discussions on student learning. This suggests an opportunity 
for additional research to explore how educators could implement these school-wide 
interventions more effectively.  
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All schools planned to provide targeted students with small group instruction, and the 
main use of TAIP funding was to hire substitute teachers to facilitate small group instruction, a 
finding not anticipated at the beginning of the study. This highlights a possible source of 
expertise for districts and schools. Districts might consider training a cadre of substitutes to 
provide this type of targeted intervention. Retired teachers, for example, could be used as 
interventionists for the short period of time before the state test. Additional research on how to 
best utilize substitute teacher would benefit schools looking to provide targeted instruction to 
students. 
The variation in the quality of the TAIP proposals indicates that these schools were not 
necessarily able to design quality interventions given the short time frame. Given that identifying 
the target students, designing the interventions, turning in the TAIP documents, and receiving 
approval for these interventions all occurred in fewer than two weeks, it is not clear what process 
the district used to mark the TAIPs as “Approved.” For example, it is unclear the extent to which 
district leaders considered whether these interventions (a) would provide additional learning 
opportunities for students or (b) were widely accessible for struggling students. Thinking about 
these factors seems worthwhile for districts to do before they offer funding under programs such 
as the TAIP interventions. This implies that districts should provide schools more time and more 
guidance to design interventions which better reflect district intentions. This additional guidance 
would require district leaders to discuss what quality interventions would look like, which would 
focus discussions on student learning. 
Given the results from this analysis, I offer some questions that district and school leaders 
might consider when discussing interventions which occur during the school day. The first 
consideration relates to equity of access. Which students need additional support and on what 
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content? Is selection into intervention based on student needs or other concerns? What is being 
lost and for whom? The second consideration relates to quality. How tailored are the 
interventions to student needs? If students are not provided targeted support aimed at their gaps 
in learning, they will not have the opportunity for increased learning. This type of targeting 
requires careful preparation and planning of the lesson to ensure it fills in gaps in learning. Who 
is going to prepare these interventions? And will the person who prepares the lessons also be 
providing the intervention? If not, how much preparation time does the provider have? Schools 
need access to quality planners and providers if they are expected to support student learning. 
Limitations 
This analysis focused on how school leaders planned to spend TAIP funds. It does not 
represent what these TAIP schools were doing for the rest of the school year to support students. 
While these results indicate that schools behaved strategically by targeting interventions mainly 
for bubble students, with many schools doing so by diverting resources from low-performers, 
this does not mean that schools behaved this way for the entire school year.  
In addition, as noted already, these documents are proposals for how schools planned to 
structure their interventions. We do not know how faithfully schools were able to implement 
these proposals. That limits the ability to quantify the effects of the various interventions on 
student outcomes. 
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Tables 
Table 13. School summary statistics for schools with and without TAIPs  
  Elementary Schools Middle Schools 
  Has TAIP No Plan Has TAIP No Plan 
 Prior Year Test Label     
M
at
h
 
Proficient/Advanced 36.1 40.1 36.8 38.3 
 (8.3) (17.6) (12.1) (21.1) 
Basic 49.1 47.1 37.1 36.1 
 (5.1) (12.1) (2.8) (9.5) 
Below Basic 14.8 12.8 26.1 25.6 
 (4.6) (8.9) (11.5) (14.4) 
Prescriptive Label     
Enrichment 14.7 19.1 11.1 16.1 
 (35.4) (39.3) (31.4) (36.7) 
Priority 44.9 43.8 40.1 38.1 
 (49.7) (49.6) (49.1) (48.6) 
Multi-Year Plan 40.4 37.1 48.0 45.8 
  (49.1) (48.3) (50.0) (49.8) 
 Prior Year Test Label     
R
ea
d
in
g
 
Proficient/Advanced 34.1 40.2 40.1 40.0 
 (8.2) (18.7) (10.0) (22.0) 
Basic 50.9 47.1 46.0 44.4 
 (3.7) (12.6) (5.6) (9.3) 
Below Basic 15.0 12.7 13.9 18.2 
 (5.4) (8.0) (7.2) (10.7) 
Prescriptive Label     
Enrichment 15.0 21.5 16.6 22.9 
 (35.7) (41.1) (37.2) (42.0) 
Priority 37.2 35.5 40.3 35.1 
 (48.3) (47.8) (49.1) (47.7) 
Multi-Year Plan 47.8 43.0 43.1 41.9 
  (50.0) (49.5) (49.5) (49.3) 
S
tu
d
en
t 
D
em
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
s 
Black 29.5 48.8 42.2 55.5 
 (11.5) (31.4) (20.5) (22.2) 
Hispanic 33.2 13.5 18.2 10.8 
 (18.0) (15.9) (13.4) (12.4) 
White 32.2 33.4 34.6 30.5 
 (13.2) (26.6) (16.6) (18.5) 
Other 4.0 2.9 4.3 2.7 
 (2.9) (3.5) (4.9) (2.4) 
Economically disadvantaged 82.7 75.3 76.8 77.6 
 (14.8) (25.9) (11.1) (22.2) 
English language learners 37.1 13.9 10.9 8.9 
 (19.7) (15.6) (11.6) (10.3) 
Students with disabilities 11.3 13.2 12.8 14.0 
 (2.4) (3.5) (3.0) (5.5) 
Mobility rate 28.9 29.9 27.9 32.7 
 (7.1) (14.3) (12.7) (19.0) 
 Observations 15 59 14 22 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
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Table 14. Descriptive statistics of which students were targeted with TAIP interventions 
 
 Total Elementary Middle 
    
Number of students targeted 
Average: 76.8  
Range: 30-
180 
Average: 61.9 
Range: 30-
180 
Average: 91.2 
Range: 47-
160 
3rd or 7th grade 29 (100%) 15 (100%) 14 (100%) 
Other grade included 1 (3%) 1 (7%) 0 (0%) 
    
Bubble students  27 (93%) 14 (93%) 13 (93%) 
Priority 1 and 2 9 (31%) 3 (20%) 6 (43%) 
Close to proficiency (“within 3 
questions of proficiency”)  
4 (14%) 2 (13%) 2 (14%) 
Basic 6 (21%) 5 (33%) 1 (7%) 
“Targeted students” 13 (45%) 8 (53%) 5 (36%) 
“Identified students” 2 (7%) 0 2 (14%) 
Low performers (Below Basic, remediation) 7 (24%) 4 (27%) 3 (21%) 
High performers (enrichment) 5 (17%) 3 (20%) 2 (14%) 
    
Bubble students only 20 (69%) 10 (67%) 10 (71%) 
Bubble and low performers students 2 (7%) 1 (7%) 1 (7%) 
All students receive intervention or 
enrichment 
5 (17%) 3 (20%) 2 (14%) 
Unclear who was targeted 2 (7%) 1 (7%) 1 (7%) 
    
Flexible groups 5 (17%) 2 (13%) 3 (29%) 
Subgroups (e.g., ELLs, students with 
disabilities) 
2 (7%) 1 (7%) 1 (7%) 
    
Observations 29 15 14 
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Table 15. Descriptive statistics of TAIP intervention features 
 Total Elementary Middle 
How were additional resources spent?    
Hire subs 28 (97%) 14 (93%) 14 (100%) 
Curricular materials and supplies (e.g., student 
workbooks, computer programs, paper, 
copy toner) 
9 (31%) 4 (27%) 5 (36%) 
Teachers paid to plan after school 7 (24%) 5 (33%) 2 (14%) 
    
Small group instruction 29 (100%) 15 (100%) 14 (100%) 
Multiple interventions 7 (24%) 3 (20%) 4 (29%) 
    
Who provided the intervention?*    
Teacher of record 16 (55%) 7 (47%) 9 (64%) 
Other teacher (e.g., “expert,” “most effective”) 9 (31%) 6 (40%) 3 (21%) 
Substitute 7 (24%) 4 (27%) 3 (21%) 
Unclear who provided 3 (10%) 2 (13%) 1 (7%) 
    
When during the school day did the intervention 
occur?* 
   
During core math or reading class 17 (59%) 7 (47%) 10 (71%) 
During another class 4 (14%) 1 (7%) 3 (21%) 
Expanded or created separate intervention time 5 (17%) 3 (20%) 2 (14%) 
Unclear when during the day 10 (34%) 7 (47%) 3 (21%) 
    
How frequently did the intervention occur?    
2 days per week 2 (7%) 1 (7%) 1 (7%) 
3 days per week 5 (17%) 5 (33%) 0 (0%) 
4 days per week 4 (14%) 2 (13%) 2 (14%) 
5 days per week 18 (62%) 7 (47%) 11 (79%) 
Total number of days 26.2 23.7 29.0 
    
What was the curricular focus?    
Math  29 (100%) 15 (100%) 14 (100%) 
Reading  29 (100%) 15 (100%) 14 (100%) 
    
Observations 29 15 14 
*may not add up to 100% because schools could have multiple in this category 
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Figures 
Figure 15. Blank Targeted Academic Intervention Proposal (TAIP) 
 
 
  
 
2012-13 TARGETED ACADEMIC INTERVENTION PROPOSAL 
 
School ___________________ Location Code _______ Phone __________________ 
Principal ____________   Person Responsible for Monitoring Activities____________ 
 
Briefly describe the proposed program. (Include a description of student and teacher selection processes, a plan 
for communicating with stakeholders and encouraging student participation.) 
 
 
Restructuring the school day: 
 
 
Intervention targets (Grade Level/Subject): ________________________________________________ 
Number of students participating ________   Proposed beginning date ________ ending date _______ 
Days of week of Intervention_____ 
 
 
 
Principal’s Electronic Signature ___________________________   Date _____ 
 
_____ Approved as requested   
_____ Approved with indicated modification 
_____Not approved: additional information needed ________________________________ 
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Figure 16. Samples of completed TAIPs 
Panel A. School A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. School B 
 
  
School A 
2012-13 TARGETED ACADEMIC INTERVENTION PROPOSAL 
Briefly describe the proposed program. (Include a description of student and teacher selection processes, a plan 
for communicating with stakeholders and encouraging student participation.) 
Restructuring the school day: 
 
 
Restructuring the school day: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intervention targets (Grade Level/Subject): _7th Grade Math and English Language Arts__ 
Number of students participating    69        Proposed beginning date   2/25/13     ending date    4/19/13      
Days of week of Intervention    M/F      
 
Sixty-nine seventh grade students were targeted because of their high priority 
status. Assessment scores for 7th grade will count twice in the areas of math 
and English/language arts for the overall school performance indicators. 
Students selected for the 7th grade instructional intervention time were chosen 
based on DEA Test B scores and their ability to meet the proficiency 
requirement. These students were within 3 answers of being proficient on the 
DEA assessment. Also, students who were proficient, but within 3 correct 
answers from the Basic category on the DEA assessment were also identified. 
All Math and ELA teachers of 7th grade students were identified for this 
initiative. [School A] will hire 3 full time substitutes (one for each of the three 
7th grade teams). The substitute will provide release time for the regular 
classroom teachers to provide small group instruction for targeted students and 
skills. 
School B 
2012-13 TARGETED ACADEMIC INTERVENTION PROPOSAL 
Briefly describe the proposed program. (Include a description of student and teacher selection processes, a plan 
for communicating with stakeholders and encouraging student participation.) 
Restructuring the school day: 
 
 
Restructuring the school day: 
 
Intervention targets (Grade Level/Subject): _7th Grade/Numeracy & Literacy__ 
Number of students participating    75        Proposed beginning date   2/19/13     ending date    4/23/13      
Days of week of Intervention    5      
 
 
 
 
 
We are requesting two substitute teachers. The substitute teachers will cover 
classes allowing our expert teachers an opportunity to work in small groups 
with our targeted students. 
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Figure 17. Range in total number of days that proposed interventions would last 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 The purpose of this dissertation was to explore how schools in this urban district used the 
benchmark data that they received three times per year and to examine the extent to which 
schools responded to the changing incentives of state policy. Each analysis chapter included a 
thorough discussion of the results. Here, I recap the results from the analyses before discussing 
the broad takeaways found across the chapters. 
Summary of Results 
 Chapter 2 used five years of benchmark data to investigate whether schools used 
benchmark information differently over the course of the school year and the extent to which that 
changed when the policy incentives changed. That analysis exploited the fact that students were 
assigned test-score labels of Below Basic, Basic, Proficient, and Advanced based on the number 
of questions answered correctly. Local linear regression discontinuity methods were used to 
estimate the causal effect of receiving the higher of two labels during NCLB, and the RD models 
were modified to utilize difference-in-differences methods to quantify the differential effect of 
the labels during the waiver. 
The results from Chapter 2 indicated that schools did focus on bubble students during 
NCLB. The focus on bubble students occurred more strongly in math than in reading, and it 
occurred only after the third benchmark. Students barely labeled as Below Basic scored about 
0.04 standard deviations lower than students barely labeled Basic on the third math benchmark 
during NCLB (estimates which were consistently significant). In reading, there was some 
evidence that middle school students labeled Below Basic scored 0.02 to 0.03 standard 
deviations lower than students barely labeled Basic on the third reading benchmark. The reading 
estimates from NCLB were stable but significant only at higher bandwidths. Elementary and 
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middle schools both focused on Basic students during NCLB, but they did so at different 
thresholds. Middle schools were more consistent across subjects with their behavior during 
NCLB, focusing on Basic over Below Basic students in both math and reading. Elementary 
schools, on the other hand, focused on Basic over Proficient students in math only. 
While Chapter 2 found that GCPS schools targeted bubble students during NCLB, the 
adoption of the waiver accountability system counteracted that effect, implying that schools 
treated lower-performing students better during the waiver. Students labeled as Below Basic on 
Benchmark C benefited in both subjects and in both types of schools. The discontinuity shifted 
0.06 standard deviations towards students barely labeled Below Basic in math, and 0.04 standard 
deviations in reading. The shift in focus in math occurred earlier in the year (by Benchmark B) 
and at more thresholds (both Basic and Proficient threshold) than in reading. Middle schools 
were again more consistent in their shift during the waiver across subjects. 
These effect sizes of 0.02 to 0.06, while statistically significant, are relatively small in 
magnitude. Although other triage studies have found larger effect sizes, these estimates are 
within the lower end of the range of those studies. For example, Jennings and Sohn (2014) find 
that the lowest-performing students in Houston public schools lost about 0.11 standard 
deviations (SD) in math after NCLB was introduced. Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) estimate 
that students in the lowest deciles scored about 0.04 SD worse while students in the middle 
deciles scored about 0.13 SD better. My estimates are similar to those found by Krieg (2008), 
that bubble students performed between 0.02 and 0.05 SD better in schools facing accountability 
pressure during NCLB. 
 Chapter 3 investigated alternative explanations for the Chapter 2 results. The first 
alternative explored whether the inclusion of growth metrics in the educator evaluation system 
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contributed to the previous chapter’s findings. This analysis used the natural experiment that 
occurred because the new evaluation system was adopted in 2011-12, the year before the waiver 
was implemented. These results showed that the shift towards lower-performing students began 
after the new evaluation system—but before the waiver—was adopted. That shift was not as 
broad as the previous chapter. The results indicate that the new evaluation system led to a shift in 
focus (a) only at the Basic threshold, (b) only on Benchmark C, and (c) more consistently in 
math than in reading. Students who barely scored Below Basic on math Benchmark C gained 
about 0.04 standard deviations more in 2011-12 than similar students in previous years 
(estimates which are statistically significant except at the narrowest bandwidth). These results 
are similar to those from the previous chapter, although the estimated differential effect of the 
new evaluation system is slightly smaller in magnitude. In reading, students who barely scored 
Below Basic on the third benchmark gained between 0.010 and 0.065, estimates which get larger 
in magnitude and are significant only at the wider bandwidths. 
 The second alternative investigated in Chapter 3 was that schools continued to triage 
during the waiver but used a different definition of bubble students than the Basic label that was 
explored in Chapter 2. This analysis took advantage of a set of prescriptive labels supplied by the 
district beginning in 2012-13 which explicitly identified the students close to proficiency as 
Priority, with low- and high-performers labeled as Multi-Year Plan and Enrichment, 
respectively. Using difference-in-differences models, this examination compared outcomes for 
students in these groups during NCLB and during the waiver.  
 The results from this alternative affirm the previous chapter’s results in math that schools 
focused on bubble students during NCLB and that low-performers benefitted after the waiver. As 
with the majority of the results, these findings were concerntrated on the third benchmark. In 
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math, bubble students gained 0.031 standard deviations more than low-achievers during NCLB, 
and there was a shift during the waiver where low-performers gained 0.043 standard deviations 
more. These results are similar in magnitude to the estimates at the Basic threshold from Chapter 
2. In addition, high-achievers gained significantly less than bubble students (0.021 standard 
deviations) during NCLB, indicating that the gains for bubble students in math came at the 
expense of low- and high-performers (i.e., schools engaged in triage). The reading results 
differed from those in Chapter 2, with low-performing students on the third reading benchmark 
gaining 0.033 standard deviations more than bubble students during NCLB. 
 The third alternative explored in Chapter 3 is that the reduced focus on bubble students 
occurred because 29 schools received additional funding in 2012-13 to provide students with 
targeted academic interventions. Under this hypothesis, the TAIP funding allowed schools to 
target bubble students without having to divert resources from low- and high-achievers. To test 
this alternative, the models from Chapter 2 were modified to include variables indicating whether 
(a) students attended a school that would receive TAIP funding and (b) the year was 2012-13, 
when the funding was provided to schools.  
The results of this analysis indicate that the TAIP funding does not explain the reduced 
focus on Basic students found during the waiver. The gains for low-performers persisted after 
controlling for TAIP money and year. The coefficients on the difference-in-difference-in-
differences estimator for students labeled Basic on the third benchmark in TAIP-funded schools 
during 2012-13 were consistently positive in both reading and math (although they were only 
rarely statistically significant). Positive coefficients indicate that students who were assigned the 
Basic label gained more than (a) students assigned the Below Basic label in the same year and 
(b) students assigned the Basic label the following year. That is, the TAIP money benefitted the 
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Basic students. The most surprising result from this analysis was that the non-targeted Below 
Basic students did worse when their schools had TAIP funds to design interventions. This 
suggested that schools used the TAIP funds in ways that harmed the low-performers, and 
Chapter 4 confirmed that many schools used the TAIP funds to facilitate triage. 
 Chapter 4 analyzed the Targeted Academic Intervention Proposals completed by 29 
school leaders that described how schools planned to spend the additional funds and which 
students would be targeted. Every school leader proposed to offer interventions only for third 
and seventh graders (the grades which counted twice in the waiver accountability system), with 
nearly 70% of the schools micro-targeting interventions for bubble students in those grades. Only 
a quarter of schools included low-performers in these interventions, which helps explain why the 
TAIP funding was not related to a reduced focus on bubble students (i.e., the third alternative in 
Chapter 3).  
 Chapter 4 found that TAIP funding would be spent primarily on hiring substitute 
teachers, paying teachers to plan after schools, and purchasing curriculum and supplies. The 
interventions were grouped into four types based on when during the school day the intervention 
occurred, who taught the intervention, and which students had access to the interventions. Even 
though schools were given additional funds, the most common use of TAIP funding was to 
facilitate triage (i.e., teacher attention), where substitutes worked with low- and high-performers 
while the teacher of record worked with bubble students. A large number of schools also offered 
bubble students pull-out tutoring, where an expert teacher provided small group instruction 
during a non-core class. Some schools used the substitutes to provide the intervention. The most 
equitable intervention structure was found in schools that built in an intervention period to the 
school day and had all students receiving instruction at their needed levels. 
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Takeaways 
The takeaways from this dissertation are as follows. 
1. Schools in GCPS did focus on bubble students during NCLB to the detriment of 
low-performers. This focus occurred after the third benchmark (around February of the 
school year). Schools used benchmark data to facilitate this focus, including the test-score 
labels and the prescriptive labels shared by the district. 
2. The quantitative analyses indicate that schools responded to changes in policy 
incentives by shifting focus to lower-performing students. Those policy changes included 
both school accountability policy and teacher and principal evaluation policy. 
3. The results across the quantitative analyses were generally more consistent and 
stronger in math than in reading. 
4. Middle and elementary schools behaved differently. Middle schools appeared to 
be more responsive to accountability incentives, having more consistent results across 
subjects and accountability eras. 
5. Even though the quantitative analyses show that, on average across the district, 
lower-performing students gained when the incentives changed, school documents 
indicate that the schools which received additional funding in 2012-13 focused 
interventions before the state test on bubble students. Even though they had additional 
funds to provide these targeted interventions, many schools diverted resources from low- 
and high-performers to offer these interventions (i.e., engaged in triage).  
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Implications 
Researchers 
This dissertation has implications for researchers, especially those who are engaging in 
triage research. When the quantitative data were broken down by TAIP and by year (i.e., in 
Chapter 3 Alternative 3), TAIP schools’ interventions—which targeted bubble students but not 
low-performers–were reflected in the positive DIDID estimates for Basic students. Furthermore, 
the use of TAIP funds to engage in triage was also reflected in the negative estimates for Below 
Basic students in 2012-13 compared to the 2013-14. This evidence of triage was visible only 
because of (a) access to district-level data (including benchmark scores and school documents) 
and (b) deep contextual knowledge of the district’s programs. These behaviors were based on 
students’ benchmarks scores, something that previous researchers studying triage have not 
neccesarily been able to access. That means these behaviors would be hidden from researchers 
and policymakers. Relying on test score differences to indicate that schools are behaving 
inequitably is concerning if scores do not pick up on these hidden behaviors. 
Because the district-wide test scores do not reflect this focus on bubble students, this has 
implications for researchers who use test scores as proxies for strategic behavior (e.g., Springer, 
2008b). In the Introduction, I offered as one of several hypotheses that prior triage research has 
failed to detect a focus on bubble students because researchers may inaccurately identify the 
bubble students. This hypothesis is borne out by this project. I illustrate this by comparing the 
district-supplied Priority label (which explicitly identifies GCPS’ bubble students) with two 
common methods prior researchers have used to identify bubble students: (a) dividing the prior 
year test score distribution into quantiles, with the middle quantiles representing the bubble 
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students (e.g., Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010), and (b) including students who score some distance 
around proficiency on the prior state test (e.g., Ladd & Lauen, 2010; Springer, 2008b). 
To compare GCPS’ prescriptive labels with quantiles from prior year, I divided the 
distribution of students’ prior year state test scores into deciles and then calculated the percent of 
each decile that was labeled each of MYP, Priority, and Enrichment (shown in Figure 18 for the 
Benchmark C labels). The lowest-performing students from the prior year are nearly completely 
identified as low-performing by the district, but the middle and high-performers show more 
volatility with benchmark performance. For example, in both subjects, more than 85% of the 
students whose prior scores place them in the lowest two deciles received the MYP label, 
indicating that students who scored low on the prior year’s state test continue to score low by 
district standards. A relatively sizeable proportion of students from the middle deciles (i.e., 
bubble students on the prior state test) are over-identified, meaning their benchmark performance 
is lower than indicated by the prior year. For instance, in math, 55% of students in the 4th decile, 
38% in the 5th decile, and 27% in the 6th decile started the year as bubble students but were 
labeled by the district in February as low-performers (with similar percentages in reading). The 
district-assigned labels indicate that high performance does not necessarily carry over the 
following year. While 88% (math) and 91% (reading) of students who score in the top decile are 
identified as Enrichment, the eighth and ninth deciles show that many students who were high 
performing in the prior year drop in status by the following year. Performance in math appears 
more unstable than in reading. In math, only 55% of students who score in the ninth decile and 
29% of students in the eighth decile are assigned the Enrichment label. In reading, those 
percentages are 71% and 42%, respectively. These decile graphs indicate that student 
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performance varies between the prior year state test and progress towards the current year’s 
standards.  
In the second comparison, I applied the same definition as Ladd and colleagues to 
identify grade-level (bubble) students as those who score between -0.5 and 0.5 standard 
deviations (SD) around the proficiency line, with students scoring -0.5 SD and below considered 
Low performers, and students scoring 0.5 SD and above considered High performers (Ladd & 
Lauen, 2010; Lauen & Gaddis, 2012). The bar graphs in Figure 19 show what percent of students 
would be labeled low, grade-level, and high based on the prior year were assigned the MYP, 
Priority, and Enrichment label by the district and have similar patterns to those in the decile 
graphs. Of those students prior research would have identified as grade-level (bubble) by being 
within 0.5 SD of proficiency, only about 2/3 of them were assigned the Priority label in both 
subjects. About 20% of students considered grade level the previous year dropped and are 
labeled by the district as MYP, with 10% (math) and 14% (reading) of those students labeled 
Enrichment. About ¾ of the students who scored more than 0.5 SD below proficiency in the 
prior year were labeled MYP, with nearly all of the remaining students assigned the Priority 
label. Seventy-six percent (reading) and 70% (math) of students who scored more than 0.5 SD 
above proficiency were labeled Enrichment, with nearly all of the remaining high performing 
students receiving the Priority label. 
These comparisons indicate that student performance is variable over time. Using these 
strategies on prior year test scores to identify bubble, low, and high students would lead to some 
misidentification regarding which students schools would consider bubble students, at least in 
GCPS. Absent from these comparisons, however, are the large percentage of students who did 
not have a prior year test score, which would eliminate them from analyses relying on that metric 
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to identify bubble students. This is highlighted in Figure 20, which shows similar bar graphs to 
those just described except they now include what percentage of students labeled MYP, Priority, 
and Enrichment were missing that metric.  
Figure 20 shows that a large proportion of the students who were labeled Priority would 
be misidentified by using prior year test scores to define them. Only 56% (math) and 60% 
(reading) would have been considered bubble students based on the distance from proficiency 
from the previous year. That means nearly four in ten of the students whom GCPS considered 
bubble students—including about 18% who were missing prior year test score—would be 
misidentified or left out of these analyses. Between 16% and 34% of students labeled as MYP 
and Enrichment are missing their prior year test score. 
Taken together, these comparisons of the district’s labels with the methods commonly 
used by prior researchers indicate that there is variation in student performance over the course 
of the school year. A sizeable proportion of bubble students from the prior year, perhaps 
unsurprising given that status, move up and down in the distribution and end up being labeled as 
low- or high-performers. One of the biggest issues this comparison highlights is the large 
proportion of students who would simply be left out of analyses using prior test scores because 
they do not have that data. The majority of those students with missing data are those taking the 
state test for the first year in elementary school (in this case, third-graders). While there is little 
researchers can do to work around missing data like this in administrative datasets, these students 
represent a substantial number of the actual students that GCPS labeled as Priority. Especially in 
2012-13, when the state accountability system prioritized third- and seventh-graders by rating 
schools on these grades separately, not having data to include third-grade students in analyses 
would limit the ability to accurately identify the effect of being a bubble student.  
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Prior research into triage may not have found evidence of triage using administrative data 
because the bubble students were not accurately identified in the data. The variation in 
performance shown between the state test in one year and student benchmark scores in the next 
points to using more local assessment information when possible to more plausibly determine 
whom schools are likely to view as bubble students. 
Another lesson for researchers is that elementary and middle schools in GCPS behaved 
differently. The quantitative results indicated that middle schools were more responsive to 
accountability incentives, and TAIP middle schools were more likely than elementary schools to 
use TAIP funds to facilitate triage. Disaggregating analyses by school level may reveal 
differences not present when data are combined. 
Policymakers 
 The implications for policymakers have been highlighted in the discussions for each 
chapter. Broadly, this dissertation adds to the literature which indicates that incentives matter. 
Student outcomes varied based on the metrics used to rate schools and educators. Using 
proficiency rates to assess schools resulted in a focus on students close to proficiency. Changing 
the incentives led to changed behavior and better outcomes for lower-performing students. The 
policy changes included (a) removing required consequences for failing to meet state-determined 
proficiency rates, (b) including value-add metrics to principal and teacher evaluation systems, 
and (c) having schools overseen by the district rather than the state. An additional incentive 
change which singled out individual grades led to schools providing students in those grades 
with special treatment while neglecting students in other grades. State policymakers had equity 
intentions, and this work points to the importance of aligning the metrics used to rate schools and 
educators with the intentions.  
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District Leaders 
The results from these analyses have implications for district leaders who share data with 
schools, and the conversations the GCPS research team had in response to these findings help 
illustrate those implications. The results across the analysis chapters indicate that the labels 
assigned to students on their benchmarks matter. It is clear from the TAIP documents that 
schools used the district-supplied test-score labels to identify students who would receive special 
treatment, meaning the labels matter because schools used them. It is unclear, however, if the 
students themselves responded to the labels in ways that affected their state test scores. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the research team talked about no longer assigning test score labels to 
students based on their benchmarks because it appeared those labels affected student outcomes. 
If the labels provide schools with no additional information beyond the raw score and might 
harm a group of students—especially low performers who need even more additional help—then 
why even share those labels? These are valuable conversations for district research teams to have 
about the purpose of providing student data to schools and how to help educators understand 
what the data do (and do not) say. 
Beyond the labels, the messages sent by the district also matter. In regards to TAIP funds, 
the district encouraged schools to target the interventions to the Priority students. Most schools 
did so, and the targeted students had better outcomes than the following year, when funds were 
not available. Yet schools targeted these students in ways that harmed the lowest-performing 
students. When presented with these results, a member of the GCPS research team responded, 
“so the good news is that the program worked, and the bad news is that the program worked.” 
That these results are both good news and bad news to the district highlights the complicated 
nature of this district initiative: they provided schools with a tool to micro-target students based 
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on the accountability system, but that led to schools taking resources away from low- and high-
performers. 
This reaction highlights another implication for district leaders. The research team 
originally created the Priority, Multi-Year Plan, and Enrichment labels for internal use to 
determine which schools should receive the additional TAIP funds. One of the superintendents in 
GCPS, however, heard about the labels and wanted all schools to focus on the Priority students 
before the state test. This led to the prescriptive labels being disseminated district-wide and 
schools being encouraged to offer TAIP interventions to Priority students. It makes sense that the 
superintendent wanted schools to focus on students closest to the proficiency line because the 
waiver accountability system held districts accountable primarily based on proficiency rates. But 
these prescriptive labels and subsequent encouragement to focus on Priority schools sent the 
message to schools that targeting bubble students was sanctioned by the district26. This illustrates 
district offices which had conflicting agendas in regards to how schools should use benchmark 
data. Prior research indicates that conflicting agendas at the district level has consequences for 
instructional improvement (Cobb, Jackson, Henrick, & Smith, 2018). Combined with the lack of 
guidance regarding how schools should design their TAIP interventions, these conflicting 
agendas likely contributed to the use of funds to facilitate triage. This highlights the importance 
of providing guidelines regarding interventions to ensure that students are not harmed by 
remediation provided to other students. If district leaders want schools to focus on students 
                                                          
26 Furthermore, the Priority label was clearly viewed as valuable by some schools; the GCPS research director 
reported that they had to turn off the Target Student Report (Appendix Figure B5) in the data warehouse in the fall 
of the 2013-14 school year because schools wanted to identify and target Priority students starting at the beginning 
of the following school year. 
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across the test score distribution, they need to communicate their vision of remediation with 
school leaders. 
Limitations 
 This dissertation provides insight into how schools in a large urban district used 
benchmark data during shifting accountability systems. The benefits of using a single district is 
the availability of rich contextual information regarding policies and practices. It is limited, 
however, in its generalizability to other urban districts. While many other districts have adopted 
benchmark testing systems similar to the one described here (Burch, 2010; Means et al., 2010), 
GCPS represents a unique case study because they shared prescriptive labels which specifically 
identified the bubble students and then offered TAIP funding to 29 schools to target Priority 
students. 
Because the waiver accountability system changed multiple incentives statewide 
simultaneously, it is difficult using this dataset to disentangle which incentives led to improved 
outcomes for low-performers. In addition, this dissertation compares two old accountability 
regimes: NCLB and the waivers offered to states in 2011. This state has had two more iterations 
of accountability policy implemented since the waiver. Furthermore, in 2015, Congress passed 
and President Obama signed a reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 
called the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), which replaces the states’ waiver accountability 
systems. While the accountability regimes have since changed, the new ESSA requires that states 
use multiple of indicators of academic achievement, and many of them use a combination of 
proficiency rates and value-add growth metrics.  
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Further Research 
 This dissertation offers a look into how schools responded to benchmark data across 
accountability systems and leads to multiple avenues for further research. The quantitative 
analyses were limited to looking for effects on student test scores, but the qualitative work 
provides a view into the effect of policies and programs on students that go beyond test scores. 
More work of this nature would be useful to provide a better sense of how these policies play out 
on the ground. Student attendance and discipline data are often available in quantitative datasets 
and could offer a broader perspective on the student experience. In addition, Chapter 2 found 
different outcomes for elementary and middle school students. The findings suggested that 
middle schools were more responsive to accountability incentives, but this is worth further study. 
For example, middle schools appeared to have focused on Basic students over Below Basic 
students during NCLB. Is that because middle school teachers hold different views on these 
students than do elementary schools, or did both sets of teachers try to focus on these students, 
but it is easier in middle than elementary schools? Examining differences in teachers’ attitudes 
and disaggregating quantitative analyses across school levels could help answer these questions. 
 This project found more consistent and stronger quantitative results in math than in 
reading, but the TAIP documents indicated that schools did not distinguish their interventions 
between the subjects. Were test scores different by subject because it is easier to “teach to the 
test” in math than in reading? Prior research indicates that state tests assess a smaller percentage 
of the math standards than reading standards (Jennings & Bearak, 2014), which may make it 
easier to behave strategically in math than in reading. This is worth further research. 
 The TAIP documents revealed that schools designed targeted interventions in a variety of 
ways. While these analyses could not quantify the effects of these different interventions, the 
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interventions were unlikely to be equally effective. Given the press to effectively remediate for 
students who are struggling, this project points to further research into how to structure 
interventions that are targeted to student need.  
This project was unique within the triage literature because it uses three different 
benchmark scores that schools had access to at different points in the school year. While the 
quantitative analyses simply substituted the new benchmark score for the old one, an open 
question is how schools use multiple pieces of data throughout the year. How do teachers and 
school leaders integrate new testing data with prior student information? In addition, it is worth 
exploring the cumulative effect of being labeled low- or high-performing on student outcomes. 
 Thinking about the cumulative effect of these benchmark labels also leads to questions 
regarding the effect of the benchmark data on students. Do students know their labels? Are they 
aware of their relative achievement level compared to their classmates? How does being told that 
they are “Below Basic” or “Advanced” influence students’ views of self and their motivation? 
Test scores are used to calculate the effect of these labels on these outcomes, but the practical 
effects on students are worth consideration. Interviews or focus groups with students would 
broaden the conversation to better understand how students are affected by being placed in 
interventions like these (or by being excluded from them). 
 This work indicates that schools responded to incentive changes that occurred when the 
waiver was adopted. As already noted, this work could not disentangle the effects of multiple 
policy changes that occurred simultaneously. Because other states tinkered with their 
accountability systems, both during the waiver and with the new ESSA, further research could 
separate the effects of different policy changes to identify which ones create perverse incentives 
and which benefit low-performers. 
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Conclusion 
Accountability has evolved since No Child Left Behind was implemented in 2003. The 
new ESSA system continues the trend of incentive shifts by adding additional indicators to 
school accountability ratings that may help paint a more complete picture of school quality than 
simply student test score results. When ESSA was signed into law in 2015, nearly one hundred 
researchers, educators, and policymakers signed an open letter to the Department of Education 
asking that the policy not require states to use proficiency rates to measure school performance  
because of the perverse incentives created by those metrics (Polikoff, 2016). If state 
policymakers want students to grow every year, do proficiency rates make sense for measuring 
school performance? Given these perverse incentives—and this dissertation’s contribution to the 
research which shows evidence that schools did in fact engage in triage—do the benefits of using 
proficiency rates outweigh the downside that this results in schools neglecting low and high 
students to focus on those close to proficiency?  
A member of the GCPS research team said they believed triage was being reduced in 
their schools in part because the accountability system for schools is so complicated that “they 
don’t know how to game the system anymore” (GCPS research team meeting). If a murky 
accountability system leads to more equitable behavior because a clear accountability system 
leads to a Campbell-like (1959) focus on the measured aspects of the work, policymakers must 
take this in to account when designing the metrics and incentives of accountability policy. This 
dissertation shows that schools are responsive to accountability incentives and points to a real 
opportunity for state policymakers when they design new systems. State policymakers should be 
aware of the types of perverse incentives in place and work to make the accountability system 
metrics align with the desired behaviors. 
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Figures 
Figure 18. Comparison of district-assigned prescriptive labels from Benchmark C with deciles of prior year state test 
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Figure 19. Comparison of district-assigned prescriptive labels with distance from proficiency on prior year state test. 
  
176 
 
Figure 20. Overlap between district-assigned prescriptive labels and prior year test performance 
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Appendix Table A1. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds during NCLB and waiver period, elementary schools math 
  Below Basic/Basic Basic/Proficient Proficient/Advanced 
Bandwidth 
(number of 
questions) 
 
2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 A
 T 
-0.018 -0.016 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.022 -0.002 0.006 0.008 0.016 -0.085 -0.029 0.007 0.002 0.004 
(0.034) (0.024) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017) (0.028) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.046) (0.036) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) 
                  
T x 
waiver 
-0.013 -0.011 -0.018 -0.019 -0.020 -0.022 -0.002 -0.013 -0.015 -0.016 0.057 -0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.005 
(0.027) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.045) (0.038) (0.035) (0.032) (0.030) 
                  
Obs 8645 11627 13686 15080 15372 8153 11203 13780 15706 16805 3380 4832 6477 7867 8854 
R2 0.453 0.471 0.488 0.506 0.511 0.458 0.491 0.523 0.547 0.563 0.419 0.455 0.486 0.511 0.532 
                 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 B
 T 
-0.043 0.022 0.017 0.033 0.040* -0.054 -0.027 -0.025 -0.009 -0.000 0.033 -0.008 0.005 -0.018 -0.025 
(0.035) (0.027) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.033) (0.024) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.046) (0.034) (0.029) (0.026) (0.024) 
                  
T x 
waiver 
-0.048 -0.040 -0.041 -0.046 -0.045 -0.007 -0.022 -0.013 -0.025 -0.029 0.027 0.055 0.042 0.046 0.037 
(0.032) (0.030) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.037) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
                  
Obs 6595 8883 11049 12610 13946 7317 10243 12979 15148 16317 3963 5573 7156 8689 9861 
R2 0.406 0.427 0.454 0.472 0.493 0.427 0.464 0.503 0.536 0.549 0.436 0.476 0.505 0.536 0.552 
                 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 C
 T 
-0.010 0.004 0.007 0.023 0.033 -0.084** -0.048* -0.045* -0.041* -0.037* 0.020 -0.002 0.000 0.010 0.020 
(0.040) (0.031) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.031) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.040) (0.029) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) 
                  
T x 
waiver 
-0.048 -0.052 -0.066* -0.071** -0.068** -0.012 -0.023 -0.032 -0.037 -0.025 0.005 0.025 0.031 0.034 0.032 
(0.036) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) 
                  
Obs 5916 8050 10083 11839 12993 7169 9814 12384 14590 15919 4540 6265 7968 9555 10753 
R2 0.394 0.426 0.467 0.496 0.508 0.418 0.456 0.504 0.545 0.565 0.451 0.486 0.525 0.554 0.577 
 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. “T” represents the discontinuity in outcomes for students who received the higher of the two labels. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the school by grade by year level. All models condition on student covariates (race, ethnicity, FRPL, ELL, and disability status), 
school covariates (log enrollment, prior year’s percent proficient in math, percent of school that is black, Hispanic, white, FRPL, ELL, and has a disability), 
grade by year fixed effects, and school fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table A2. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds during NCLB and waiver period, middle schools math 
  Below Basic/Basic Basic/Proficient Proficient/Advanced 
Bandwidth 
(number of 
questions) 
 
2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 A
 T 
-0.011 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.008 0.004 0.019 0.014 0.026* 0.028* 0.050 0.019 0.024 0.020 0.019 
(0.023) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.023) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.029) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) 
                  
T x 
waiver 
0.023 0.016 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.005 -0.017 -0.033* -0.037** -0.036* 0.022 0.001 -0.018 -0.023 -0.026 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
                  
Obs 22409 30078 35580 38849 40883 18829 26184 33241 37674 39724 8867 12490 16332 20065 22079 
R2 0.402 0.426 0.450 0.469 0.482 0.453 0.487 0.521 0.537 0.542 0.394 0.438 0.477 0.515 0.533 
                 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 B
 T 
-0.014 -0.001 0.006 0.017 0.018 -0.010 0.024 0.036** 0.039*** 0.036** 0.059* 0.028 0.029 0.021 0.025 
(0.024) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.020) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.026) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) 
                  
T x 
waiver 
-0.026 -0.032* -0.032* -0.032* -0.031* -0.013 -0.031* -0.044*** -0.038** -0.036** 0.036 0.021 0.024 0.011 0.006 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
                  
Obs 18740 25621 31482 35405 37423 20159 27630 33934 38279 40518 11818 16597 21288 24799 26273 
R2 0.394 0.425 0.458 0.484 0.501 0.467 0.498 0.526 0.541 0.547 0.460 0.496 0.527 0.552 0.568 
                 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 C
 T 
0.049* 0.052** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.049*** 0.018 0.002 -0.002 0.006 0.013 0.023 -0.005 0.000 0.008 0.012 
(0.022) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.025) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
                  
T x 
waiver 
-0.038* -0.059*** -0.058*** -0.064*** -0.067*** -0.029 -0.024 -0.029* -0.030* -0.032* -0.022 -0.000 0.014 0.015 0.011 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
                  
Obs 16540 22588 28244 32310 34647 17838 24686 31124 35989 38794 12668 17422 22034 26061 27766 
R2 0.404 0.436 0.473 0.491 0.502 0.423 0.463 0.507 0.536 0.554 0.461 0.505 0.540 0.572 0.589 
 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. “T” represents the discontinuity in outcomes for students who received the higher of the two labels. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the school by grade by year level. All models condition on student covariates (race, ethnicity, FRPL, ELL, and disability status), 
school covariates (log enrollment, prior year’s percent proficient in math, percent of school that is black, Hispanic, white, FRPL, ELL, and has a disability), 
grade by year fixed effects, and school fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table A3. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds during NCLB and waiver period, elementary schools reading 
  Below Basic/Basic Basic/Proficient Proficient/Advanced 
Bandwidth 
(number of 
questions) 
 
2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 A
 T 
0.019 0.026 0.015 0.020 0.031 -0.006 -0.002 0.010 0.012 0.015 0.056 0.032 0.010 0.010 0.013 
(0.043) (0.031) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.023) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.042) (0.031) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) 
                  
T x 
waiver 
0.014 -0.003 0.007 -0.008 -0.018 0.030 0.013 0.016 0.022 0.017 -0.034 -0.024 -0.008 0.002 0.001 
(0.037) (0.033) (0.030) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.034) (0.030) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) 
                  
Obs 4470 6238 7819 9417 10914 6436 8804 11158 13466 15199 4331 5859 7251 8527 9763 
R2 0.402 0.417 0.436 0.459 0.480 0.397 0.444 0.488 0.534 0.569 0.402 0.448 0.488 0.516 0.540 
                 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 B
 T 
0.022 -0.009 -0.004 0.008 0.026 -0.020 -0.016 -0.023 -0.020 -0.021 -0.043 0.017 0.024 0.030 0.029 
(0.047) (0.033) (0.027) (0.024) (0.023) (0.031) (0.023) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.036) (0.026) (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) 
                  
T x 
waiver 
-0.034 -0.019 -0.024 -0.040 -0.042 -0.001 -0.005 0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.071* -0.070** -0.048 -0.057* -0.059* 
(0.034) (0.030) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.026) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.032) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
                  
Obs 4794 6595 8304 9897 11142 6705 9322 11855 13961 15693 4675 6492 8136 9607 10734 
R2 0.369 0.408 0.437 0.474 0.491 0.411 0.453 0.505 0.549 0.582 0.440 0.473 0.505 0.540 0.557 
                 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 C
 T 
0.023 0.003 0.013 -0.001 0.013 0.025 0.030 0.021 0.017 0.008 0.019 -0.004 0.030 0.035 0.037 
(0.050) (0.034) (0.029) (0.026) (0.024) (0.032) (0.023) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.038) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) 
                  
T x 
waiver 
-0.023 -0.040 -0.040 -0.022 -0.028 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.007 -0.021 -0.017 -0.023 -0.031 -0.024 
(0.037) (0.032) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) 
                  
Obs 3796 5347 6823 8303 9670 6679 9272 11767 14067 15420 4584 6122 7605 8987 10212 
R2 0.426 0.434 0.451 0.474 0.495 0.414 0.450 0.506 0.558 0.584 0.455 0.489 0.516 0.542 0.560 
 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. “T” represents the discontinuity in outcomes for students who received the higher of the two labels. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the school by grade by year level. All models condition on student covariates (race, ethnicity, FRPL, ELL, and disability status), 
school covariates (log enrollment, prior year’s percent proficient in reading, percent of school that is black, Hispanic, white, FRPL, ELL, and has a disability), 
grade by year fixed effects, and school fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table A3. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds during NCLB and waiver period, middle schools reading 
  Below Basic/Basic Basic/Proficient Proficient/Advanced 
Bandwidth 
(number of 
questions) 
 
2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 A
 T 
0.005 -0.019 -0.007 0.003 0.009 -0.003 0.005 0.011 0.014 0.016 0.004 -0.003 0.002 0.012 0.009 
(0.032) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.025) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) 
                  
T x 
waiver 
-0.027 -0.023 -0.013 -0.024 -0.029* -0.021 -0.021 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.001 0.003 -0.005 -0.001 0.002 
(0.021) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
                  
Obs 11059 15362 19461 23331 27118 17170 23724 29763 35527 40333 10663 14790 18507 22017 25382 
R2 0.390 0.414 0.431 0.454 0.480 0.448 0.481 0.522 0.559 0.587 0.427 0.472 0.508 0.535 0.557 
                 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 B
 T 
-0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.019 -0.014 -0.023 -0.013 -0.016 -0.017 0.001 -0.006 0.002 0.016 0.015 
(0.028) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.025) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
                  
T x 
waiver 
0.015 0.007 -0.000 -0.016 -0.019 0.022 0.017 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.016 -0.002 -0.004 -0.015 -0.020 
(0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
                  
Obs 10881 15094 19140 22700 26057 17492 24178 30548 36285 40686 11284 15501 19347 23112 26578 
R2 0.378 0.405 0.429 0.451 0.470 0.447 0.491 0.527 0.564 0.595 0.447 0.485 0.514 0.543 0.566 
                 
                 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 C
 T 
0.035 0.027 0.020 0.035* 0.034* -0.033 -0.027* -0.021 -0.012 -0.011 -0.007 -0.005 -0.000 0.001 0.008 
(0.030) (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.024) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) 
                  
T x 
waiver 
-0.057* -0.042* -0.047* -0.050** -0.060** -0.010 -0.017 -0.017 -0.023* -0.026** 0.045* 0.055** 0.048** 0.038* 0.033* 
(0.024) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
                  
Obs 9633 13496 17302 21149 24413 18276 25153 31690 37475 42381 10901 14944 18629 22259 25544 
R2 0.436 0.455 0.477 0.503 0.514 0.454 0.494 0.540 0.577 0.611 0.448 0.486 0.521 0.551 0.569 
 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. “T” represents the discontinuity in outcomes for students who received the higher of the two labels. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the school by grade by year level. All models condition on student covariates (race, ethnicity, FRPL, ELL, and disability status), 
school covariates (log enrollment, prior year’s percent proficient in reading, percent of school that is black, Hispanic, white, FRPL, ELL, and has a disability), 
grade by year fixed effects, and school fixed effects. 
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Appendix Figure A1. Percent of students meeting proficiency and average outcome by benchmark rawscore, math 
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Appendix Figure A2. Percent of students meeting proficiency and average outcome by benchmark rawscore, reading 
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Appendix Figure A3. Histogram of number of questions answered correctly during NCLB and waiver, math 
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Appendix Figure A4.  Histogram of number of questions answered correctly during NCLB and waiver, reading 
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Appendix Table B1. Effect of Chapter 2 labels when using difference-in-differences models 
 Math  Read 
 
Benchmark 
B 
Benchmark 
C 
 
Benchmark 
B 
Benchmark 
C 
      
Below Basic -0.061*** -0.043***  -0.069*** -0.083*** 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.008) 
Below Basic x Waiver 0.071*** 0.047***  0.037*** 0.011 
 (0.010) (0.012)  (0.010) (0.013) 
Proficient 0.016* -0.014  -0.017** -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.006) 
Proficient x Waiver -0.044*** -0.030***  0.003 -0.014* 
 (0.009) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Advanced 0.001 0.004  0.046*** 0.070*** 
 (0.015) (0.014)  (0.011) (0.013) 
Advanced x Waiver -0.020 -0.039**  -0.007 0.006 
 (0.015) (0.014)  (0.014) (0.014) 
      
Observations 122518 123496  125501 125564 
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.75  0.77 0.77 
 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school by grade level. All 
models condition on student testing variables up to cubic polynomials and interactions between all the variables 
(prior year state test z-score; projected percentile; raw scores for Benchmarks A, B, and C, centered on proficiency), 
student demographics (race, ethnicity, FRPL, ELL, and disability status), school covariates (log enrollment, prior 
year’s percent proficient in that subject, percent of school that is black, Hispanic, white, FRPL, ELL, and has a 
disability), school fixed effects, and grade by year fixed effects.   
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Appendix Table B2. Consistency of Multi-Year Plan, Priority, and Enrichment labels across 
Benchmarks B and C 
Panel A. 
 Math Benchmark C 
  MYP Priority Enrichment No Label Missing 
M
at
h
 B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 B
 MYP 8,063 2,544 99 36 1,139 
Priority 1,184 6,205 1,400 58 1,083 
Enrichment 21 474 3,294 40 287 
No Label 10 100 112 57 12 
Missing 1,034 1,300 527 7 1,779 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Reading 
 
  
 Reading Benchmark C  
  MYP Priority Enrichment No Label Missing  
R
ea
d
in
g
 B
en
ch
m
ar
k
 B
 MYP 8,789 2,251 67 4 1,186 
 
Priority 1,466 5,330 1,326 21 1,130 
 
Enrichment 24 922 4,083 17 511 
 
No Label 1 43 36 7 6 
 
Missing 1,028 1,295 602 9 1,778  
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Appendix Table B3. Estimated discontinuities at Basic/Proficient threshold by TAIP funding and 2012-13, reading 
 Benchmark B Benchmark C 
Bandwidth (number of questions)  2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 
           
Proficient -0.006 -0.014 -0.012 -0.016 -0.015 -0.018 -0.012 -0.005 0.002 0.001 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Proficient x has TAIP -0.019 -0.016 -0.007 -0.003 -0.006 0.002 -0.001 -0.012 -0.014 -0.013 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Proficient x waiver 0.016 0.011 0.017 0.017 0.010 0.013 -0.004 -0.014 -0.016 -0.015 
 (0.024) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) 
Has TAIP x waiver -0.007 0.003 0.034 0.035 0.026 -0.008 -0.018 -0.011 0.007 0.001 
 (0.030) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.029) (0.026) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) 
Proficient x has TAIP x waiver  0.005 -0.010 -0.035 -0.030 -0.023 -0.025 -0.014 -0.008 -0.014 -0.016 
 (0.037) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.032) (0.028) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) 
Proficient x 2013 -0.034 -0.023 -0.027 -0.022 -0.012 -0.033 -0.011 0.003 0.004 0.002 
 (0.029) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.026) (0.023) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) 
Has TAIP x 2013 -0.042 -0.039 -0.059* -0.051* -0.044 0.007 0.024 0.006 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.035) (0.030) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.035) (0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) 
Proficient x has TAIP x 2013 0.060 0.067 0.085* 0.064* 0.056 0.031 0.011 0.018 0.013 0.013 
 (0.045) (0.037) (0.034) (0.032) (0.030) (0.040) (0.035) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) 
           
Observations 24197 33500 42403 50246 56379 24955 34425 43457 51542 57801 
R2 0.436 0.479 0.520 0.559 0.591 0.447 0.486 0.535 0.576 0.605 
 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school by grade by year level. All models condition on student 
covariates (race, ethnicity, FRPL, ELL, and disability status), school covariates (log enrollment, prior year’s percent proficient in reading, percent 
of school that is black, Hispanic, white, FRPL, ELL, and has a disability), grade by year fixed effects, and school fixed effects.  
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Appendix Figure B1. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds for math, 2011-12 coded as waiver 
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Appendix Figure B2. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds for math, 2011-12 dropped from analysis 
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Appendix Figure B3. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds for reading, 2011-12 coded as waiver 
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Appendix Figure B4. Estimated discontinuities at label thresholds for reading, 2011-12 dropped from analysis 
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Appendix Figure B5. Virtual data wall report used with Identification of Target Students document  
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Appendix Figure B6. Stylized version of Identification of Target Students matrix  
 
Note: Original Identification of Target Student matrix shown in Figure 2. 
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